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NOTES FROM THE EDITOR
Homeland Security Affairs (HSA) is pleased to present this special collection of essays in 
remembrance of the ten-year anniversary of September 11, 2001.  We chose to honor those who 
lost their lives that tragic day, as well as those whose lives were forever impacted, by reflecting 
on the homeland security lessons and achievements since 9/11 and the challenges that lie ahead.
The emergence of homeland security forced the United States to revisit, over the past ten years, 
some of its founding principles and social values in order to address tough security questions. 
What are the federal government’s constitutional responsibilities (and limits) to prevent, 
prepare for, respond to, and recover from events, versus those of state and local governments?  
What is the appropriate tradeoff between privacy, civil liberties, and security? In a free market 
economy, how do we engage businesses as active homeland security partners without heavily 
regulating industry? What are the definitions of war, a prisoner of war, enemy combatant, 
terrorist, and criminal and how do we bring these people to justice? What responsibilities do 
individual citizens have for their own safety and the security of their community? In the age of 
social networking, what is a community and what holds it together?
In assembling these essays, HSA invited the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s three 
Secretaries – current Secretary Janet Napolitano and former Secretaries Tom Ridge and 
Michael Chertoff – to reflect on homeland security’s past and future. HSA also asked 
Department of Defense Assistant Secretary Paul Stockton (the founding Director of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security) to pen an essay from the 
homeland defense point of view. We are grateful that all four accepted our offer.
In “Progress Toward a More Secure and Resilient Nation,” Secretary Napolitano states, “Our 
experience these past ten years also has made us smarter about the kind of threats we face, and 
how best to deal with them.” Her essay focuses on the strategy of local hometown security as a 
key to making our communities and the nation safer in the future. Napolitano argues that, “ … 
more and more often, state, local, and tribal law enforcement officers – and their community 
partners – are best positioned to uncover the first signs of terrorist activity.” 
Secretary Ridge reminds us, in his essay “Never Any Doubt: A Resilient America,” of the dangers 
of complacency and that “ten years is enough time to know that in the next ten years, the fight 
will still be with us.” He also reminds us that as new threats surface, our tools, policies, and 
security strategies must continue to evolve. “Because after taking fifty years to win the Cold War,  
while we emerged as the lone superpower, we were also left with a stockpile of weapons, tactics, 
and diplomatic relationships that were of little utility in the new security environment.”
In “9/11: Before & After,” Secretary Chertoff provides an overview of the “new legal architecture 
for counterterrorism” which required a refashioning of US laws and processes “focused on three 
elements of the counterterrorism process: intelligence collection, information integration, and 
terrorist incapacitation.” His analysis includes observations on the legal challenges that 
homeland security presents in preventing attacks, sharing information and bringing terrorists to 
justice.
Assistant Secretary Stockton’s essay, “Ten Years After 9/11: Challenges for the Decade to Come,”  
is an invitation to practitioners and academics to work in partnership with the Department of 
Defense to build on the far-reaching progress that has already occurred since 9/11. Stockton 
identifies two areas that require specific attention: defense support to civil authorities and “a 
little-known but vital realm of preparedness: civil support to defense.” 
HSA also invited faculty from the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense 
and Security (publisher of HSA) to reflect on areas related to their research and teaching. The 
ten essays presented here provide insight to a broad array of domestic, international, 
technological, economic, academic, and social topics that influence how we live and govern. 
More importantly, the faculty essays help us better understand opportunities for increased 
security over the next decade. 
In “Does Homeland Security Exist Outside The United States?” Nadav Morag contends 
“Homeland security is a uniquely American concept. It is a product of American geographic 
isolation and the strong tendency throughout American history to believe that there was a clear 
divide between events, issues and problems outside US borders and those inside US borders.” In  
answering the question, he examines how other countries have organized their security policies, 
strategies, and plans.
John Rollins provides a transnational perspective on how the US approaches homeland security. 
As US economic, political, social, and environmental interests become more global, so have 
security threats. Rollins believes “the US no longer has the geographic or economic luxury of 
approaching security issues from a domestic or international perspective. Regardless of where a 
threat emanates from, today’s security professionals need to recognize, respond, and appreciate 
the near- and long-term transnational implications of risks facing the nation.” 
One security component that was the focus of much scrutiny following 9/11 is the US 
intelligence and information sharing system. In “Domestic Intelligence Today: More Security 
but Less Liberty?” Erik Dahl discusses the reshaping of the US intelligence system over the past 
ten years and argues, “that even though we as a nation decided not to establish a domestic 
intelligence organization, we have in recent years done just that….” His overview concludes that 
while progress has been made, “… the development of a vast domestic intelligence structure 
since 9/11 has moved the balance [between security and liberty] quite firmly in the direction of 
more security, but less liberty.”
Adaptable, creative, risk-taking, and innovative are words that are used to describe 
entrepreneurs, especially in the technology sector. They are also words that could be used to 
describe al-Qaeda during the past ten years. Rodrigo Nieto-Gómez looks at the innovation 
process that drives the technology sector and how the convergence of technology made 9/11 
possible. He also explores the difficulties that technology convergence poses for homeland 
security professionals. “This retrospective distortion creates a security ecosystem where 
homeland security practitioners feel pressured to try to ‘connect the dots’ every time, instead of 
adapting to an environment of emerging patterns and mutating dots that cannot be connected.”
“If there is any advantage to being at war, it is that it creates conditions for exploring new 
knowledge and gathering disparate players around the flagpole for support.”  Stan Supinski’s 
essay, “Security Studies: The Homeland Adapts,” examines the development of homeland 
security education since 9/11 and the influences that have helped to shape its evolution. 
Supinski highlights some key challenges that remain to be addressed in order for homeland 
security to achieve academic maturity.
The essay by Susan Page Hocevar, Erik Jansen, and Gail Fann Thomas is an example of 
the maturing of homeland security as an academic area of study. “Inter-Organizational 
Collaboration: Addressing the Challenge,” demonstrates how scholars have become 
engaged in theoretical work that can provide the basis for new homeland security 
policies, plans and organizational arrangements. The authors’ work focuses on 
identifying factors that contribute to effective inter-organizational collaboration and the 
factors that inhibit collaboration. This is an area that has proven to be one of the most 
critical challenges for the homeland security community. 
Sam Clovis brings education into the homeland security discussion using a different argument. 
“My intent is to call the attention of my homeland security colleagues to the idea that public 
education reform must be part of any serious discussion about national or homeland security.” 
Clovis argues, “A better-educated citizenry will be less dependent on government and more 
independent in times of crisis … will be more attentive to issues and challenges at the state and 
local level and more engaged at the national level … will cost less in public funding and will 
contribute more to the public coffers.”
In “How Proverbs Damage Homeland Security,” Chris Bellavita discusses twelve proverbs – or 
accepted truths – that have characterized the homeland security narrative. He contends that in 
the haste to establish a homeland security enterprise and create new policies and strategies, 
many homeland security proverbs may be inaccurate and “distort the homeland security 
narrative in a way that inhibits the search for more effective ideas to protect the nation.” 
Bellavita sees an opportunity over the next ten years for academics and strategists “to take 
another look at the basic assumptions underpinning our homeland security narrative, and 
identify evidence that supports or refutes the proverbs used to guide strategic direction.”
In, “The Post-Tragedy ‘Opportunity-bubble’ and the Prospect of Citizen Engagement,” Fathali 
Moghaddam and James Breckenridge examine the opportunities that exist for leaders to 
mobilize the public immediately following a tragic event. “Although great crisis will inevitably 
invite consideration of many alternatives, leadership must pay special attention to opportunities 
to engage the public as capable partners in their country’s response to the crisis – calling upon 
them as citizens with civic duties, as well as rights.” 
Future generations of Americans will inevitably view 9/11 as a historical event and time period 
much like the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the Vietnam War era. However, 9/11 brought about 
significant changes to the country and American’s daily lives. These changes are the subject of 
James Wirtz’s essay, “The Last Days of Summer.”  “Instead of remaining an ‘extraordinary’ 
activity,” Wirtz suggests, “homeland security in the United States is becoming part of everyday 
life because it is slowly but surely improving the ability of federal, state, local and tribal agencies 
to prevent and respond more quickly and effectively to all sorts of threats and incidents.”
Homeland security is still a work in progress and we as a nation are still working through many 
important issues that touch on who we are as a nation. One of the true benefits of homeland 
security is that America gains strength through the process of debating answers, solutions, and 
options. The essays in this special issue provide perspective on the ongoing national homeland 
security dialogue.
Progress Toward a More Secure and Resilient Nation
Janet Napolitano
A  decade has now  passed since the tragic 
attacks of 9/11,  when terrorists exploited our 
nation’s aviation  system  to kill  nearly  3,000 
innocent  men, women, and children, 
including citizens of more than 90 countries.
Today, as we approach  the tenth 
anniversary  of 9/11,  there is no question  that 
America  is stronger and more secure than we 
were a  decade ago. We have bounced back 
from  the worst  attacks ever on  our  soil,  and 
have made progress on every  front to protect 
ourselves.
In  late July, I released a  report outlining 
the significant  progress the Department  of 
Homeland Security  (DHS)  and our  many 
partners have made in  fulfilling specific 
recommendations by  the 9/11  Commission  to 
make our  nation stronger, safer, and more 
resilient. 1
The report  details the great strides we 
have made over  the last decade to secure our 
nation  against  a  terrorist  attack or  other 
disaster, to protect our  critical  infrastructure 
and cyber  networks, and to engage a  broader 
r a n g e o f A m e r i c a n s i n t h e s h a r e d 
responsibility for our security. 
Our  experience these past  ten years also 
has made us smarter  about  the kind of 
threats we face, and how  best to deal with 
them. We have used this knowledge to make 
our  nation  and communities more resilient, 
not only  to terrorist  attacks,  but also to 
threats and disasters of all  kinds,  while 
safeguarding the fundamental rights of all 
Americans.  
But  there should be no doubt: serious 
threats from  terrorism  remain. Terrorism  did 
not begin  on  9/11, nor  did it end with  the 
death  of Osama bin Laden. Today’s terrorist 
threats are real and rapidly  evolving.  They 
demand our constant vigilance. And they 
demand our willingness to learn and adapt.
While defending  against  this evolving 
threat  is the founding  mission  of DHS, no 
federal  agency  – or any  part  of government – 
can, by  itself,  deliver  security. Perhaps more 
than  at  any  point  in  our  nation’s history,  we 
share in  this responsibility. And this has 
broad implications for  how  we will continue 
to work with  our  partners to keep our  country 
safe and secure.
EVOLVING THREATS
The terrorist  threats facing  the United States 
have evolved significantly  over  the last 
decade,  and continue to evolve. In  addition  to 
the direct  threats from  al Qaeda, we also face 
growing  threats from  other  foreign-based 
terrorist  groups that are inspired by  al 
Qaeda’s ideology, but that  have few 
operational  connections to the core al Qaeda 
group. 
We face a  threat  environment  where 
violent  extremism  is neither  constrained by 
international borders nor  limited to any 
single ideology. Indeed,  one of the most 
striking  elements of today’s threat  picture is 
that  plots to attack America  increasingly 
involve American  residents and citizens, 
including individuals who may  be in  the 
United States and are  prepared to carry  out 
terrorist attacks with little or no warning.
Over  the past two years, we have seen al 
Qaeda-inspired terrorist groups seek to 
r e c r u i t i n d i v i d u a l s w h o a r e e i t h e r 
Westerners, or  have connections to the West, 
and who are unknown  to authorities. The 
increasingly  savvy  use of the Internet, 
m a i n s t r e a m  a n d s o c i a l  m e d i a , a n d 
information  technology  by  these groups adds 
an additional layer of complexity.
The fact  that these new  kinds of threats 
can  come from  any  direction,  and with  little 
or  no warning, changes much  of our thinking 
about  terrorism  prevention.  Of course, we 
need a  strong military  and top-notch 
intelligence to fight terrorism  abroad; the 
operation  that  led to Osama  bin  Laden’s 
death clearly demonstrates this. 
This essential international  dimension  to 
“homeland” security  ranges from  aviation 
and supply  chain  security,  to information 
sharing about  the latest  terrorist travel 
routes,  tactics,  and technologies.  Indeed,  the 
importance of international partnerships is 
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why  DHS has a  significant international 
presence – in  seventy-five different countries, 
the third largest  international  footprint of 
any US government agency.
We also, however, face threats from  within 
our  own borders.  As a  result, our  state, local, 
and tribal  law  enforcement officers,  our  first 
responders, and individual  citizens are often 
the first  to notice signs of potential  terrorist 
activity  in  their  communities.  And that  means 
we need every  part  of our  society  to be 
cognizant of the kinds of threats that  exist, 
and knowledgeable about common  sense 
steps to counter them.
BUILDING THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY HOMELAND SECURITY 
ENTERPRISE
For  the past  several  years, DHS and our 
partners have worked to develop and 
strengthen  the homeland security  enterprise 
to better  mitigate and defend against 
dynamic threats,  minimize  risks,  and 
maximize  the ability  to respond to and 
recover  from  attacks and disasters of all 
kinds.
This approach is based on  the simple but 
powerful premise that  homeland security 
begins with  hometown  security. 2  We are all 
now  stakeholders in  the effort  to keep our 
families and communities,  our  businesses, 
our  social networks, and our  places of 
meeting and worship secure and resilient. 
These insights have driven our  effort  to 
build critical features that  did not  exist  on 
9 / 1 1 ,  a n d w h i c h  a d d r e s s k e y 
recommendations of the 9/11  Commission. 
For  example,  we understand the critical 
importance of analyzing threat information  at 
the local level,  and then  sharing that 
information  wherever  it may  be relevant. 
That  is why  today  we have seventy-two 
recognized state and major-urban-area  fusion 
centers throughout the country. 
These fusion centers serve as focal points 
where information about threats can  be 
gathered,  analyzed, and shared among 
federal,  state,  local,  tribal, territorial,  and 
private sector  partners. Fusion  centers also 
support  and interact  regularly  with  FBI-led 
Joint Terrorism  Task Forces (JTTF),  which 
coordinate resources and expertise  from 
across the federal government  to investigate 
terrorism cases.
We also have greatly  expanded and 
enhanced the Nationwide Suspicious Activity 
Reporting Initiative,  which  trains state and 
local  law  enforcement to recognize behaviors 
and indicators related to terrorism, crime, 
and other  threats,  and standardizes how 
those observations are documented, 
analyzed,  and shared with  the FBI,  other law 
enforcement, and communities throughout 
the country.
We launched the new  National Terrorism 
Advisory  System  in April 2011,  replacing the 
outdated color-coded system  of alerts.  This 
new  system  delivers timely,  detailed 
information  about  terrorist threats to the 
p u b l i c ,  g o v e r n m e n t  a g e n c i e s ,  f i r s t 
responders,  transportation hubs,  and the 
private sector.
We are expanding  the “If You  See 
Something,  Say  Something™”  campaign. It is 
a  simple and effective program, first 
i m p l e m e n t e d b y  N e w  Y o r k  C i t y ’ s 
Metropolitan  Transportation  Authority, to 
raise public  awareness of indicators of 
terrorism, crime, and other  threats, and to 
emphasize the importance of reporting 
suspicious activity  to the proper  law 
enforcement authorities – from  federal 
buildings to transit  systems to major  sports 
and entertainment venues.
In  addition  to these measures,  we have 
taken  very  significant steps to facilitate the 
exchange of information  about  terrorists and 
criminals with  international partners; 
strengthen  airline passenger  pre-screening; 
enhance screening  for explosives; protect 
cyber  networks and critical infrastructure; 
bolster  security  of our  air,  land, and sea 
borders and identification documents; and 
ensure robust  privacy  and civil liberties 
safeguards.  
Additionally,  to help counter  the threat  of 
violent  extremism  in  our  communities,  DHS 
has trained more than  46,000 front-line law 
enforcement  professionals, and has worked 
with  hundreds of communities and local 
organizations over the last eighteen  months 
to implement  community-oriented policing 
strategies that  have been successful in  other 
crime-reduction efforts, such  as combating 
gang violence in places like Los Angeles. 3
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HOMETOWN SECURITY: A ROLE FOR 
ALL OF US
The elements of this new  homeland security 
enterprise are designed to support and 
complement  one another, and to protect 
privacy, civil rights,  and civil  liberties.  They 
reflect  the emerging reality  that  more and 
more often,  state,  local,  and tribal  law 
enforcement  officers – and their  community 
partners – are best  positioned to uncover  the 
first  signs of terrorist  activity.  Therefore, 
DHS has made a  priority  of getting 
information,  tools,  and resources out of 
Washington, DC,  and into  the hands of those 
on  the front l ines of keeping their 
communities safe. 
And growing evidence shows the 
tremendous role the public  can  play  in 
homeland security. According  to one recent 
outside analysis, from  1999  through 2009  a 
total of eighty-six  terrorist plots against 
Americans were foiled.  These were motivated 
by  a  range of ideologies, with  those linked to 
al  Qaeda  or  their  affiliates only  representing 
about half.  
What  is most  critical  to note,  and which 
often  does not  get  the attention  it  deserves, is 
that  information  that  originated with  the 
public is credited with  stopping  almost  one 
third of these plots. When you  add federal, 
state, local, and tribal law  enforcement,  more 
than  80 percent  of foiled plots came from  a 
combination  of old fashioned vigilance and 
c o o p e r a t i o n ,  i n f o r m a t i o n  s h a r i n g , 
community-oriented policing, and citizen 
awareness.4
In  many  ways,  this is not really  a new 
story.  America  has a long history  of 
communities playing  an  active role in their 
own  security,  and of responding  to new 
threats by  adopting  new  precautions. For 
decades,  we looked to civil defense and 
neighborhood watch  programs as elements of 
our  own protection. And in  the early  years of 
the Cold War, Americans all knew  where the 
closest fallout shelter  was, and we kept 
children  indoors when polio outbreaks were 
the biggest threat to public health. 
The threats we have seen emerging  over 
the last  few  years require us to be nimble and 
forward leaning.  We ought  to be alert,  not 
alarmed, and that  requires us to engage in 
regular discussion about preparedness and 
response to the threats a  particular 
community  may  face.  Building  secure 
hometowns across the country  requires each 
of us as individuals – and also as parents, 
business owners,  or  community  leaders – to 
play a role. 
Indeed, all of us can  learn more about the 
signs or indicators of potential  criminal or 
terrorist  planning,  and say  something  to the 
proper  authorities if we see something out  of 
place. It  was a  street  vendor  who tipped off 
police to the Times Square bombing  attempt 
in  2010.  In  January  2011, alert city  workers 
in  Spokane,  Washington  reported a 
suspicious backpack and,  in  doing  so, 
thwarted what almost certainly  would have 
been  a  deadly  bombing  along the Martin 
Luther King Day parade route. 
We can  practice safe cyber  habits 
whenever we are online, and also share and 
teach  them  to our  children. This is especially 
relevant  in  the wake of several major 
breaches and phishing  attacks that have 
targeted consumers and the public.  
And we can  all take the basic steps to be 
ready  for  an  emergency,  including  making  a 
plan  for  reuniting with  family  in  a  crisis.  We 
need only  look at  the deadly  tornadoes,  and 
the flooding and wildfires many  communities 
have endured this year  to understand the 
value of preparedness.
Today, hometowns across the country  are 
working together,  building  a  strong 
foundation  for  a  secure and resilient 
homeland.  Because of these  efforts, and those 
of our  men and women on  the front lines and 
our  dedicated counterterrorism  and 
emergency  management professionals,  we 
are stronger than we were on 9/11.
We will  never be able to seal our  country 
under a  glass dome to prevent  future terrorist 
attacks or  disasters.  But  we can continue to 
do everything  possible to minimize the 
possibility  that  such  an  attack  will succeed, 
and maximize our  ability  to respond 
effectively. Protecting the  nation  is a  shared 
responsibility  and we all  have an  important 
role to play.
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9/11:  Before and After
Michael Chertoff
WHERE WERE WE?
Until  September 11,  2001,  the United States 
had limited experience with  terrorist  attacks 
on  our own  soil,  and only  intermittent 
experience with  attacks overseas.  During the 
1970s and 80s,  airline hijackings and 
overseas bombings were the focus of most 
terrorist  activity.  In  1993, violent  Islamist 
extremists bombed the World Trade Center, 
causing six  deaths and more than a  thousand 
injuries, but  failing  to significantly  damage 
the structures themselves. During  the next 
decade,  several domestic focused Islamist 
terrorist  plots were foiled at  the planning 
stage; however,  additional attacks were 
conducted overseas,  by  operatives of 
Hezbollah  killing  US service personnel in 
1996  at the Khobar  Towers complex  in  Saudi 
Arabia, by  al Qaeda  bombing  of US embassies 
in  East  Africa  in  1998,  and the attack  on the 
USS Cole near  Yemen in 2000. The most 
deadly  attack domestically  during the 1990s 
was the Oklahoma  City  bombing,  carried out 
by  Timothy  McVeigh,  an  anti-government 
extremist.
All  of these attacks and attempts were 
addressed through  the existing  criminal 
justice system.  Under  that  legal architecture, 
the Foreign  Intelligence Surveillance Act  and 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act,  as well as a  host  of other 
statutes and regulations,  governed domestic 
intel l igence col lect ion. Exchange of 
information  collected by  foreign  and 
domestic agencies was determined by  a  strict 
set  of rules that was (perhaps somewhat 
incorrectly) interpreted as forbidding  pure 
“intelligence” information  from  being 
collected for  law  enforcement purposes,  and 
– conversely  – made it difficult to share 
criminal  justice-derived information  with 
other  agencies.  When terrorists were 
apprehended either  in  the United States or 
abroad, they  were accorded the treatment  of 
any  other  criminal  defendant, including 
receiving  warnings about  the right  to silence, 
and a full-blown criminal jury trial.
The attacks of September  11, 2001  and the 
consequent  retrospective investigations – 
such as the 9/11 Commission Report – 
exposed the inadequacy  of this architecture 
in  addressing and thwarting  further  attacks. 
The inability  to coordinate information 
collection  and integration  among  various 
agencies led to the failure to identify  patterns 
of behavior  that  might have provided warning 
of attack. Rules designed to govern  electronic 
surveillance in  the days of fixed land-line 
communications were difficult  to apply  to 
communications media such  as mobile, 
disposable telephones or  voice over  internet 
communications. And even when  terrorists 
were identified and apprehended, difficulties 
in  providing  evidence admissible  in 
traditional  courtroom  proceedings left 
authorities with  few  avenues to detain  or 
incapacitate them.
For  the fundamental lesson was this: a 
counterterrorism  architecture that is founded 
o n  c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e p r i n c i p l e s i s 
fundamentally  oriented to punishing  those 
who have plotted or  carried out  attacks.  But 
with  the danger  to innocent life posed by 
modern terrorism, prevention and not 
punishment  becomes the critical driver  for 
counterterrorism.  And that  required 
refashioning our legal tool set.
This refashioning focused on  three 
elements of the counterterrorism  process: 
inte l l igence co l lec t ion , in format ion 
integration,  and terrorist  incapacitation.  The 
first  refers to how  we can better  collect 
information  in  real  time within  the context  of 
modern  global communication, travel, and 
finance.  The second focuses on  how  we can 
b e t t e r  c o m b i n e a n d i n t e g r a t e t h a t 
information  once collected. And the third 
addresses how  we can  act  on that information 
to incapacitate terrorists at  the earliest  stage 
before they can advance their operations.
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WHERE ARE WE?
Intelligence Collection 
In  the wake of the attacks of September  11, 
the Bush Administration worked with 
Congress to update some of the rules 
governing  interception  of electronic 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n d t o s t r e a m l i n e 
information  requests. The USA  PATRIOT 
Act,  passed overwhelmingly,  updated 
electronic  surveillance rules to allow  warrants 
to intercept individuals even when they 
frequently  changed phones,  and to grant 
access to Internet  communications on  the 
same basic  terms as applicable to traditional 
telephone communications.
Somewhat  more controversial was the 
implementation of regulations designed to 
collect routine traveler  and financial 
information. During  the past  decade, the 
United States government  implemented US 
VISIT,  a  program  that  captures fingerprints 
from  all  foreign travelers entering  the United 
States. The government  also exerted its right 
under the Chicago Aviation  Convention  to 
collect  from  the airlines commercial travel 
data  relating  to inbound travelers.  This kind 
of data  proved crucial in  identifying high-risk 
travelers who are connected with  known or 
suspected terrorists.  Based on  these “red 
flags,”  aviation  and border  security  officials 
can  now  take a  closer  look at  these travelers 
from  among the millions who cross our 
borders each day.
The legality  of these efforts has never  been 
seriously  challenged under  US constitutional 
or  statutory  law.  European  data  protection 
officials,  however, resisted the use of 
commercial data  on  the grounds that it 
invaded the privacy  of European  travelers 
under European  laws. The clash  between 
international law  giving  the US the right  to 
vet  all incoming  air  travelers and European 
law  seeking  to cloak the privacy  of those 
travelers threatened to cause disruption  in 
the air  industry. Fortunately  this was averted 
for  the time being through  a  US-European 
Union agreement  that  set  an  acceptable 
framework  to accommodate security  and 
privacy concerns.
A  similar  legal impasse arose from  US 
government  efforts to collect  information 
from  the so-called SWIFT  system, an 
interbank network that exchanges global 
financial transactions every  day. Government 
collection of this data under  legal process 
allowed quick identification of suspicious 
movement  of funds that might  be used to 
support terrorist  operations. This was 
precisely  the type of smart intelligence 
collection advocated by  the 9/11  Commission. 
In  2006, however, the New  York  Times  chose 
to reveal  the existence of the SWIFT 
collection program, thereby  not only  giving 
warning to terrorist  financiers but provoking 
another  privacy  dispute with  European 
authorities.  Ironically, as even  the Times 
acknowledged, the legal underpinnings of the 
SWIFT  program  were not open  to serious 
question.
Perhaps the most  controversial change in 
collection architecture arose from  a  dispute 
over  the legality  of an  electronic surveillance 
program  directed at intercepting  certain 
international communications. The conflict 
was resolved by  the passage of the FISA  Act 
Amendments,  which  provided the US 
government  with  additional  procedures and 
specific limitations to collecting  information 
and intelligence from  foreign  terrorists and 
their  affiliates located outside of the United 
States. 
Information Integration  
Perhaps the most well  known  finding  of the 
9/11  Commission  was the missed warning 
signs that arose from  a  “failure to connect  the 
dots”  of individual intelligence items.  This 
failure arose from  institutional and cultural 
obstacles within  the intelligence agencies, but 
also from  a  legal approach  to the relationship 
between  law  enforcement  and intelligence 
collection that  built  a substantial barrier  to 
information  sharing.  The PATRIOT Act 
amended the law  to dramatically  lower  the 
legal  barrier  to sharing,  and to create a 
presumption  of sharing  rather  than  an 
inhibition  against  sharing.  Ironically,  a  later 
court  decision  by  the FISA  Court  of Review 
established that  the previous interpretation 
of the FISA  restriction on information 
sharing  was unduly  stringent, and reflected 
an  overly  cautious approach  to the legal 
requirement.
Little  legal  controversy  has arisen  in  the 
United States over  information sharing, 
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although  cultural  barriers within  the agencies 
remain,  most recently  demonstrated by  the 
failure to integrate warning  information of 
the would-be 2009  Christmas bomber,  Umar 
Farouk Abdulmutallab.  European  views on 
information  sharing  remain dramatically 
different, however,  with  a  strong bias against 
allowing integration of information  from 
individual  databases. For  this reason, 
American and European officials have 
engaged in  lengthy  negotiations over the 
years about how  willing the latter  are to share 
biographic  and biometric  data  even about 
individuals who are known  criminals or 
terrorists. This information is not simply 
beneficial  to the United States. Using  known 
information  about individuals,  such as travel 
information, is an  essential tool for detecting 
potentially  dangerous individuals associated 
with  terrorism  and transnational criminal 
activity. Despite the differences between  the 
US and European  officials, information 
sharing agreements involving  travel 
information  and methods of payment exist 
today  and incorporate appropriate privacy 
protect ions for  indiv idual personal 
information. As a  result, the US has been  able 
to enforce our  border  and immigration  laws 
by  disrupting,  denying  and dismantling 
terrorist  travel  as well as human  trafficking 
and drug smuggling  networks seeking  to 
enter our nation.
Incapacitation
The most controversial elements of the new 
legal  architecture for  counterterrorism  arise 
from  the question  of how  to incapacitate 
someone apprehended here or  overseas as a 
terrorist.
For  the first  several  years after  the 
September  11  attacks,  Congress took  no 
action to address the issue of incapacitation, 
as it had done with  the issues of intelligence 
collection and sharing through  the PATRIOT 
Act. The question of detention  and 
punishment  evolved within  the Executive 
Branch. Alongside the customary  criminal 
justice architecture,  the Bush  Administration 
established a  military  commission  structure, 
drawing upon the historical  model of military 
commissions that  were impaneled during  the 
Civil War  and the Second World War and its 
aftermath. Military  commissions – applicable 
only  to non-US citizens – were designed to 
mete our  punishment for  the laws of war  in 
the same way  that  the civilian  justice system 
had punished terrorists for  violating  civilian 
laws.
Neither the courts nor  the commissions, 
however,  had a clear  mechanism  for 
detaining  operatives who were terrorist 
threats before they  were charged with  a  crime 
and punished. Such detention  was available 
for  those in the civilian  system  after  charges 
were leveled,  but that  process required 
willingness to proceed to a  trial in  relatively 
short  order. Especially  for  those caught  on 
the battlefield overseas,  where admissible 
evidence might  be difficult  to assemble, 
beginning  the criminal justice process was 
impractical.  Moreover, civilian  arrest  and 
charging  triggered the right  to silence,  which 
frustrates the process of questioning for 
intelligence gathering, which  was a  primary 
objective when capturing terrorists.
Under these circumstances, the Bush 
Administration  asserted the right  to detain 
and hold enemy  belligerents without  trial  or 
even  military  commission  in  line with  the 
traditional authority  of the military  to hold 
prisoners in wartime.  What  was unclear  in 
the initial  stages of the conflict  in  Afghanistan 
was exactly  what procedural mechanisms 
would be made available to assure those held 
were, in  fact, affiliated with  terrorists, and 
how  this would mesh  with  various procedures 
mandated under the Geneva Convention.
Over  the subsequent  ten  years,  the 
evolution  of the detention and incapacitation 
process has been  ad hoc,  if not  at  times 
chaotic.   Contrary  to conventional  wisdom  – 
indeed, conventional myth  – the Bush 
Administration  did not simply  push  all 
suspected terrorists into the military  system. 
Generally, the Administration  charged 
Americans and those captured on  American 
soil in  the civilian  criminal justice system. 
Only  two individuals apprehended in  the 
United States were detained as military 
belligerents; each of these was eventually 
charged and convicted in  US civilian  courts. 
On the other  hand,  non-Americans 
apprehended overseas were generally 
detained in  military  facilities (including 
Guantanamo), and some began  to be charged 
o r p r o c e s s e d t h r o u g h  t h e m i l i t a r y 
commission system.  Thus,  the Bush 
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Administration  in  practical terms deployed 
both  civilian  and military  legal  systems to 
handle issues of detention, with  a  rough 
presumption  that those apprehended in the 
US and American citizens would be 
addressed through  the former,  and those 
non-citizens captured overseas would be 
addressed through the latter.
What  was far  less settled was the review  to 
be afforded to those non-citizens held in 
military  custody.  Congress’ failure to 
establish  a  process, and the Defense 
Department’s restrictive approach  to detainee 
rights, provoked ever  more vigorous judicial 
review  and eventual ly  a  s ignif icant 
overturning  of parts of that  system. While the 
Supreme Court affirmed the fundamental 
right  of the president  to detain  and hold 
enemy  belligerents during hostilities,  the 
Court  eventually  granted at least detainees in 
Guantanamo some legal  latitude to challenge 
the bases for their  confinement  by  filing 
habeas corpus petitions in  federal court. 
When  Congress finally  engaged in  2007 
through  the Military  Commissions Act, the 
Congressional  effort  to limit this review  was 
struck down  by  the Court.  As a  result, the 
exact  scope of review  for  detainees in 
Guantanamo – let  alone elsewhere – remains 
murky.  A recent  survey  of individual cases 
suggests that  the government  prevails in  the 
vast majority of challenges to date.
The advent  of the Obama  Administration 
was widely  expected to herald a  sea  change in 
the approach  to detention.  After  the 
president on  his first  day  declared his intent 
to close Guantanamo, advocacy  groups 
eagerly  anticipated a return to the pre-9/11 
legal  architecture for  detention, operating 
exclusively  through the criminal justice 
system.  Early  returns suggested this change 
would occur, and the announced decision by 
Attorney  General Eric Holder  to try  Khalid 
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coconspirators in federal court in  New  York 
was the apogee of this movement. But  strong 
resistance – and perhaps a strong dose of 
reality  triggered by  the near  success of the 
2009  Christmas Day  bomber  – began  to 
reverse direction. Over  the last year, the 
Obama  Administration  has indicated that  the 
9/11  conspirators will be tried in  military 
commissions, and while other  terrorists have 
been  tried in  civilian  courts,  that mixed 
approach  is largely  consistent with  the 
p r a g m a t i c a p p r o a c h  o f t h e B u s h 
Administration. Perhaps most  notable  as a 
symbolic reversal,  however, is the continued 
vitality  of terrorist detention  at  Guantanamo, 
a  practice that  is likely  to continue in the 
f u t u r e g i v e n  s t r o n g  C o n g r e s s i o n a l 
prohibitions against  bringing  Guantanamo 
terrorist detainees into the United States.
However  inelegantly  evolved,  the current 
legal  structure for  incapacitating  terrorists 
seems a  rough compromise between  security 
and civi l  l iberties concerns, and is 
distinguished by  a  remarkable  degree of 
continuity  between the Bush  and Obama 
Administrations.  The executive branch’s 
authority  to detain enemy  belligerents has 
been  affirmed by  both  presidents,  and by  the 
Supreme Court.  Some court review  is 
afforded those held in the United States and 
in  Guantanamo, but  the rules of that review 
remain indistinct  and uncertain.  Military 
commissions are funct ioning  under 
somewhat  more generous ru les for 
defendants,  but  no case has yet worked itself 
through the process. And legal  adviser 
Harold Koh  – who as dean of Yale Law 
School was an outspoken  critic of the Bush 
Administration  counterterrorism  policy  on 
civil  liberties grounds – has recently  issued a 
full throated defense of the president’s right 
to order the killing of terrorists overseas. 
WHERE SHOULD WE BE?
Although  the legal architecture governing 
intelligence collection has adapted to new 
technologies in  the last  ten years,  new 
challenges emerge.  As cyber  crime and 
“hacktivism”  increase in  frequency  and 
consequence, the government’s ability  to 
monitor  in  real time for  malicious code and 
similar  cyber  hacking  tools is constrained by 
real uncertainty  about  the legal effects of the 
rules for  electronic  communications 
surveillance. If the malicious code is buried in 
the flow  of Internet  packets that delivers the 
stream  of communication,  does that mean 
those packets can  only  be scanned under  the 
re lat ively  str ingent  rules governing 
interception  of communications? Or does the 
fact  that  the scanning  is undertaken at  the 
packet  level mean  surveillance rules should 
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not apply,  since  malicious computer 
instructions rather  than  intel l igible 
communications are being sought? Sorting 
this legal  conundrum, with  far-reaching 
implications for  both security  and freedom  of 
the Internet,  is one of the overpowering  legal 
challenges confronting us today.
By  contrast,  information  sharing  is on 
firmer legal footing  in  the United States.  Here 
the continuing  effort will be to resolve 
ongoing  disputes with  the European  Union, 
which  has reopened the controversy  over 
American  use of inbound airline passenger 
commercial data.
Finally,  and most unsettled,  are the legal 
rules that  will govern  detention  of terrorist 
suspects.  The current structure,  fashioned 
case by  case though  the courts, leaves many 
questions unresolved. Issues of burdens of 
proof, what kind of evidence is admissible 
and what  proof is sufficient,  await definitive 
answers. Only  Congress has the institutional 
capability  and authority  to fashion  a 
comprehensive procedure for  reviewing  these 
cases that balance practical  security  concerns 
and fundamental fairness. Unless the 
administration  and the legislators find the 
time and will  to address these issues, 
uncertainties in  our  legal framework for 
detention  will  result in  a  system  that  is less 
than  optimal from  both  security  and liberty 
standpoints.
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Never Any Doubt: A Resilient America
Tom Ridge
On September  10,  2001, most Americans 
were feeling  good about their  place in the 
world as a  strong,  unchallenged nation  with  a 
strong, expanding economy.  
The ugliness and brutality  of terrorism 
was viewed as an  unseemly  part of the 
modern  world.  With  the exception  of 
Oklahoma  City  and the 1993  World Trade 
Center  bombing, such  incidents occurred 
“over  there”  – beyond our  borders. We were a 
superpower, enjoying a  standard of living 
unequalled in  the world,  with  friends to the 
north  and south  and oceans to the east  and 
west. We were safe,  secure,  and many 
concluded, immune from such horrific acts.  
It was absolutely  unimaginable then that  a 
small  group of individuals,  with  limited 
funding, regardless of the intensity  of their 
hatred,  could conceive and execute an attack 
that  could result  in  a  catastrophic  loss of life 
and economic devastation  of hundreds of 
billions of dollars.
The attacks of 9/11  left the country 
stunned and in  grief, but as I look back over 
the last  ten  years,  it  is abundantly  clear  that 
America  was, is, and always will be an 
undeniably resilient nation.
We went  from  the bent knee of prayer  to a 
battle plan, and have become a  better, 
stronger  nation  for  everything  we have 
achieved.
In  a  decade's time,  we strengthened our 
intelligence assets and partnered with  allies 
and friends. We captured and killed terrorists 
and destroyed safe havens in  Afghanistan  and 
around the globe. 
We undertook  one of the biggest  change 
management  challenges of our time with  the 
reorganization  of the federal  government. We 
stood up a  new  department, Homeland 
Security,  combining twenty-plus agencies 
and 180,000-plus people. Federal, state and 
local  authorities re-positioned as the country 
embraced an  emotionally  charged and 
strategically  driven national  mission.  We did 
so with  an  eye toward the safekeeping of our 
civil  liberties,  our  Constitution and the 
integrity of the American brand.
We improved preparedness and response 
capabilities and established layers of security 
throughout  our aviation  system.  We 
embedded new  technologies at our  borders 
and deployed fingerprint-based screening 
and radiation  portal monitors at our  ports of 
entry.  In  light  of the new  security  threat,  we 
were compelled to think  and act  anew, and 
we did.
With  public and private sector leadership 
and investment,  we are more secure.  But we 
remain a target nonetheless. 
What  we know  now  more than  ever  is that 
over  the course of ten  years,  the threat 
remains strong  and continues to change. We 
have thwarted some attacks,  but  we have also 
been  fortunate that  a  few  others have simply 
failed.
As we close one vulnerability,  we should 
anticipate that  terrorists will  adapt  and seek 
out another.  They  are patient, strategic  actors 
and before them  lays a  map of the world and 
a  centuries-old ideology  of hate and 
intolerance that  we resoundingly  reject  in  the 
Western world.
This is a  multi-generational  threat, and 
war. And for  that  reason, we must  always 
view  security  as an  ongoing  process,  not  an 
endpoint. A  deliberative process, not  a 
breathless reaction  to all conceivable threats, 
is required at all times.
In  that regard,  it  is helpful to view  the 
threat  of terrorism  in  the context  of another 
threat  we faced in  the latter  half of the 20th 
century  – when two super  powers armed with 
thousands of nuclear  weapons had a  very 
serious staring contest.  
It was a  time during which  we built  the 
strongest economy  in the world, advanced 
the cause of civil and human  rights at  home 
and abroad,  and demonstrated that our 
political and economic system  could deal 
with  that  very  real threat  to our  way  of life 
while our  citizens continued to enjoy  and to 
promote the freedoms that  are at  America’s 
very foundation.  
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We should have equal confidence in  our 
ability  to do the same in  the twenty-first 
century.  
But  also,  we must be committed to making 
sure that we have all  of the tools and 
resources we need at  our  disposal.  Because 
after  taking  fifty  years to win  the Cold War, 
while we emerged as the lone superpower, we 
were also left  with  a  stockpile of weapons, 
tactics,  and diplomatic relationships that 
were of little utility  in  the new  security 
environment. 
Adapting  to this threat  environment takes 
commitment.  It  takes collaboration.  It  takes a 
willingness to recognize and overcome what 
might  be the single greatest threat in  the fight 
again  terrorism  – one that  affects all of our 
actions by  not  affecting  action  at  all. 
Complacency.
When reporters ask me what  worries me 
most, they  expect  me to say  a nuclear  event 
or  a  bio-agent.  Those potential  scenarios 
worry  me,  yes. But  the important  thing  in  my 
mind is that  we continue to see the world 
through a 9/11 lens. More so, a 9/12 lens. 
On September  12,  2001  we were grieving, 
but we had a  sense of unity  and an  aggressive 
state of determination  – that  the perpetrators 
of the attack  would come to justice and that 
we would take every  step,  every  measure, 
every  opportunity  to make this country  and 
its people more secure.
Every  day,  we have learned a  little more. 
Every  day,  more people are working  together 
to find security  solutions and identify 
vulnerabilities.  But every  day, we get  a  little 
farther away from the tragedy.
So we have to be willing to look  over  our 
shoulders, and let  the images and feelings of 
an  unspeakable and intolerable tragedy 
motivate us.  We also must be mindful  that 
terrorists do not  rest,  so neither  can we. We 
cannot underestimate the appeal of their 
belief system  and their  willingness to be 
patient  in  bringing  the broader  world to 
accept  that bel ief system.  We have 
wristwatches, but  they  have time. That  means 
that  in  spite of the significant progress we 
have made, much work remains to be done.
We have strengthened information 
sharing  in  country  and among  allies and 
friends, but  we still  saw  an attempted 
Christmas Day  bomber  come very  close to his 
goals due to overt  and repeated information 
not  being shared.  This began  with  the 
bomber’s own  father  expressing concern  to 
authorities that  his son  had been radicalized. 
We need to create a culture  of intelligence 
sharing  where everyone feels empowered to 
hit the send button, to share more, not less.
We have bolstered communication 
technologies,  but  after  hearing  of the 
heartbreaking  difficulty  first  responders on 
9/11  had in  speaking  to each  other  with 
outdated equipment and disparate  channel 
frequencies,  an  interoperable broadband 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s s y s t e m  r e m a i n s 
undelivered. If the tragedy  of 9/11, the 
specific recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission  and the sustained pleas of 
police, firemen, and emergency  service 
professionals cannot  generate federal support 
for such a network, then what will it take?
We have instituted an  entry  system  to 
validate who comes into the country, but 
have not  created an  exit system  that ensures 
these same visitors leave and do not  exploit 
an  as-yet unfinished system. The technology 
exists but  Congress has not  kept  pace.  It  is 
likely  therefore that  we have people among  us 
who have overstayed their  visas.  Where are 
they  now  and what  are they  doing? Where is 
the sense of urgency needed to address this?
I t  would be easy  to c i te  a l l  the 
vulnerabilities we have yet to address and the 
9/11  recommendations we have yet  to meet. 
But  as I know, Secretary  Chertoff knows,  and 
Secretary  Napolitano knows, achieving  these 
and other  goals requires the navigation  of a 
federal  system  where urgency  does not  come 
e a s i l y  w h e n p o l i t i c s , b u d g e t s , a n d 
bureaucracy are involved.
As citizens, we are entitled to have 
expectations of our  government relative to 
our  security.  What  we cannot  expect  is that 
the government  can create a  fail-safe,  risk-
free environment.  That perhaps has been  a 
n o t i o n  t h a t m a k e s m a n y  p e o p l e 
uncomfortable. But  ten  years on from  9/11, 
we simply  must be prepared to accept  the fact 
that  no matter  how  hard we try,  another 
attack is likely.
Trying to determine what scenarios pose a 
threat  to the United States is like trying  to 
find a  needle in  a haystack. The solution,  as 
we have found out,  is to remove much  of the 
haystack from  the needle.  But that does not 
mean  that  we must  treat  every  person  as a 
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potential terrorist or  that  every  possible 
scenario must be explored. 
Risks are ever  present  and cannot  be 
eliminated. They  must  be managed. Priorities 
have to be set and trade offs must  be made. 
That  means we have to balance how  much 
security is enough with our fiscal realities.
D o w e s p e n d b i l l i o n s d e f e n d i n g 
commercial airlines against  shoulder-fired 
missiles,  or  do we invest  in nuclear  detection 
technology  to inspect the 20  million cargo 
containers shipped to our  ports? Do we 
appropriate the money  to complete the US-
VISIT system  or  do we give states more 
money  for  equipment  and training? Do we 
choose among adding more layers of security 
at  chemical  sites, addressing  a  different 
security  risk in  mass transit,  or  channeling 
that  investment  to a  national health  or energy 
security priority? 
The needs and wants are limitless. 
Resources are not.  So we must  manage the 
r isk  careful ly  and judiciously.  That 
responsibility  is great  and complex. And ten 
years later, it doesn’t get any easier. 
One of the biggest news stories of the year, 
one that  capped a  decade of emotion, was the 
killing of Osama Bin  Laden. What we 
immediately  understood,  even  long before it 
happened, was that  despite  the fact he was 
brought  to justice, his death  didn't mean 
much  to the threat we continue to face. As 
Benazir  Bhutto once advised: "You  can 
imprison  a  man but  not  an  idea.  You  can  exile 
a  man,  but not  an  idea. You  can kill a  man, 
but not  an  idea." Bin  Laden is gone, but  the 
ideology lives on in others.
The images of home videos of bin  Laden 
demonstrated that  he was just  one guy.  Just 
one man – sitting  in  his easy  chair, flipping 
the remote control,  worrying about the gray 
hairs in  his beard,  frustrated when  he'd flub 
the lines of his own scripts – those videos of 
warning we used to see.  He was just a  guy. 
Not much  of a  warrior. No super-human 
mystique about him. 
But  it  only  took that  one guy  and a  few 
believers. Likewise,  it  only  took one time,  one 
difficult September  morning,  for  America  to 
understand that the world has changed and 
we must change with it. 
Ten  years is not  a  lot of time,  but  it  was 
enough  time to begin. It  was enough  time to 
commit ourselves to a  new  fight  and 
underscore an  America  we have long since 
known. Ten  years is enough  time to know 
that  in the next ten  years,  the fight will still be 
with  us. It  will go on.  But  we will  go on  with 
it,  as a  stronger and more secure country, as 
the resilient and freedom-loving  people we 
have always been, and as a  nation  that will 
always remember  those we lost one 
September day. 
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Ten Years After 9/11: Challenges for the Decade to Come
Paul Stockton
One of the best ways to honor  those who 
perished on 9/11  is to rededicate ourselves to 
finding,  and fixing, the gaps in  preparedness 
that  still confront  our nation. Over  the past 
decade,  the Department of Defense (DoD) 
has greatly  improved its ability  to support  the 
federal  departments and agencies that  lead 
US preparedness against  terrorism  and 
natural hazards.  Yet,  significant challenges 
remain in our  ability  to provide such defense 
support  to civil authorities.  Still  greater 
shortfalls are emerging in  a  little-known but 
vital realm  of preparedness:  civil support  to 
defense.  
This essay  begins by  examining two gaps 
in  DoD support to civil  authorities.  The first 
is DoD support  to the Federal Emergency 
M a n a g e m e n t A g e n c y  ( F E M A ) f o r 
catastrophes more severe than  Hurricane 
Katrina.  The second gap is that  of defense 
support  to the civilian  law  enforcement 
departments and agencies that lead the 
prevention of terrorism in the United States.  
I will then flip the familiar  construct  of 
defense support  to civil authorities upside 
down,  and explore the crucial roles that 
civilian  agencies – and the private sector  – 
can  play  to support  the Department  of 
Defense. I will argue that  DoD is increasingly 
dependent  on domestic  infrastructure beyond 
the department’s control, and that this 
infrastructure may  be at growing  risk of 
attack.  I will  also argue that only  through  new 
forms of civil-military  cooperation  can  DoD 
ensure its ability  to execute its core missions, 
at  home and abroad.  I hope that  the shortfalls 
highlighted below  will become part  of the 
research  agenda for  graduate students and 
faculty,  and a  focus for  the community  of 
practice in  homeland defense and security 
that  is one of the greatest  achievements of the 
past decade.  
DEFENSE SUPPORT TO CIVIL 
AUTHORITIES
Complex Catastrophes
The Department  of Defense is well prepared 
to support  the Department  of Homeland 
Security  (DHS), FEMA  and other federal 
departments and agencies in  responding  to 
“normal disasters”  – that  is,  hurricanes, 
wildfires,  and other  events of typical 
magnitude, that  most often  spur  governors to 
request federal assistance or prompt  the 
federal  government to position  resources in 
anticipation  of need. Of course, there are 
opportunities to improve our preparedness 
for normal disasters.  Thanks to the 
leadership of the state governors, we are 
making  progress across a  broad range of 
issues in  defense support  for disaster 
response, especially  in  strengthening unity  of 
effort  between  state and federal military 
response forces.1
The National  Level Exercise 2011  (NLE 11) 
highlighted the need to strengthen  our 
preparedness for  events worse than normal 
disasters – disasters even more severe than 
Hurricane Katrina.  NLE 11  was based on  a 
scenario that  began  with  a  magnitude 7.7 
earthquake along  the New  Madrid fault.  An 
earthquake of that magnitude occurred in 
1812; a  similar  one could strike at  any  time. 
The destructive effects could be far  greater 
than  two centuries ago, however.  The Mid-
America  Earthquake Center  notes that if such 
an  event  were to take place today, “the 
consequences would be much  more 
significant and damage would be much  more 
severe in  terms of injuries and fatalities, 
structural  damage, and economic and social 
impacts.” 2  Indeed,  the resulting  devastation 
could so exceed the damage in normal 
disasters that these extraordinary  events 
should be classified separately  as “complex 
catastrophes.” 
Complex catastrophes differ from  normal 
disasters in two ways.  First,  the scale of 
destruction  is vastly  greater. Katrina  resulted 
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in  8,800 casualties,  primarily  (though  not 
exclusively)  in  Louisiana  and Mississippi.  An 
earthquake like the one described in  NLE 11 
could inflict  up to ten  times as many 
casualties across eight states and four  multi-
state FEMA  regions. 3  Localities and states 
near  the New  Madrid fault  have made 
r e m a r k a b l e p r o g r e s s i n  i m p r o v i n g 
preparedness for  such  an  event. Nevertheless, 
the magnitude of the destruction and need 
for  life-saving  capabilities would almost 
certainly  prompt governors to ask FEMA  for 
large-scale federal assistance – with  FEMA, 
in  turn, asking  DoD for  unprecedented levels 
of defense support.  Responding to those 
requests in  a timely  manner  could create 
complex challenges for  the department  in 
sourcing  the requested capabil i t ies , 
transporting them, and then  providing for 
their  reception, staging, onward movement, 
and integration  in a  severely  disrupted 
environment.
Second, as NLE 11  demonstrated,  complex 
catastrophes may  create cascading,  region-
wide failures of critical infrastructure, 
start ing with  the disruption  of the 
commercial electric  power  grid.   A  7.7  New 
Madrid earthquake would produce vastly 
greater  damage to the grid than  occurred in 
Hurricane Katrina  or  any  other  disaster  in  US 
history.4 The net  effect of physical damage to 
high-voltage transformers and other  hard-to-
replace components could be lengthy  power 
outages across numerous states, with  the 
potential for  post-quake rolling  blackouts 
also occurring in  Chicago,  the Eastern United 
States, and elsewhere.5
This loss of power could create cascading 
effects on  communications and other critical 
infrastructure. From  a  public safety 
perspective,  the most  immediate concern 
might  be the impact  on  municipal water 
systems, which  in  Memphis and most  other 
cities depend on  commercial  electric power to 
operate.  The loss of power  could jeopardize 
the availability  of drinking  water  from  those 
systems. Transportation  infrastructure could 
be degraded as well; gas and diesel fuel 
pumps,  for  example, depend on electric 
power  to function.  While many  hospitals and 
other facilities critical to disaster  response 
ef forts have backup diesel-powered 
generators, we anticipate few  will have 
sufficient fuel  on  hand to offset  power  outage 
lasting  weeks to months,  and that  companies 
responsible  for resupplying  them  could face a 
radical  mismatch between  supply  and 
demand.  
DoD is working today  with  FEMA  and the 
DHS National Protection  and Programs 
Directorate (NPPD),  as well as other  federal 
departments and agencies, to assess the 
lessons learned from  NLE 11  and better 
prepare for  complex  catastrophes. Doing  so 
will require innovative thinking  on  how  to 
strengthen  our  preparedness. Consensus will 
be easy  to reach on  key  foundations of our 
drive  for  greater  preparedness.  For  example, 
in  both complex  catastrophes and normal 
disasters,  the  Post-Katrina  Emergency 
Reform  Act  of 2006  (and the leadership role 
it  assigns to the administrator of FEMA) will 
continue to govern  response authorities and 
supported/supporting  relationships.  Other 
challenges of preparing  for  complex 
catastrophes could prove more difficult, 
however, starting with  the need for  better 
analysis of how  cascading  infrastructure 
failure could both  increase requests for 
federal  assistance, and make that  assistance 
much more difficult to provide.
Defense Support to Law 
Enforcement   
The most critical shortfalls revealed by  9/11 
were not in  disaster  response, but rather in 
terrorism  prevention.  Over  the past  decade, 
the Department  of Justice (DOJ),  the Federal 
B u r e a u  o f I n v e s t i g a t i o n  ( F B I ) , t h e 
Department of Homeland Security  (DHS), 
and other  federal,  state, local,  and tribal law 
enforcement  agencies have made great 
strides in  strengthening  US prevention 
capabilities.6  The efforts of DoD and its 
partners abroad have also weakened al-
Qaeda.  As President  Obama notes, “we have 
put  al-Qaeda  on the path  to defeat.”  7  The 
president  also notes,  however, that  “we 
continue to face a  significant  terrorist  threat 
from  al-Qaeda, its affiliates,  and its 
adherents.”8  This threat  includes efforts by 
al-Qaeda  to inspire individuals within the 
United States to conduct  their  own  attacks, 
and to disseminate plans on  how  to construct 
improvised explosive devices (IED).9  
Of course, the primary  DoD contribution 
to preventing  terrorism  against  the United 
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States has been  (and will remain) our 
operations abroad to disrupt, dismantle, and 
ultimately  defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliates. 
The department also takes very  seriously  its 
responsibilities for  homeland defense. In 
addition,  within  the United States,  DoD 
supports – within  the constraints set  by  the 
Constitution and other  US law  – its lead 
federal  partners in  their  law  enforcement 
efforts when they  request prevention-related 
assistance. Those requests may  grow  in  the 
future.  For  example, if terrorists were to 
launch  a campaign using IED in  the United 
States, DoD has technical  expertise from 
dealing  with  such  threats abroad that – 
consistent  with  US law  – could be used to 
help meet  requests for  assistance by  the FBI, 
DHS and other  law  enforcement agencies 
that would lead domestic  counter-IED 
efforts.   
President  Obama  has taken decisive steps 
to integrate US government prevention 
efforts more effectively.  The June 2011 
National Strategy for Counterterrorism  lays 
out the overarching goals, and the steps to 
achieve them,  that  the US government  will 
follow. 10  Presidential Policy  Directive 8 
(PPD-8), National  Preparedness,  further 
specifies how  the United States will  organize 
to meet the challenges of terrorism  and other 
key  hazards at home.  Among other  features, 
PPD-8  provides for  the creation of a  national 
preparedness system  that will  include a  series 
of integrated national  planning frameworks, 
covering  prevention, protection,  mitigation, 
response, and recovery. The frameworks – 
including prevention  – will be supported by 
an  interagency  operational plan that  provides 
a  detai led concept of operations; a 
d e s c r i p t i o n  o f c r i t i c a l  t a s k s a n d 
responsibilities; detailed resource,  personnel, 
and sourcing  requirements; and specific 
provisions for  the rapid integration  of 
resources and personnel.  PPD-8 also requires 
the DoD and other  federal departments and 
agencies to develop department-level 
operational  plans, as needed, to support  the 
interagency operations plans. 11
 The nation  has long  needed a  national 
prevention framework. Now, thanks to 
PPD-8, we will  soon have one.  PPD-8 sets out 
stringent deadlines for  the development of a 
national preparedness goal and the 
supporting  preparedness system. Building 
out the prevention  framework and the follow-
on  detailed operational plan  will also require 
innovative thinking  and new  approaches to 
strengthen  collaboration,  across the federal 
government  and among  federal,  state,  local, 
tribal, and private sector entities. 12 
CIVIL SUPPORT TO DEFENSE
The concept  of defense support  to civil 
authorities is widely  understood.  Less 
familiar but  increasingly  important  are 
opportunities for  civilian  agencies and private 
sector  support to defense.  Civilian  agency 
support  to DoD was very  much  in  evidence 
on  September  11, 2001.  Firefighters, 
emergency  managers,  and law  enforcement 
personnel from  Arlington, Virginia, and other 
surrounding  communities saved many  lives 
at  the Pentagon. We will always be grateful 
for  their  heroism. Their  support  that  day  also 
foreshadowed a  growing  challenge in  the 
post-9/11  era.   DoD is becoming ever  more 
dependent  on  capabilities provided by 
civilian  agencies and the private sector. Yet, 
those same capabilities are at  increasing  risk 
to cyber  attack and other  threats.  New  forms 
of civil-military  cooperation  are essential to 
meet the novel challenges of this era. 
The Defense Industrial Base
DoD has long depended on  the private sector 
to help arm  and equip the armed services. 
But in  the post-9/11  era, something 
important  has changed: the Defense 
Industrial Base (DIB) is under  cyber  attack 
every  day.  The July  2011  Department of 
Defense Strategy for Operat ing in 
Cyberspace notes 
Foreign cyberspace operations against US 
public and private sector  systems are 
increasing  in number  and sophistication. 
DoD networks are probed millions of times 
every  day, and successful  penetrations have 
led to the loss of thousands of files from  US 
networks and those of US allies and 
industry partners.13 
It is the responsibility  of the Department 
of Homeland Security  to protect  the nation’s 
critical infrastructure, and DIB is one of the 
eighteen  critical infrastructure sectors under 
the National  Infrastructure Protection  Plan. 
Given  the DoD’s particular  dependence on 
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the DIB, the need for  DoD and DHS to 
partner  with  this sector  against  the threats 
they face is especially crucial.  
Accordingly,  the two agencies are now 
working  closely  with  the DIB to increase  the 
protection  of sensitive information.  The DIB 
c o m p r i s e s t h e p u b l i c a n d p r i v a t e 
organizations and corporations that  support 
DoD through  the provision of defense 
technologies,  weapons systems, policy  and 
strategy  development, and personnel. To 
increase protection of DIB networks, DoD 
launched the Defense Industrial Base Cyber 
Security  and Information Assurance (CS/IA) 
program  in  2007.  Building  upon this 
program, DOD is working with  DHS to pilot a 
public-private sector relationship intended to 
demonstrate the feasibility  and benefits of 
voluntarily  increasing  the sharing  of 
information  about  malicious or  unauthorized 
cyber  activity  and protective cyber  security 
measures.14
Still to be determined is whether  and how 
the models of the DoD-DHS relationship 
with  the DIB might  be extended to other 
parts of the private sector  on which  DoD 
depends.  The DoD Cyber Strategy lays out 
some key  considerations in  this regard.  The 
S t r a t e g y  n o t e s t h a t  p u b l i c - p r i v a t e 
“partnerships will necessarily  require a 
b a l a n c e b e t w e e n  r e g u l a t i o n  a n d 
volunteerism, and they  will be built  on 
innovation,  openness,  and trust.”  In  some 
cases, incentives or other measures may  be 
necessary  to promote private sector 
participation. Efforts must also extend 
beyond large corporations to small and 
medium-sized businesses to ensure 
participation  and leverage innovation.” 15 
These efforts are only  just  underway, and will 
require intense dialogue and new  thinking on 
the part  of all of those in  this growing  realm 
of collaboration.
 Fortunately,  DHS and DoD have shared 
interests and a  strong  partnership in  this 
area.  Last  year, Secretaries Gates and 
Napolitano signed a memorandum  of 
agreement  laying  out  areas of joint 
cooperation in  cyber  security,  to ensure that 
scarce resources are applied to the highest 
priority  areas and to avoid unnecessary 
duplication of effort. 
Fort Hood and the “Insider Threat” 
DoD has traditionally  focused on  threats 
outside the perimeter  of our  military  bases. 
Our  adversary  now  seeks to exploit  that 
familiar  emphasis, and inspire attacks from 
within. Anwar  al Aulaqi of al-Qaeda  in  the 
Arabian Peninsula  is actively  recruiting  US 
military  personnel and other  radicalized US 
citizens to conduct  “lone actor”  attacks on US 
military  targets.  The author  of Inspire, an 
English  language magazine, intends to 
encourage and facilitate terrorist  attacks on 
the United States.  Al  Aulaqi  has been 
exhorting US sympathizers to conduct attacks 
similar  to that  which  occurred at  Fort  Hood 
in  November  2009: “This is because killing 
10  soldiers in  America  for  example,  is much 
more effective than  killing  100 apostates in 
the Yemeni military.” 16    
DoD is already  taking  a  range of internal 
measures to counter  this new  strategy.  For 
example,  military  facilities in  the United 
States now  benefit from  “active shooter” 
training programs that  will  enable their  force 
protection  personnel to counter  insider 
threats more effectively. The DoD Final 
Recommendations  of the Ft.  Hood Follow-on 
Review  identify  a  score of additional 
measures being  implemented at  military 
facilities nationwide to prevent  a  recurrence 
of the tragedy  that struck Ft.  Hood. 17  Other 
initiatives recommended in  the report, 
however, will  require longer-term  academic 
and policy research. 18 
The need for innovation  is even  greater  in 
those areas where DoD must  depend on 
civilian  departments and agencies to help 
DoD counter  insider threats.  Because DoD is 
generally  restricted from  collecting and 
storing  law  enforcement  information  on US 
citizens,  DoD must rely  on  civilian  agencies 
that  play  an  increasingly  important  role in 
the overall system  that  protects US military 
facilities.  As part of the Ft. Hood review, 
then-Secretary  Gates directed several  actions 
to improve DoD collaboration with  the FBI at 
the Joint  Terrorism  Task Forces.19  These 
ongoing  efforts will be particularly  effective 
in  the context of a  new, consolidated DoD-
FBI Memorandum  of Understanding  being 
developed,  aimed at  promoting systemic, 
s t a n d a r d i z e d i n f o r m a t i o n - s h a r i n g 
mechanisms and clarifying coordination 
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procedures as wel l as invest igat ive 
responsibilities between  DoD and FBI. DoD 
will also rely  on  FBI,  DHS and the other 
civilian  law  enforcement agencies with  which 
the FBI and DHS are networked to provide 
data  on  other domestic  threats to U.S military 
installations,  including  “lone actor”  attackers. 
Further, DoD, as part of its force protection 
efforts, is working  closely  with  state and local 
law  enforcement to recognize the indicators 
of a “lone actor”  threat and share suspicious 
activity  reports to prevent another  Fort Hood 
type of attack from  occurring.  As this novel 
threat  evolves, so too must  the mechanisms 
by  which  the FBI and other  civilian  law 
enforcement agencies will support DoD. 
Mission Assurance 
The cyber  threat to the DIB is only  part  of a 
much  larger  challenge to DoD.  Potential 
adversaries are seeking asymmetric means to 
cripple our force projection,  warfighting, and 
sustainment capabilities,  by  targeting  the 
critical civilian and defense supporting  assets 
(within  the United States and abroad) on 
which  our  forces depend.  This challenge is 
not limited to man-made threats; DoD must 
also execute its mission-essential functions in 
the face of disruptions caused by  naturally 
occurring hazards.20
Threats and hazards to DoD mission 
execution  include incidents such  as 
earthquakes,  naturally  occurring  pandemics, 
solar  weather  events, and industrial 
accidents, as well as kinetic or  virtual attacks 
by  state or  non-state actors. Threats can  also 
emanate from  insiders with  ties to foreign 
c o u n t e r i n t e l l i g e n c e o r g a n i z a t i o n s , 
homegrown terrorists,  or  individuals with a 
malicious agenda. 
From  a  DoD perspective,  this global 
convergence of unprecedented threats and 
h a z a r d s , a n d v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s a n d 
consequences,  is a  particularly  problematic 
reality  of the post-Cold War  world. 
Successfully  deploying  and sustaining our 
military  forces are increasingly  a  function  of 
interdependent supply  chains and privately 
owned infrastructure within  the United 
States and abroad, including  transportation 
networks,  cyber systems, commercial 
corridors, communications pathways,  and 
energy  grids. This infrastructure largely  falls 
outside DoD direct control.  Adversary  actions 
to destroy, disrupt,  or manipulate  this highly 
vulnerable homeland- and foreign-based 
infrastructure may  be relatively  easy  to 
achieve and extremely  tough to counter. 
Attacking  such “soft,”  diffuse infrastructure 
systems could significantly  affect  our  military 
forces globally  – potentially  blinding  them, 
neutering  their  command and control, 
degrading their  mobility, and isolating them 
from  their  principal sources of logistics 
support. 
The Defense Critical Infrastructure 
Program  (DCIP) under  Mission  Assurance 
seeks to improve execution of DoD assigned 
missions to make them  more resilient. This is 
accomplished through the assessment of the 
supporting  commercial  infrastructure relied 
upon  by  key  nodes during  execution. By 
building  resilience into the system  and 
ensuring  this support  is well maintained, 
DoD aims to ensure it  can  "take a  punch  as 
well  as deliver  one."21  It also provides the 
department the means to priorit ize 
investments across all DoD components and 
assigned missions to the  most critical  issues 
faced by  the department  through  the use of 
risk decision packages (RDP).22
The commercial power  supply  on  which 
DoD depends exemplifies both  the novel 
challenges we face and the great progress we 
are making  with  other  federal  agencies and 
the private sector.  Today’s commercial 
electric power grid has a  great  deal of 
resilience against the sort of disruptive events 
that  have traditionally  been  factored into the 
grid’s design.  Yet,  the grid  will increasingly 
confront threats beyond that  traditional 
design  basis. This complex  risk  environment 
includes:  disruptive or  deliberate attacks, 
either  physical or  cyber  in  nature; severe 
natural hazards such  as geomagnetic  storms 
and natural disasters with  cascading  regional 
and national impacts (as in  NLE 11); long 
supply  chain  lead times for  key  replacement 
electric  power  equipment; transition to 
automated control  systems and other  smart 
grid technologies without  robust  security; 
and more frequent interruptions in  fuel 
supplies to electricity-generating  plants. 
These risks are magnified by  globalization, 
urbanization, and the highly  interconnected 
nature of people,  economies,  information, 
and infrastructure systems.   
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The department  is highly  dependent  on 
commercial power  grids and energy  sources. 
As the largest  consumer  of energy  in  the 
United States,  DoD is dependent  on 
commercial electricity  sources outside its 
o w n e r s h i p a n d c o n t r o l  f o r  s e c u r e , 
uninterrupted power  to support  critical 
missions.  In  fact,  approximately  99  percent of 
the electricity  consumed by  DoD facilities 
originates offsite,  while approximately  85 
percent  of critical electricity  infrastructure 
itself is commercially owned.  
This situation  only  underscores the 
importance of our  partnership with  DHS and 
its work to protect the nation’s critical 
infrastructure – a mission  that serves not 
only  the national  defense but  also the larger 
national purpose of sustaining our  economic 
health and competitiveness.
DoD has traditionally  assumed that the 
commercial  grid  will  be subject  only  to 
infrequent, weather-related,  and short-term 
disruptions,  and that  available backup power 
is sufficient to meet  critical mission  needs. As 
noted in  the February  2008  Report of the 
Defense Science Board Task  Force on DoD 
Energy Strategy,  “In  most  cases,  neither  the 
grid nor  on-base backup power  provides 
sufficient reliability  to ensure continuity  of 
critical  national priority  functions and 
oversight of strategic missions in  the face of a 
long term  (several  months) outage.” 23 
Similarly, a  2009  GAO Report  on  Actions 
Needed to  Improve the Identification and 
Management of Electrical Power Risks  and 
Vulnerabilities  to  DoD Critical Assets  stated 
that DoD mission-critical assets rely 
primarily  on  commercial electric power  and 
are vulnerable to disruptions in  electric 
p o w e r  s u p p l i e s .24  M o r e o v e r , t h e s e 
vulnerabilities may  cascade into other  critical 
infrastructure that  uses the grid – 
communications, water,  transportation,  and 
pipelines – that, in  turn,  is needed for  the 
normal operation  of the grid, as well as its 
quick recovery in emergency situations. 
To remedy  this situation, the Defense 
S c i e n c e B o a r d ( D S B ) T a s k F o r c e 
recommended that DoD take a broad-based 
approach, including  a  focused analysis of 
critical functions and supporting  assets,  a 
more realistic  assessment  of electricity  outage 
cause and duration, and an  integrated 
approach  to risk  management that  includes 
greater  efficiency,  renewable resources, 
distributed generation,  and increased 
reliability. DoD Mission Assurance is 
designed to carry  forward the DSB 
recommendations. 
Yet,  for a  variety  of reasons – technical, 
financial, regulatory, and legal  – DoD has 
limited ability  to manage electrical power 
demand and supply  on  its installations.  As 
noted above, DHS is the lead agency  for 
critical infrastructure protection  by  law  and 
pursuant to Homeland Security  Presidential 
Directive 7. The Department of Energy  (DOE) 
is the lead agency  on  energy  matters.  And 
within  DoD, energy  and energy  security  roles 
and responsibilities are distributed and 
shared,  with  different entities managing 
security  against  physical,  nuclear,  and cyber 
threats; cost  and regulatory  compliance; and 
the response to natural disasters. And of 
course,  production and delivery  of electric 
power  to most DoD installations are 
controlled by  commercial entities that are 
regulated by  state and local  uti l i ty 
commissions. The resulting  paradox: DoD is 
dependent  on  a  commercial  power  system 
over  which it does not  – and never  will  – 
exercise control. 
Although  there are  steps DoD can and 
should take on its own to improve resilience 
and continuity  of operations, achieving  more 
comprehensive electric grid security  to 
ensure critical DoD missions is not 
something  DoD can  do alone. Meeting  and 
securing  the critical  electric power needs of 
DoD in  an  interdependent  and increasingly 
complex risk  environment  requires a  broad 
scope of collaborative engagement between 
government  and industry  stakeholders whose 
roles and responsibilities in  power grid 
security  and resiliency  are distributed and 
shared. 
DoD is collaborating  with  DOE, DHS, the 
Federal  Energy  Regulatory  Commission, and 
industry  representatives, namely  the North 
American  Electric Reliability  Corporation 
(NERC),  in these matters. For  example, DoD 
is planning  to develop a combined kinetic 
and cyber threat-based scenario for  the US 
electric power  grid.  This scenario could be 
tested by  DOE and others on  a regional scale 
throughout the country  and could produce 
data  to support the development of a  new 
system  "design basis" for  building additional 
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resilience in  the US electric power  grid.  The 
department is also working  with  the NERC 
on  a  case study  of a  military  installation for 
analysis,  paired up with  the local utility 
provider,  to determine what  can  be done in 
the short term  to mitigate electric power 
vulnerabilities and risks.  DoD will make the 
results of this analysis more broadly  available 
to DHS, DOE,  and the industry.  These efforts 
will help DoD achieve greater  energy  grid 
security  and resiliency  and help mitigate the 
risks to critical DoD missions from 
commercial power outages.  
DoD is making  organizational  changes and 
capability  improvements that  address electric 
power  reliability  and security  issues and that 
enable better  risk-informed decision-making 
and investments. In  January  2011,  DoD 
submitted a  report to Congress describing 
on-going  efforts to mitigate the risks posed to 
critical DoD missions by  extended power 
outages resulting  from  failure of the 
commercial electricity  supply  or  grid and 
related infrastructure.25  
In  the report, DoD identified risks to the 
infrastructure supporting  its key  missions 
and is working with  affected mission  owners 
to "buy  down" risk to an acceptable level. 
When  fully  implemented, risk  reduction 
courses of action  are aimed at  reducing  these 
risks to an  acceptable level for  DoD. DoD is 
conducting  a series of case studies to identify 
the policy  and technical issues associated 
with mitigating  long-term  electric power 
outages on  installations. DoD is also planning 
a n d c o n d u c t i n g  d e m o n s t r a t i o n s o n 
installations to create cyber-secure power 
systems with microgrids and other  smart  grid 
technologies to improve electric grid security. 
The Marine Corps Air  Ground Combat Center 
at  Twentynine Palms,  Cali fornia,  is 
implementing energy  eff ic iency  and 
alternative energy  initiatives to demonstrate 
how  microgrids will serve as an  important 
component of the smart grid.  
DoD established the Energy  Grid Security 
Executive Council (EGSEC) to oversee many 
of these initiatives.   The EGSEC brings 
together  experts and senior  executives from 
across DoD and from  DOE and DHS to focus 
on  ensuring the security  of the  electric  grid 
that  serves DoD.   The EGSEC focuses on  DoD 
energy  grid vulnerability  issues, the risk to 
critical missions created by  commercial 
p o w e r  o u t a g e s ,  a n d d e v e l o p i n g 
comprehensive mitigating solutions.  
We must identify  and acknowledge our 
vulnerabilities and make the right choices – 
in  collaboration  with our  strategic “partners” 
– to buy  down  our  collective risk to an 
acceptable and affordable  level in  an 
informed way  across the department. 
Determining how  best  to do that will require 
a  sustained analytic effort  and a  willingness 
to collaborate in  new  ways.  Driving  that 
process forward, in  the realm  of mission 
assurance and so many  others, would be a 
wonderful  way  to honor  those who perished 
on 9/11.
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Does Homeland Security Exist Outside the United States? 
Nadav Morag
Homeland security  is a uniquely  American 
concept. It  is a  product  of American 
geographic isolation and the strong  tendency 
throughout American history  to believe that 
there was a  clear  divide between  events, 
issues, and problems outside US borders and 
those inside US borders.  Among other 
things, the legal  and institutional tools with 
which  the United States is able to deal with 
threats outside its borders (in  the context  of 
what  is referred to as “national  security”) 
differ  markedly  from  those it  is able to 
employ  inside its borders. In  the aftermath of 
the terrorist  attacks on  September  11, 2001, 
American  leaders realized that  they  would 
need new  tools to deal with  large-scale 
terrorist  threats and yet  they  were 
constrained by  the Constitution,  legislation, 
and federalism. Consequently, they  largely 
could not  apply  tried and tested national 
security  tools and methodologies to the 
domestic arena. Homeland security  policies, 
institutions,  and methodologies thus 
developed to fill  this void between  what  the 
US could do overseas and what it was unable 
to do domestically.  The subsequent  inability 
to deal with  large-scale disasters, such  as that 
produced by  Hurricane Katrina  in late August 
of 2005, led to a broadening of the definition 
of homeland security  to include large 
significant  disasters,  major  public health 
emergencies,  and other  large-scale events 
that had the potential  to endanger  the 
citizenry,  economy,  rule of law, and the 
general functioning  of government and 
society.1
America’s sister  democracies around the 
world did not  undergo the dual shocks of 9/11 
and Katrina; thus,  these countries did not 
face situations of significant  social  or 
economic  chaos resulting  from  such  a  wide 
range of threats.  Some of them, like Israel 
and the United Kingdom, had to cope with 
significant terrorist threats while others,  such 
as Japan,  had to cope with  significant natural 
disasters,  but  none had to cope with  massive 
and unprecedented terrorist events and 
natural disasters in  the space of only  a  few 
years.  Moreover, countries such  as Australia, 
Canada,  Germany, France, the UK, Israel, 
Japan,  Italy,  the Netherlands,  and others had 
never  really  viewed domestic threats as 
qualitatively  different  from  overseas threats 
and were able to use tools – such  as the 
military  – both  externally  and internally 
(though,  of course,  not  in  precisely  the same 
way). Given  the above,  it  is not surprising 
that  the concept  of homeland security, as an 
integrative idea  that brings together  domestic 
preparedness, response,  and recovery  efforts 
with  respect  to threats ranging  from  large-
scale terrorism  to natural  disasters to 
pandemics (to name a  few)  was largely  alien 
to these countries.  It  is not  that  other 
democracies did not  prepare for, attempt to 
mitigate, respond to, and recover  from 
terrorism, natural disasters,  public  health 
emergencies,  threats to critical  infrastructure, 
and the like; it  is just  that  they  did not view 
all  of these activities as interlinked and part 
of a  common  effort  designed to head off and, 
failing  that, cope with  and recover  from 
events that could produce massive social and 
economic disruption.
With  the creation,  in  the United States,  of 
homeland security  as a  policy  framework and 
practitioner  and academic discipline during 
the course of the first  decade of the twenty-
first  century,  other  democracies took  notice 
and some began  to use the terminology  of 
homeland security  without, necessarily, 
understanding  its scope or  raison d’être. 
Most  countries have still  not  truly  come 
around to the idea  that  counter-terrorism, 
e m e r g e n c y  m a n a g e m e n t , c r i t i c a l 
infrastructure protection,  public health, 
combating  large-scale crime,  etc.  are part and 
parcel  of the same overall problem: that  of 
maintaining  social  and economic stability 
and governmental functioning  in  the face of 
events that threaten  to overwhelm  the 
capacity of government and society to cope.  
A  case in  point  is the United Kingdom. 
The UK is one of the most,  if not  the most, 
prolific  producer  of national and local 
governmental strategies.  It  has an  elaborate 
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and well-thought-out  counterterrorism 
strategy  known as CONTEST with four 
elements: Prevent,  Pursue, Protect  and 
Prepare.2  Counterterrorism, as used in  the 
UK, is a  broad policy  area  that  also includes 
maritime,  aviation  and border  security, 
critical  infrastructure protection,  and 
resilience but it  is not  entirely  equivalent to 
homeland security  both  because it does not 
address as broad a  range of functions and 
because it is focused on  preventing,  preparing 
for, responding to,  and coping  with, 
t e r r o r i s m .  L o n d o n  a n d o t h e r  l o c a l 
jurisdictions have also developed emergency 
management  plans based on  a three-tier 
incident  management system  (the tiers are 
referred to as gold, silver, and bronze)  that 
separate the strategic  functions from  the 
tactical and operational  ones.3  These 
response systems will  kick in  during  major 
terrorist  incidents as well as disasters (the 
UK suffers from  flooding  on  occasion),  but 
they  are not necessarily  seen  as integrally 
related to the counterterrorism effort.  
From  an organizational standpoint, a 
significant segment  of the homeland security 
enterprise is housed in  the Home Office, 
which  is the national-level department  that 
overseas aspects of the law  enforcement 
mission. Although  the UK’s regional and 
national police forces are administratively 
independent, the Home Office does have 
oversight and funding influence over  them. 
M o r e o v e r , t h e  c o u n t r y ’ s p r e m i e r 
investigatory  agency, the Serious and 
Organized Crime Agency  (SOCA) is under  the 
direct purview  of the Home Office.  The 
domestic intelligence mission,  carried out by 
the British  Security  Service (MI5),  is also 
under the authority  of the Home Secretary. 
Finally,  border  security  (the UK Border 
Agency  operates under  the auspices of the 
Home Office) and immigration  are also 
w i t h i n  t h e H o m e O f f i c e ’ s r e m i t .4 
Nevertheless,  functions such  as those carried 
out by  the Federal Emergency  Management 
Agency  (FEMA) and housed within  the US 
Department of Homeland Security  are  not 
within  the scope of Home Office operations. 
Moreover, at  the state level,  most homeland 
security  agencies in  the United States have a 
large emergency  management  component 
and many  also include a  public health 
component (though  public health  is primarily 
a  local  governmental  function  in  the United 
States) and all of these do not  exist in  any  one 
institution  in the UK.  In  short,  in  terms of 
doctrine,  policy, and organization,  the UK 
does not view  counterterrorism  and 
emergency  management  (not  to mention 
other elements of the homeland security 
enterprise)  as part  of a  common  operational 
sphere.
At the other end of the spectrum  lies 
Canada,  influenced as it is by  its proximity 
and historic relationship to the United States. 
Canada  has moved closer  to the US model of 
a  homeland security  enterprise. Canada’s 
national security  policy  (the reader will  note 
this is national security  more broadly, as 
opposed to just homeland security) 
incorporates the disc ip l ines of law 
enforcement,  intelligence,  emergency 
m a n a g e m e n t ,  p u b l i c h e a l t h ,  a n d 
transportation  and border  security, but  it also 
includes aspects of international security  that 
take it  outside the sphere of the homeland 
security  enterprise.5 Organizationally  Canada 
takes somewhat  of a  middle ground approach 
between  the UK and the US in  that,  while it 
does not  incorporates securi ty  and 
emergency  management  under  the same 
organizational  framework,  it  does view  these 
disciplines as part  of the overall  public  safety 
mission.  The premier federal security 
department in  the country  is Public  Safety 
Canada,  which is responsible for  federal law 
enforcement  (via  the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police, RCMP, which  also contracts 
to provincial and municipal  governments to 
provide policing  services) and intelligence 
(via  the Canadian  Security  Intelligence 
Service,  CSIS). While Public  Safety  Canada 
does not  have direct  organizational 
responsibility  for  emergency  management  in 
the way  that  DHS does via  FEMA,  it  will  play 
a  coordinating role with  federal ministries 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r  h e a l t h a n d c r i t i c a l 
infrastructures, as well as with  provincial  and 
municipal authorities and the private sector.6   
Israel arguably  lies at  the center  of the 
spectrum.  Though  it does not  possess an 
articulated national security  strategy,  let 
alone a  homeland security  one (Israeli prime 
ministers do not like to be penned in  by 
formal strategies), it  has, in practice,  adopted 
elements of a  homeland security  doctrine that 
tie together  the police, fire,  EMS,  the health 
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system,  and the military. Despite fighting 
major wars at  least  once a decade since 
independence,  the country’s civilian  sector 
was largely  exempted from  military  attack 
(though  not terrorism).  However, the current 
presence of long  range/high  payload surface-
to-surface missiles,  as well as short-range/
low  payload rockets, has made Israel’s 
civilian  population highly  vulnerable.  In  the 
wake of the SCUD attacks on  Israel in  the 
1991  Gulf War, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) 
recognized that  the civilian sector  had come 
to be part of the battle space (if not, indeed, 
the primary  battle space) and created a  fourth 
regional command (in  addition to the 
Northern, Central and Southern  Commands): 
the Homefront Command (HFC). The HFC 
was created to improve interagency 
cooperation  between  the military, first 
responders, and government  ministries,  to 
free the three IDF regional commands to 
focus exclusively  on  the front  lines, to provide 
military  resources to the civilian  sector 
(capabilities such  as search  and rescue, WMD 
detection  and response, etc.), and to enable 
the centralization  of response efforts. 7  In 
normal times,  the HFC is responsible for 
establ ishing  emergency  procedures , 
supervising  preparedness exercises,  and 
monitoring the preparedness of the health 
system, municipalities,  the transportation 
system,  and critical infrastructures.  During 
periods in  which  Israel is facing an active 
wartime scenario (or  potentially,  a  WMD 
terrorist  attack or  other  mass casualty  event), 
the Cabinet  can  declare a  “limited state of 
emergency”  whereupon  the HFC is given 
command and control over  the other 
response agencies.  The integrative Israeli 
approach  however, is focused primarily  on 
the response piece of the homeland security 
mission.  In  terms of prevention and 
organizational  structures,  the police (Israel 
has a  single national  police force) coordinate 
with  the domestic intelligence service, the 
Israel Security  Agency  (ISA,  also known  as 
the Shin Bet or  Shabak)  and the military 
(which  has law  enforcement powers in  the 
West  Bank), but each  entity  largely  functions 
in  its own operational  sphere and according 
to its own operational doctrine.  
Overall then,  as the above examples have 
shown, homeland security  is not  really 
conceived of abroad as an “enterprise”  and 
overarching  discipline in  the manner  in 
which  it  is viewed in  the United States. 
Whether  or  not it  is entirely  viewed in  this 
manner  in  the United States is arguable 
since,  at  least  from  the organizational 
perspective, the homeland security  mission  is 
not even strictly  confined to DHS at  the 
federal  level  or  to state or  local homeland 
security  offices at  their  respective levels of 
government.  However, the homeland security 
enterprise is being  actively  developed as a 
discipline in  the US and this is likely  to 
continue to impact  policies,  strategies and 
institutions.  Whether or not  other  countries 
will eventually  adopt the same logic and view 
their  disparate homeland security  efforts as 
part of the same set of objectives requiring a 
joint  policy,  doctrinal,  and organizational 
framework remains to be seen.
Notwithstanding  the present  absence 
overseas of homeland security  as a  coherent 
policy  sphere, other  countries are still 
engaging  in homeland security-related 
policymaking  and strategizing. Learning from 
other countries’ experiences and approaches 
in  this context is important  not  only  because 
it  makes sense for  American  decision  makers 
to learn  from  the experiences of foreign 
governments (of which  there are many)  and 
thus avoid trying  to “reinvent  the wheel,”  but 
also because, in  many  cases,  the threats are 
transnational and consequently  safeguarding 
homeland security  requires cooperation with 
other countries. Whether  the threat emanates 
from  radicalized Europeans accessing  the 
United States under  the visa  waiver  program 
in order to execute terrorist  attacks,  or 
aircraft  passengers flying in  to the US from 
an  Asian city  carrying  the latest  viral 
mutation with  them, many  homeland security 
threats emanate from  abroad.  Examples of 
such  threats abound. In  the terrorism  sphere, 
in  addition to the 9/11  attackers,  Ahmed 
Resam  (the “Millennium  Bomber”),  arrested 
in  1999, used Canada  as a  staging area for his 
plot to bomb the Los Angeles International 
Airport.  Richard Reid (the “Shoe Bomber”) 
boarded a  Miami-bound flight  in  Paris in 
December  2001.  The 2006 transatlantic 
liquid explosives plot (the “Overt  Plot”) was 
hatched and prepared in  the UK and Umar 
Farouk Abdulmutallab (the “Underwear 
Bomber”  or  “Christmas Bomber”) boarded 
his Detroit-bound flight  in  Amsterdam  in 
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December  2009. The potential  and actual 
spillover  of Mexican  criminal violence into 
the US has also been  an  issue of concern  for 
some time. In the pandemic  sphere,  the SARS 
outbreak  in  China  led to the US public  health 
system  being  put on  alert  in  December 2003 
and the outbreaks of avian  influenza  and 
swine flu  in  Southeast Asia  and Mexico 
respectively  led to pandemic  concerns in  the 
US. In  short,  there is no lack  of examples of 
homeland security  threats emanating  from 
overseas.  It therefore follows that  addressing 
these threats wi l l not  only  require 
international cooperation,  but  also an 
understanding of how  other  countries, 
particularly  allied democratic nations, 
address these issues within  their  own borders 
before those issues reach US shores,  and 
what  their  respective laws, institutions, and 
modes of operation  allow  those countries to 
do.
Ultimately  then, as homeland security 
becomes more of a  global enterprise, other 
countries may  realize the logic of having 
o b j e c t i v e s s u p e r s e d e t o o l s a n d 
methodologies. In  other words,  they  may 
come to adopt  American  logic  that the 
ultimate objectives of ensuring  social  and 
economic  stability  and the continued rule of 
law  in  severe crisis situations means that 
operational  spheres as seemingly  disparate as 
counterterrorism,  law  enforcement in  the 
face of massive criminal activity, securing 
transport systems, borders, and critical 
infrastructure,  and coping with  public health 
emergencies and the management  of crisis 
situations are all essentially  part  of the same 
effort.  If and when  this does occur, it  will 
make it  considerably  easier  for  the United 
States to improve its ability  to safeguard 
homeland security  because it, and its global 
partners, will  be viewing  the problem  in  the 
same way  and integrating  their  respective 
resources and strategies accordingly.
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Ten Years After the Terrorist Attacks of 9/11: 




Increasing  risks associated with  man-made 
and naturally  occurring  incidents, coupled 
with  the inter-relationship of seemingly 
disparate activities,  suggest  that the world is 
more dangerous and vulnerable than  at 
anytime in  recent  history. The United States, 
as the most technologically  advanced and 
globally  connected nation  on  earth,  is 
especially  at  risk to systematic  or  single-
incident  disruptions.  Lessons learned from 
incidents occurring  prior  to and since the 
terrorist  attacks of 9/11  have demonstrated 
that  the current  US approach  to addressing 
risk is not always effective and may  be ill 
suited to assess emerging  challenges. The US 
no longer  has the geographic or  economic 
luxury  of approaching  security  issues from  a 
domestic  or  international perspective. 
Regardless of where a  threat  emanates from, 
today’s security  professionals need to 
recognize, respond to,  and appreciate the 
total ity  of the near- and long-term 
implications of risks facing  the nation. 
During  this period of remembrance of the 
terrorist  attacks of September  11,  2001,  now 
is the time to consider transitioning  away 
f rom  a geographic-centr ic focus o f 
safeguarding  the nation’s interests to a 
transnational approach to security  that 
reflects a better understanding of the 
complexities of global risks. 
UNITED STATES APPROACH TO 
SECURITY PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 11, 
2001
Many  changes to the US approach  to 
addressing global security  issues have 
occurred since World War  I and have usually 
been  in response to an  incident  that  has 
demonstrated a  shortcoming  in  the 
government’s ability  to effectively  detect and 
respond to a threat. Based in  part  on the 
Japanese attack on Pearl  Harbor  in  1941  and 
the deficiencies observed in  effectively 
addressing  international security  matters 
during  World War  II in  1947, the National 
Security  Act was passed to better  align  the 
missions and goals of the military,  foreign 
policy,  and intelligence communities. The 
surprises associated with  the start  of the 
Korean  War  in  1950, the Iraq invasion  of 
Kuwait  in  1990, and the bombing  of the 
Oklahoma  City  Murrah  Federal  building in 
1995, led to agency  reorganizations and 
redistribution  of resources between the 
international and domestic  security  activities. 
S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e F e d e r a l E m e r g e n c y 
Management Agency  has been  reorganized 
numerous times after  perceived failures in 
responding to natural disasters. 
After  each  of these incidents, and others 
like them,  successive administrations and 
policymakers pursued organizational changes 
to the nation’s security  apparatus, including a 
reprioritizing  of focus and resources 
previously  dedicated to overseas and 
domestic security  activities. Often  the 
philosophical and organizational changes 
approved by  policymakers assumed that the 
next significant  event would likely  take the 
form  of the most recent  incident.  In  fact, 
some might suggest  that  many  of America’s 
security  leaders continue to suffer  from  the 
same myopic  approach  to assessing  current 
and emerging threats.  The World Economic 
Forum’s annual global  risk  report  for  2011 
found that “in  an increasingly  turbulent 
global environment there is the  temptation  to 
always focus on  the most  recent  risk event,  it 
is important  to take a long-term  perspective 
to risk assessment and response. Many  global 
risks could emerge over  decades rather than 
months or  years.” 1  Such  a  propensity  to 
philosophically  approach  and organize to 
fight  the last war  may  have contributed to the 
US government’s under appreciation of risks 
facing  the nation prior  to 9/11.  Al-Qaeda  first 
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targeted US interests when  attempting  to 
attack  service members in  Yemen  in  1992. In 
the intervening  period,  between 1992  and 
September  10, 2001, the terrorist group 
successfully  carried out numerous other 
attacks against US global interests. Distracted 
by  more recent  events and lacking 
appreciation  of global threats,  the nation’s 
security attention was focused elsewhere. 
POST-9/11 SECURITY: A SOMETIMES 
EFFECTIVE BUT NOT REFLECTIVE 
APPROACH TO THREATS 
After  the 9/11  terrorist  attacks, the US 
reorganized its security  apparatus, creating  a 
host  of new  organizations and authorities to 
better  address threats directed at the 
homeland.  This reaction,  and the subsequent 
Global  War  on  Terror,  came at  high  cost both 
in  terms of blood and treasure and were 
undertaken  during  a  very  emotional  and 
highly  politicized environment.  One might 
describe the post-9/11  approach  to security  as 
the taking  of offensive actions overseas to 
defeat  terrorists planning  efforts directed at 
global interests while undertaking  defensive 
measures in  the homeland making  it  difficult 
for  bad actors to enter  or  freely  operate in the 
United States. The US military, foreign 
service,  and the overseas-focused aspects of 
the intelligence community  have been 
focused on  the away  game while the post-9/11 
creation, the Department  of Homeland 
Security,  the Federal Bureau  of Investigation, 
state, local,  tribal,  and private sector  entities 
have been  guarding  the homeland. To some, 
such  a  concept  could be viewed as a  rational 
response to the terrorist  attacks of 9/11.  In 
hindsight, it  could also be argued that while 
the attacks were significant  and catastrophic, 
they  were not  indicative of a  persistent  threat 
challenging  the American  way  of life. 
Furthermore,  some might  suggest  that  the US 
response to this tragedy  has contributed to a 
misunderstanding of the diversity  of threats 
found in  the global environment  and the 
creation of a  sometimes-ineffective approach 
to assessing risk. 
The post-9/11  government  adoption  of a 
bifurcated organizational and philosophical 
approach  to national  and homeland security 
has achieved a  number  of well-publicized and 
unreported counterterrorism, intelligence, 
natural disaster, and public  health successes. 
However,  there have also been examples 
where the unclear  responsibilities of 
applicable organizations and the need to 
address prospective threats from  a domestic 
or  international perspective have led to 
inefficiencies,  actual  and near  tragedy, and 
cont inuing chal lenges in  detect ing , 
responding,  or  recovering from  a  security-
related issue. Examples include:
• Response and recovery  efforts and offers 
of international assistance associated 
with  Hurricane Katrina  of 2005  and the 
2010 B.P. oil spill, 
• Intelligence community  and diplomatic 
policy  failures that  nearly  led to a 
successful  detonation  of an  explosive 
device onboard a  US bound aircraft  in 
December 2009,
• Late recognition of radicalization efforts 
by  global  actors enticing  US citizens to 
take-up arms against countrymen, 
• Slow  recognition  and response to the 
2009 global H1N1 pandemic, and 
• Numerous counterterrorism-related legal 
and policy  decisions void of appreciation 
o f l o n g - t e r m  i m p l i c a t i o n s a n d 
consequences.  
For  most  of these incidences failures were 
assessed,  addit ional resources were 
authorized, reorganizations implemented, 
and new  policies were developed to ensure 
that  the next time a  similar  incident  occurs a 
more robust  system  would be in  place to 
detect  prospective anomalies. However, the 
conceptual approach  to detecting  and 
responding to threats remains the same: 
maintaining  separate , and at t imes 
uncoordinated processes, based on  the 
current understanding  of the origination  of 
the threat and the prospective targets. Future 
threats directed at US interests are 
increasingly  less likely  to observe and be 
constrained by  national  borders or  the veil of 
geographic protection enjoyed since World 
War II. DHS Secretary  Janet Napolitano 
offered a  similar  sentiment  in  June 2011  at a 
Center  for  Strategic and International Studies 
f o r u m  f o c u s e d o n  b u i l d i n g  s t r o n g 
international partnerships,  when  she stated 
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that  “the evolving  threats we face are  not 
limited by  international borders.” 2  Natural 
disasters have never  recognized a nation’s 
borders when  causing  damage and America’s 
introduction  to asymmetric warfare against 
US interests should serve as an  indicator  that 
some of America’s greatest attributes; open 
society, multitude of connections to global 
activities, and observance of the rule of law, 
also serve to make us more vulnerable. 
Due to the complexity  of current and 
emerging  threats and US interconnectedness 
with  global financial,  infrastructure,  and 
s e c u r i t y  e c o s y s t e m s , t h e n a t i o n  i s 
increasingly  at  risk  of falling  prey  to man-
made or  naturally  occurring  incidences. 
Failed and failing states and ungoverned 
areas; sophisticated criminal syndicates; 
changes to the climate; the ease of 
manufacturing  and surreptitious delivery  of 
h a r m f u l e x p l o s i v e , b i o l o g i c a l ,  a n d 
technological devices with increasingly  lethal 
results; and dwindling  life-sustaining 
resources are but a  few  of the near- and long-
term  transnational  security  challenges the 
nation  will  be required to confront. 
Accompanying  these threats will  be a 
degraded international order  whereby  many 
nations’ capacity  to address challenges and 
organizations focused on  global  sustainability 
may  be on  the decline.  Traditionally  stable 
state powers the United States relies upon  to 
identify  risks and assist with addressing 
global security  issues of mutual interest are 
encountering challenges in  maintaining 
viability. An  assessment accompanying  the 
annually  published Failed State Index, 
published in  June 2011  by  the Fund for 
Peace,  notes “the upper echelons of the Failed 
States Index  are occupied almost  exclusively 
by  Western  European  nations.  Some of the 
worst  slides this year  were recorded in 
Western Europe as the economic crisis began 
to impact on  countries such  as Ireland and 
Greece.” 3  Should other  long-standing 
international partners of the US encounter 
economic difficulties,  one must start 
questioning  their  capacity  to be an  effective 
member of the global security apparatus. 
What  might  have been  understood, but 
not adequately  acted upon  until after the 
terrorist  attacks of September  11,  2011,  was 
that  a  threat  to US interests can  be 
manifested from  anywhere in  the world and 
have both  domestic and international 
implications. Such threats can  have very  real 
safety, economic,  and societal consequences 
if security  leaders are unable to appreciate 
the transnational implications accompanying 
risks found throughout  the world.  In  a  speech 
given  to the South Carolina  Corps of Cadets 
in  October, 2010 DHS Secretary  Napolitano 
addressed the need for  today’s security 
professionals to take a more global 
perspective of risks facing  the nation  when 
she stated that none of today’s threats “stop 
at  the border to morph from  a  national  to a 
homeland security  threat. Our  thinking  – and 
our  responses – can’t stop at  the borders 
either.” She further stated: 
The attacks  of September  11, 2001 
challenge the conventional  notion that 
foreign  threats were truly foreign  and that 
we could maintain  a  divide between 
domestic and foreign  affairs. Profound 
shifts are still  underway and are even  faster 
and more transformational  that ever. The 
lines  between the foreign and domestic are 
even  murkier than before, if often not there 
at all.4 
The nation  can  no longer  afford to 
categorize or  approach  threats from  a 
national or  homeland security  perspective. 
Strategies,  policies,  organizations, and 
resources devoted to addressing one aspect of 
risk to US global  security  interests will prove 
insufficient to the challenges facing  the 
nation  and may  miss significant  connections 
to the larger global  threat  environment. In 
order  to best prepare the nation’s security 
professionals to address emerging  risks, a 
transnational approach should be adopted. 
A TRANSNATIONAL APPROACH TO 
PROTECTING US GLOBAL SECURITY 
INTERESTS
Whether  a  threat emanates from  overseas or 
in  the homeland, implications can be found, 
and should be explored, to gain  a  true 
appreciation  of specific  activity  and possible 
consequences. A  transnational  security 
approach, which  entails understanding  and 
addressing the interrelationship of global 
risks to a  nation’s short- and long-term 
strategic  interests, should be adopted to 
assist  in recognizing  and responding  to 
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threats we know  exist,  threats we can 
envision,  and unforeseen  threats. The 
adoption  of a  transnational approach  to 
protecting US global security  interests would 
have a number of benefits, including:
• Giving  current  and future security 
professionals an  opportunity  to better 
appreciate the diversity  and complexity  of 
threats facing the nation,   
• Provid ing pol icymakers a  bet ter 
understanding  of the implications and 
consequences of actions pursued in 
response to an emerging threat,
• Utilizing funds and other  resources in a 
more efficient and targeted manner, and 
• Reducing the likelihood of unforeseen 
events and a  more thoughtful approach  to 
policy  and resource considerations when 
a significant incident does occur. 
The 2008  National Intelligence Council’s 
Global Trends  2025: A Transformed World 
report  affirmed the need for  security 
professionals to have a  transnational 
appreciation  of risk  by  assessing  that  the 
future will  entail  a  “rapidly  changing 
international order of growing  geopolitical 
challenges with  an  increased likelihood of 
discontinuities,  shocks,  and surprises.” 5 The 
Global Trends report  further  noted that 
today’s enemies have already  adopted a 
global approach to terrorism,  crime, and 
financial pursuits with  the goal  of “leveraging 
transnational outcomes across national and 
organizational boundaries.”
T h e U S N a t i o n a l S t r a t e g y f o r 
Counterterrorism,  released in June 2011, 
states “the preeminent  security  threat  to the 
United States continues to be from  al-Qaeda 
and its affiliates and adherents.” 6  According 
to data compiled by  the Centre for  Research 
on  the Epidemiology  of Disasters, for  the 
majority  of the period between  1975  to 2010 
there has been  a  steady  trend upward of the 
number  of people affected, and estimated 
damages caused, by  natural disasters.7  The 
2011  Global  Peace Index  has found that the 
world is less peaceful for  a third straight  year 
based on  assessing international,  regional 
and national  conflicts,  safety  and security  in 
societies, and militarization efforts.8 
As witnessed during the past  decade, 
policy,  organizational,  and resource decisions 
made in  a post-incident crisis environment 
often  lack  foresight  and are dismissive of 
long-term  consequences of actions pursued. 
Whether  al-Qaeda will still  be in  existence 
when  America  observes the twenty-year 
remembrance of the attacks of September  11, 
2001, the consequences of disasters continue 
to increase,  or  the world becomes a  less 
peaceful place,  a  reasonable assessment  of 
tomorrow’s challenges suggests a  new 
approach is needed to understand and 
address global risk. Elected officials and 
policymakers should use ongoing  budgetary 
discussions related to reducing  or  eliminating 
funding for  activities and programs that  are 
seen as ineffective or  duplicative to initiate 
changes to the nation’s current  approach to 
security. Through  the use of future budget 
allocations, policy-makers should require 
systemic changes be made to the federal 
security  apparatus that transitions security 
organizations away  from  focusing  on  threats 
from  a  geographically  linear  perspective  to an 
appreciation  of the global complexities 
associated with  risks facing the nation. 
Future  legislative,  strategy, policy,  and 
resource decisions should be based on  a more 
mature understanding of the global risk 
environment  with  a  desire for  the federal 
government  to be organized and resourced in 
a  manner  that  corresponds to current and 
emerging  transnational security  concerns. 
Adoption  of such  an approach  will better 
prepare the nation  to address known  threats 
and unforeseen risks.
As we enter  a  relatively  peaceful  period of 
remembrance with  the tenth  anniversary  of 
the attacks of September 11, 2001,  America 
now  possesses a  refined understanding of 
risks to the nation’s global interests.  Might 
this period of reflection  serve as an 
opportune time to discuss adopting  a 
t r a n s n a t i o n a l  a p p r o a c h t o m e e t i n g 
tomorrow’s security challenges? 
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Domestic Intelligence Today: More Security but Less Liberty?
Erik J. Dahl
One of the most  important questions about 
intelligence reform  after  the 9/11  attacks was 
whether the United States should establish  a 
new  domestic intelligence agency  – an 
American  equivalent  of the British  MI-5, 
some suggested. Supporters of the idea 
argued that  only  a  completely  new 
organization  would be able to provide the 
fresh  thinking  and strength  of focus that  was 
needed, and they  pointed out  that the US was 
the only  Western  country  without such  an 
organization. Critics said the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI)  was already  well on  its 
way  to reinventing itself as just  the sort  of 
intelligence-driven  agency  the country 
needed and that establishing  a  new  domestic 
intelligence agency  would require the 
creation  of a  costly  new  bureaucracy  to 
duplicate capabilities that already existed. 
That  debate was eventually  settled in the 
negative.   Although  a  number  of major 
reforms were made to American  intelligence 
– including,  most  notably,  the establishment 
of the position  of the Director  of National 
Intelligence (DNI) – no central domestic 
intelligence agency  has been  created.  Instead, 
the intelligence functions of the FBI have 
been  beefed up and several new  organizations 
have been created, including the National 
Counterterrorism  Center  (NCTC). Although 
occasionally  the argument  is still  heard that 
the US needs a  domestic intelligence service,1 
in  general most  intelligence professionals and 
outside observers appear  to agree that  no 
new  domestic intelligence organization  is 
necessary.  
But  this essay  argues that  even though  we 
as a  nation  decided not to establish  a 
domestic intelligence organization, we have 
in  recent years done just  that: we have 
created a vast domestic  intelligence 
establishment, one which  few  Americans 
understand and which  does not  receive the 
oversight and scrutiny  it  deserves.  There is 
good news here: this domestic intelligence 
system  appears to have been  successful in 
increasing security  within  the US,  as 
demonstrated by  numerous foiled terrorist 
plots and the lack  of another major  successful 
attack  on  American  soil since 9/11.  But there 
is also bad news: these gains are coming  at 
the cost of increasing domestic surveillance 
and at the risk of civil liberties. 
This essay  begins by  reviewing  the debate 
over  whether  a  domestic intelligence agency 
was needed after  9/11. It  then  describes the 
current system  of homeland security 
intelligence within  the US,  including  the 
growth  of new  intelligence organizations at 
the state and local  level,  and argues that  this 
constitutes a  de facto domestic  intelligence 
organization. Next  it  demonstrates that  the 
development of this domestic intelligence 
structure has moved the balance between 
security  and liberty  quite firmly  in  the 
direction of more security,  but  less liberty. 
The essay  concludes by  arguing  that even 
though  these developments might  very  well 
be acceptable to the American people, we 
cannot know  whether they  are acceptable or 
not without a  better-informed national 
discussion about domestic intelligence. 2   
THE DEBATE OVER A DOMESTIC 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
One aspect  of the debate over  intelligence 
reform  following  the 9/11  attacks was the 
question  of whether the United States should 
establish  a  new  domestic intelligence agency. 
Although  the question  was often  framed in 
terms of whether the US should create an 
organization  modeled on the British  MI-5, 
several options were widely discussed.  
The change supported by  many  experts 
was to form  an  independent intelligence 
service within  the FBI. The FBI already  had 
the lead on  most  domestic intelligence issues 
and since 9/11  had been  increasing  its focus 
on  intelligence,  so forming  such  an 
organization  within  the FBI appeared to be 
the simplest  option,  involving  few  changes to 
the rest  of the intelligence community. A 
group of six  experienced intelligence and 
national security  experts, writing in  The 
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Economist,  argued for  this approach.3  The 
WMD Commission Report also supported 
such  a  change,  proposing that  the counter-
terrorism, counter- intel l igence,  and 
intelligence services of the FBI be combined 
to create a new National Security Service.4  
Critics,  however,  argued either  that  such  a 
change was unnecessary  because the FBI was 
a lready  transforming  i tse l f into an 
intelligence-driven  agency,  or  that  it  would be 
a  dangerous move because the  FBI was likely 
to remain  primarily  a  law  enforcement 
organization,  unsuited to the intelligence 
mission  and inclined to use its increasing 
intelligence and surveillance powers at  the 
risk of civil liberties.  
Another  idea  was to create a new 
intelligence agency  under  the newly  created 
Department of Homeland Security  (DHS). 
Federal  Judge Richard Posner, for  example, 
argued for  such  an  organization, to be called 
the Security  Intelligence Service, with  the 
head of this agency  to be dual-hatted as the 
DNI’s deputy for domestic intelligence.5  
The idea  that  was most  often  talked about 
was to create  a  wholly  new,  independent 
organization, possibly  modeled on  the British 
MI-5  (which  is officially  known  as the 
Security  Service). Supporters of the idea 
noted that most Western  countries have some 
sort  of domestic intelligence agency. In 
Britain MI-5  collects and analyzes domestic 
intelligence, but it has no police power or 
arrest  authority; foreign  intelligence in the 
British  system  is handled by  MI-6, the Secret 
Intelligence Service.6  Critics argued that  the 
MI-5  model was unlikely  to be applicable to 
the US because Britain  is a  much  smaller, 
more centralized country  with fewer  local 
police forces and a  powerful  Home Office, 
w h i l e  t h e U S i s m u c h l a r g e r  a n d 
decentralized, with  thousands of independent 
local police and sheriff’s departments.  
E x p e r t s a l s o e x a m i n e d d o m e s t i c 
intelligence models from  other  countries, 
including Australia, India,  France,  and 
Germany.7 Other  than  MI-5, the model most 
often  pointed to as appropriate for  the US 
was the Canadian  Security  Intelligence 
Service (CSIS). The CSIS was established 
relatively  recently  (1984), after the Canadian 
national police force (the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police) was found to have broken 
the law  and violated civil liberties in  dealing 
with  Quebec  separatist groups and other 
internal threats.8  
Support  for  a  new  domestic intelligence 
agency  was never  as strong  as it  had been  for 
o t h e r  m a j o r  r e f o r m s s u c h  a s t h e 
establishment  of a  Director  of National 
I n t e l l i g e n c e .  T h e 9 / 1 1  C o m m i s s i o n 
recommended against  creating  such a  new 
agency, and although  discussion  continues 
about  whether  or not the nation’s domestic 
inte l l igence structure is adequately 
organized,  there seems to be little impetus for 
setting up a US version of MI-5.9  
The most extensive study  of the question 
was conducted by  RAND, at  the request  of 
the Department  of Homeland Security,  and 
resulted in  three volumes of reports. 10 RAND 
was specifically  not asked by  DHS to offer 
recommendations, but these reports can 
hardly  be seen  as ringing  endorsements for 
the idea  of a new  domestic  agency. When  the 
RAND researchers surveyed a  group of 
experts,  most expressed the view  that  the 
current organization for  domestic intelligence 
wasn’t very  good; but  they  also said they  did 
not think  that  any  reorganization  was likely 
to improve the situation.11 Gregory  Treverton 
summed up the study  this way: “Caution  and 
deliberations are the watchwords for  this 
study’s conclusions.” 12 
CURRENT DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE 
ORGANIZATION  
In  its analysis for  DHS,  RAND outlined what 
i t cal led the “domestic  intel l igence 
enterprise.” 13  This enterprise encompasses a 
c o m p l e x  s y s t e m  t h a t  i n c l u d e s 
counterterrorism  organizations led by  the 
NCTC; other  federal-level organizations and 
efforts, including those within  the FBI, DHS, 
and Department of Defense; and state,  local, 
and private sector  activities. Some of the 
experts consulted by  RAND saw  this 
domest ic inte l l igence enterpr ise as 
problematic  because it  was uncoordinated 
and thus potentially  ineffective; one 
described domestic intelligence as “a pickup 
ballgame without  a  real structure, leadership, 
management, or  output.” 14 But  even  though 
our  domestic  intelligence system  may  not 
have a  centralized structure,  it  is more 
coordinated and also more effective than 
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most Americans realize,  and constitutes a  de 
facto – but  little understood – domestic 
intelligence system.  
It is difficult, if not  impossible, for  the 
American  public to accurately  gauge the size 
of the country’s domestic intelligence effort. 
Much  of that  effort  is deservedly  kept secret, 
as is the overall  scope of America’s 
intelligence activities at home and abroad. 
The size of the national intelligence 
community  is not  precisely  known,  but  in 
2009  then-Director  of National  Intelligence 
Dennis Blair  described it  as a  200,000-
person, $75  billion  per  year  enterprise. 15 By 
the next  year  the intelligence budget had 
grown to $80.1  billion. That number  is 
believed to be twice what  it  was in  2001,  and 
it  is considerably  more than the $53  billion 
spent  on  the Department  of Homeland 
Security in 2010.16  
An  investigation into the country’s 
intelligence and counterterrorism  structure 
by  The Washington Post described what  it 
called “a  Top Secret  America  hidden  from 
public view  and lacking  in  thorough 
oversight.” 17  The Post found that some 
854,000  people hold top secret security 
clearances,  and that  at  least  263  government 
agencies and organizations had been  created 
or reorganized as a response to 9/11.   
The office  of the DNI is itself a  large entity, 
with  some 1,800 employees as of 2010,  and 
has come to be considered one of the 
seventeen  top-level agencies of the 
intelligence community.18  Within the 
Department of Homeland Security  there are 
at  least  nine separate intelligence elements, 
including  the Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis and intelligence organizations of six 
separate DHS components: Customs and 
Border  Protection,  Immigration  and Customs 
Enforcement, Citizenship and Immigration 
S e r v i c e s ,  T r a n s p o r t a t i o n  S e c u r i t y 
Administration, the  Coast  Guard,  and the 
Secret Service. 19  
Since 9/11  the FBI has greatly  increased 
the priority  it  gives to intelligence and 
counter-terrorism,  setting  up a new  National 
Security  Branch, increasing  the number  and 
status of its intelligence analysts,  and 
establishing  Field Intelligence Groups in  each 
of its fifty-six  field offices. The FBI has also 
been  busy  developing  new  networks of 
informants within  the United States: its 2008 
budget  request  said that  it  “recruits new  CHS 
[confidential human sources]  every  day,”  and 
needed more money  to do it,  with  apparently 
15,000 sources needing to be validated.20  
Some elements of national  and military 
intelligence have become more involved in 
domestic  surveillance since 9/11.  The 
National Security  Agency  (NSA),  for  example, 
which  was revealed in  2005  to have been 
involved in  what  was called the Terrorist 
Surveillance Program,  reportedly  continues 
to conduct a  significant amount of domestic 
intelligence collection. 21 As an  indication  of 
the growth  in  the NSA’s business – although 
presumably  much  of the growth is in foreign 
intelligence – the agency  is building  a  new 
data storage center in  Utah that  will 
reportedly  cost  $1.7  billion  and occupy  as 
much  as one million  square feet  of space, 
larger than the US Capitol building.  
Some domestic counterintelligence 
activities of the Department of Defense have 
drawn criticism  since 9/11,  in  particular  the 
now-defunct  Counterintelligence Field 
Activity  (CIFA). But  in  general,  military  and 
other  nat ional securi ty  inte l l igence 
capabi l i t ies have not  been  ut i l i zed 
domestically  to any  great degree,  because of 
civil liberties concerns as well  as Posse 
Comitatus restrictions on  the use of military 
personnel for  law  enforcement. For example, 
an  effort  to establish  a  National Applications 
Office  (NAO) to coordinate the domestic use 
of reconnaissance satellites failed after 
members of Congress opposed it. 22  And the 
US Northern  Command,  established after  the 
9/11  attacks to coordinate US military 
support  for  homeland defense and security, 
has been  careful  to focus most of its 
intelligence efforts toward homeland defense 
– focusing on  threats from  outside the US – 
and takes a  very  limited role in  domestic 
intelligence and surveillance (such  as helping 
to coordinate reconnaissance assets when 
needed to support  state and federal 
authorities following emergencies such  as the 
Gulf oil spill and Hurricane Katrina).    
Another  area  where military  capabilities 
have not seen  widespread domestic use is 
with  unmanned aerial  vehicles, or  UAV. 
Although  UAV  have become a  mainstay  of US 
military  operations overseas, they  are little 
used within  the US, even  by  civilian 
authorities.  United States Customs and 
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Border  Protection  does operate small 
numbers of UAV  along  the country’s northern 
and southern  borders,  and a  few  local  law 
enforcement agencies have experimented 
with  the technology, but they  remain  an 
underutilized capability.23     
A  growth  area  for  intelligence since 9/11 
has been  in  the development of national 
intel l igence centers, combining and 
coordinating efforts of a  wide variety  of 
organizations on specific  problems.  In  some 
cases these centers are new,  such  as the 
National Counterterrorism  Center  and the 
National  Counterproliferation Center.  In 
other cases already  existing  intelligence 
organizations have been  redesignated as 
national centers,  such  as the National 
Maritime Intelligence Center  at  Suitland, 
Maryland,  and the National Center  for 
Medical  Intelligence at Fort Detrick, 
Maryland.  
There are a  number  of other  new  or 
growing  federal intelligence agencies and 
organizations,  including  the El Paso 
Intelligence Center  (EPIC),  a  multi-agency 
counter  drug center  run  jointly  by  the DEA 
and DHS, and the interagency  National Gang 
Inte l l igence Center .  There are a lso 
operational  organizations that  are significant 
users of intelligence, including  the 106  FBI-
led Joint Terrorism  Task  Forces that  are 
critical tools in  combating domestic 
terrorism, and High  Intensity  Drug 
Trafficking  Area (HIDTA) Intelligence and 
Investigative Support  Centers,  which  are 
counter-drug  efforts sponsored by  the Office 
of National Drug  Control  Policy.24 There are 
also two Joint  Interagency  Task Forces 
(JIATFs),  one in  Hawaii and the other  in  Key 
West,  Florida,  which  are interagency  counter-
drug organizations nominally  under 
Department of Defense control.  
At the next  level down from  the federal 
level of intelligence is a network of seventy-
two state and local intelligence fusion 
centers. These centers receive DHS funding 
and support, and many  of them  have a DHS 
intelligence liaison  officer  assigned to them 
full time, providing  analytical  support  and 
reach-back  capability  to DHS headquarters. 
These fusion centers are not widely  known, 
but they  have had some notable successes in 
helping  to prevent terrorist  attacks and 
assisting law  enforcement  agencies in 
capturing criminals.25  
These fusion centers,  however,  have also 
generated controversy.26 The American  Civil 
Liberties Union argues that: 
The federal  government’s increasing efforts 
to formalize, standardize, and network 
these state, local, and regional  intelligence 
centers  – and plug  them directly  into the 
intelligence community’s Information 
Sharing Environment – are the functional 
equivalent of creating a  new national 
domestic intelligence agency  that deputizes 
a broad range of  personnel from all levels of 
government, the private sector, and the 
military to spy on their fellow Americans.27  
Bruce Fein, a  lawyer  and former federal 
official who is a  frequent government critic, 
testified before the House Homeland Security 
Committee  that the US “should abandon 
fusion  centers that engage 800,000  state  and 
local  law  enforcement officers in the business 
of gathering and sharing  allegedly  domestic 
or international terrorism intelligence.” 28   
The best  known  of these state and local 
organizations is actually  not  part  of the 
national fusion  center  network: the New  York 
Police Department’s intelligence division.29 
The NYPD intelligence effort includes liaison 
officers in  some eleven  countries overseas, 
analysts who reportedly  speak more 
languages than  can  be found in  the New  York 
office of the FBI, and even  a  program  that 
takes police recruits out of the police 
academy  and places them  in undercover 
positions, in  some cases conducting 
investigations inside mosques in  the New 
York City area. 30  
BALANCING SECURITY AND LIBERTY  
The 9/11  Commission  argued that  we should 
not have to trade security  for  liberty,  calling 
the choice  between the two a “false choice.” 31 
But  it seems that  the balance and the tradeoff 
are very  real  today.   There is nothing  new  in 
this: as a  RAND study  notes,  “Throughout US 
history,  in  times of national  security  crisis, 
civil  liberties have been curtailed in exchange 
for  perceived greater  security, the balance 
between  liberties and security  generally  being 
restored after  each  crisis.” 32  What is new 
today, ten years after  the 9/11  attacks,  is that 
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the balance has not  yet  been  restored, and in 
some ways the balance continues to shift 
toward greater governmental power.  
In  some cases,  this increased government 
authority  is obvious: more intrusive 
screening  at airports, for  example, continues 
the tilt  toward greater  security  at  the expense 
of liberty  (and occasionally,  dignity). In  other 
cases, the greater powers of government  are 
less evident. As an  example,  there is a  great 
deal of attention  paid today  to the previously 
little-known  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court  (FISC), which  is empowered to issue 
warrants for  domestic  searches and 
surveillance under  the Foreign Intelligence 
and Surveillance Act  (FISA).  But while fewer 
than  fifty  FISA  orders were issued in 2006, 
during  that same year the FBI issued more 
than  28,000  of what are called National 
Security  Letters (NSLs),  which  can  authorize 
search  or  surveillance of US persons but  do 
not require review  by  a  court or judge.33  In 
2010  the FBI made 24,287  NSL requests 
pertaining  to US persons,  but  only  1,579 
applications to the FISC for surveillance and 
search authority.34   
The FBI is expanding  its domestic 
intelligence and surveillance operations in 
other ways, as well. It  is changing its own 
internal rules to give its agents more leeway 
to conduct investigations and surveillance, 
such  as by  searching  databases or  sorting 
through  a  person’s trash. 35 And it appears to 
be making  greater  use of undercover 
informants in  intelligence investigations, 
leading  in  some cases to successful arrests 
and prosecut ions ,  but in others to 
controversy.36  
One of the most controversial  aspects of 
domestic  intelligence after  9/11  was the 
Patriot  Act, which  significantly  expanded the 
ability  of government  authorities to collect 
information  within  the US and lowered the 
“wall”  separating  criminal investigation from 
foreign  intelligence gathering. In  the years 
since it was first passed several  of the Patriot 
Act’s provisions have been  renewed,  adding 
tighter  controls of government  activity.  But  in 
general the government  has retained its 
increased authorities.  Several  of these 
provisions,  which  had been scheduled to 
“sunset,”  or  expire, were renewed in  May 
2011, with  the renewal receiving  as much 
attention  for  the way  it  happened – President 
Obama, who was in  Europe,  authorized the 
use of an  autopen  machine to sign  the bill 
into law  – as for  the fact  that  it  occurred at 
all. 37  
Because so much  of intelligence work – 
including domestic intelligence – needs to be 
hidden  from  view, a  considerable amount  of 
secrecy  might  be acceptable as long  as the 
American  public could be confident that  its 
legislators or  others were watching out  for 
the public.  As Gregory  Treverton  writes, “The 
public doesn’t  need to know  the details of 
what  is being  done in  its name.  It  does need 
to know  that  some body  independent of an 
administration  does know  and does 
a p p r o v e . ” 38  T h e p r o b l e m  i s t h a t 
Congressional oversight of intelligence 
matters is widely  regarded as weak, and 
much  of the day-to-day  supervision  of 
intelligence agencies is conducted by 
organizations such  as the National Security 
Council, the Office of Management  and 
Budget,  and agency  inspectors general. Such 
oversight is often useful, but  it still means the 
Executive Branch is supervising itself.  
Concerns over oversight of the national 
intelligence community  are heightened when 
the focus shifts to state and local  intelligence 
efforts. Although  most  local fusion  centers 
receive federal funds and receive operating 
guidelines from  DHS and the Department of 
Justice, they  are under  state or  local control 
and as such  are not  subject  to any  strong, 
centralized oversight.  And programs such as 
the Nationwide Suspicious Activity  Reporting 
Initiative, which is being  implemented in 
cities and states around the country, show 
great  potential for  helping to prevent terrorist 
attacks and detect  other  criminal activity,  but 
they  also raise questions about  civil 
liberties.39  
Critics argue that in  the past ten  years the 
balance between  security  and liberty  his 
shifted far  too much  toward security, leading 
to a  great  increase in government power. In 
the words of Laura  Murphy  of the ACLU, “It 
feels as though scissors have cut  out  whole 
portions of our  liberties in  the name of 
fighting the war on  terrorism.” 40 This may  be 
an  overstatement, but  it does seem  clear  that 
the development  of a vast domestic 
intelligence structure since 9/11  has moved 
the balance quite firmly  in  the direction  of 
more security, and less liberty.  
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CONCLUSION: WHERE TO FROM 
HERE?  
By  its very  nature,  domestic  and homeland 
security  intelligence is intrusive and risks 
infringing  on civil  liberties. As then-Secretary 
of Homeland Security  Michael Chertoff put 
it: 
Intelligence, as  you know, is not only about 
spies and satellites. Intelligence is about  the 
thousands and thousands of  routine, 
everyday observations and activities. 
Surveillances, interactions – each of which 
may  be taken  in  isolation  as not a 
p a r t i c u l a r l y m e a n i n g f u l  p i e c e o f 
information, but when fused together, gives 
us a sense of  the patterns and the flow that 
really  is at the core of what  intelligence 
analysis is really about.41  
These thousands and thousands of 
observations are largely  observations about 
people and events in  America, and in  the 
years since 9/11  America  has created a 
domestic intelligence system  to collect them. 
In  some cases the people are  terrorists or 
other types of criminals,  and the intelligence 
collected has helped to prevent  bad events 
from  happening.  But  in  many  cases these 
observations, this intelligence, is about 
routine activities undertaken  by  ordinary 
Americans and others who do not intend to 
cause harm.    
Unless the threat situation  changes 
dramatically,  we are not  likely  to see a  new 
American domestic intelligence agency 
anytime soon. In  the place of an  “American 
MI-5,”  however,  a  huge and expensive 
domestic  intelligence system  has been 
constructed.  This system  has thus far 
succeeded in  keeping America  safer  than 
most experts would have predicted ten years 
ago, but  it  has also reduced civil liberties in 
w a y s t h a t  m a n y  A m e r i c a n s f a i l t o 
understand. Precisely  because it  was 
unplanned and is decentralized, this 
domestic intelligence system  has not  received 
the oversight  it  deserves. In  the long run, 
American  liberty  as well as security  will  gain 
from  a  fuller  discussion  of the benefits and 
risks of homeland security intelligence.  
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Preventing the Next 9/10: The Homeland Security Challenges of 
Technological Evolution and Convergence in the Next Ten Years
Rodrigo Nieto-Gómez
The September  10, 2001  edition  of Time 
magazine dedicated its cover story  to Colin 
Powell and his “megastar  wattage … curiously 
dimmed”  inside of the Bush  administration. 
Of course, no one knew  that at that precise 
moment all the human and technological 
components for  the worst  attack  ever 
committed on  United States soil were already 
in place,  and imminent danger  existed. 
Discussing  General Powell’s role inside the 
White House was a  good cover  story  for 
September 10th.
Then  came the attacks of September 11, 
2001 – 9/11.
The catastrophic  event  occurred without 
warning.  The attacks seemed like a  random 
and unpredictable occurrence; a  black hole in 
our cognition.
But  obviously,  9/11  was a  complicated 
event  that  required the use of many  previous 
steps,  many  technologies in  concert, and 
many  brains working  together  to achieve that 
particular  end.  What  we saw  that day  was 
o n l y  o n e m o r e s t e p ( n o t  e v e n  t h e 
culmination) of a  very  long  series of 
converging  processes – a  deviant  result  of the 
innovation  process that  also fuels progress 
inside our technologically  dependent 
civilization. 
On September 12,  2001  a still  perplexed 
world asked how  was it  possible that the 
terrorists’ attacks were not stopped; all the 
clues were there, the dots were waiting  to be 
connected and al Qaeda  had already  been 
active and recognized as a  threat  by  the 
federal government since the 1990s.
On September 14,  2001  Time  had a new 
cover. It  featured a  collapsing World Trade 
Center  – an  avalanche of dust,  steel and 
glass.
But  if 9/11  was just  the visible part  of a 
longer process, were did it all start?
T h e h i s t o r i c a c c o u n t o f t h e 9 / 1 1 
Commission Report finds the roots of 9/11  in 
the rise of a  national resistance against  the 
communist  government of Afghanistan in 
1978, which  would eventually  lead to the 
formation of al Qaeda 1.
I argue that  the patterns that  lead to 9/11 
are much older,  but at  the same time they  are 
considerably  less linear.  Therefore,  that 
direct line that  the 9/11 Commission Report 
traced is nothing  more than  an  illusion 
produced by  what Nassim  Taleb  calls the 
retrospective distortion, “or  how  we can 
assess matters only  after  the fact, as if they 
were in a  rearview  mirror  (history  seems 
clearer  and more organized [linear]  in  history 
books than in empirical reality).” 2 
This retrospective distortion creates a 
security  ecosystem  where homeland security 
practitioners feel  pressured to try  to “connect 
the dots”  every  time, instead of adapting to 
an  environment  of emerging patterns and 
mutating dots that cannot be connected. 
Moreover, certain  technologies have been 
doubling  in  capacity  every  few  months for 
many  years now  and, as a  consequence, 
technology  improvement cycles have also 
shrunk. We have grown  used to having  a  new 
and improved version  of a  product that  is 
twice as powerful in  just a  few  months,  and 
radical disruptive propositions every  year  or 
two.  Because of technological  convergence,  it 
is very  hard to predict  what  unintended 
consequences all  those improvements and 
new  technologies will have once they  are 
r e c o m b i n e d w i t h  o t h e r s ,  a n d w h a t 
catastrophic  possibilities convergence might 
have that  we will miss on  the next  9/10.  This 
is the chaotic  security  environment where 
homeland security  operates today. For  the 
next ten  years, homeland security  should 
embrace it. 
9/11/1973: WHY NOT?  
Romance languages, as well  as German, have 
introduced the neologism  of “uchronia”  (from 
uchronie in  French)  in their  vocabularies to 
define the subgenre in  fiction  where reality  as 
we know  it  is profoundly  altered by  a  change 
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in  the chain  of events.  They  describe a time 
that  does not exist, or  a non-time.  In  an 
uchronic  novel, reality  it is indistinguishable 
to ours until an  event  – often called a  “point 
of divergence”  or  a  “Jonbar  Hinge”  – triggers 
a  ser ies o f second and th i rd leve l 
consequences that end up creating a  reality 
that  it  is almost  unrecognizable from  ours, 
even though initial conditions were identical.
In  Turtledove’s novel How  Few  Remain, 
the south  won  the American Civil  War 
because of an  accidental  recovery  of a 
document; in  The Man in the High Castle,  by 
Phillip K.  Dick, a  successful assassination 
plot against  President  Roosevelt  creates an 
environment  that ends up being favorable to 
the axis powers,  who end up winning  World 
War II.
Uchronias make interesting  readings (or 
movies, although  some people have trouble 
enjoying  the convoluted plots of time paradox 
films) because they  describe contextual 
patterns that we all  recognize  and are 
familiar  with. Then,  after  a  fictional  “point  of 
divergence”,  second and third degree 
consequences create a  believable new 
environment  that  is almost unrecognizable 
from  reality  as we know  it,  but  that  we can 
accept as a  plausible “what if.”  Uchronias 
confront  us with  the fragility  of reality  and 
the power  of the randomized and chaotic 
forces that  surround us.  They  contradict  the 
linear  nature of historic events; show  us how 
precarious and fluid are “the dots”  that  have 
to be connected, and how  organic  is the 
nature of any  threat.  If the briefcase bomb 
would have been  a  little  to the left (or  to the 
right… who knows?),  Hitler  would have died; 
if one of many  things described in  the 9/11 
Commission Report would have happened 
(or  not  happened) on  9/10, we would have 
continued the discussion  about  Collin  Powell 
on 9/12.
The innovation  cycle is “pushing” Jonbar 
Hinges on  society  faster  than  ever  before. 
Each  new  or  improved technology  adds a  new 
series of combinatorial possibilities that  can 
shape society  in  unpredictable ways.  Many 
technologies today  are nothing other  than 
backbones designed to support spontaneous 
innovation  – touch screen  blank slates for 
others to design  their  apps, in an  emerging 
cycle that feeds on itself.
Millions of people potentially  empowered 
by  those backbone technologies mean 
millions of potential innovators all thinking 
and doing  things that  have not  been  thought 
or done before. 
But  those innovations do not  happen  in  a 
vacuum. Instead, as Brian Arthur explains: 
New technologies in  time become possible 
components – building blocks  – for  the 
construction  of further new technologies. 
Some of  these in turn  go on  to become 
possible building  blocks of  yet  newer 
technologies. In  this  way, slowly, over time, 
many  technologies form  from  an initial  few, 
and more complex  ones  form using simpler 
ones as components. The overall  collection 
of technologies  bootstraps itself  upward 
from  the few to the many and from the 
simple to the complex. We can say that 
technology creates itself out of itself. 3
Ideas – or  memes, as evolutionists like to 
call  them  – evolve from  the simple to the 
complex.  They  progress in the sense that 
whatever  was there before will be constantly 
improved and recombined with  new  thoughts 
and ideas making  something better  that can 
then  be used again to continue this incessant 
process. 
Unfortunately,  innovation  has a  dark side. 
The same accelerated combinatorial 
evolution  that  empowers entrepreneurs to 
rapidly  improve our high  tech  environment 
can, and often is, used to harm the innocent. 
In  fact,  I believe 9/11  was the product of 
thousands of years of innovation in a  radical, 
deadly, and novel way. 
T h e i n n o v a t i v e r e c o m b i n a t i o n  o f 
technology  that made those terrorist  attacks 
possible took  advantage not  only  of the 
knowledge and imagination of Khalid Sheik 
Mohammed and Osama  Bin  Laden, but  also 
of Minory  Yamasaki (the WTC architect); the 
ingenuity  of the Wright brothers and all the 
aviation  heroes who made flying  machines a 
reality; the hundreds of engineers form 
Boeing; and, in  general,  thousands of years of 
accumulated human  knowledge (material 
engineering,  tube frame design,  Le Corbusier 
modernist philosophy, and thousands more 
innovations, all the way  back to the wheel, 
language and the invention of tools!).  
In  Uchronia,  9/11/2001  could have 
occurred on  9/11/1973, just  a  few  months 
after  the ribbon  cutting  ceremony  of the 
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World Trade Center.  By  that  time,  jumbo jets 
were flying,  the Pentagon  had been  built,  and 
most of the technology  that  was materially 
used during 9/11  existed, ready  to be 
recombined in  order  to achieve a  catastrophic 
result. 
But  if the technology  already  existed in 
1973,  the “9/11  idea”  did not. Creativity  does 
not evolve following  a  linear  path  of dots and 
many  things had to happen  for  this complex 
adaptive environment to evolve towards a 
state where 9/11  went  from  being  a  possibility 
that  lurked in  the dark since 1973,  to a  sad 
meme of human innovation 4. 
That  is the paradox.  We can  easily  imagine 
“planes as weapons”  as the 9/11 Commission 
Report asked. The meme requires the 
recombination  of just  a  few  previously  known 
ideas: suicide militants,  planes, volatile  jet 
fuel, and skyscrapers.  But the same thing can 
be said for  Facebook  (it  is not  hard today  to 
imagine an  interconnected personal 
database),  Amazon  (an  online-only  retail 
store), or Netflix  (a mail-based rental  model 
that  combined the backbone of the postal 
service with  the Internet). Yes,  we can 
imagine all  that,  but someone imagined it 
first,  recombined technologies and created 
huge companies out  of it.  We can  all  imagine 
an  iPad,  but  Steve Jobs and the rest  of the 
Apple designers imagined and successfully 
implemented it first.
Innovation  is innovation  not because it  is 
impossible to think  of something,  but 
because no one else thought of it before. 
WE DON’T REINVENT THE WHEEL – WE 
APPROPRIATE IT!
Ted Lewis identified the importance of 
“stigmergy”  in  the invention-innovation 
cycle: “invention  [works] as the stimulus and 
innovation  as the response.  After  each  cycle, 
the stimulus-response pattern repeats.” 5
I agree with  him  that “stigmergic”  behavior 
is one of the patterns that  govern  the 
c o m b i n a t o r i a l e vo l u t i o n  p r o c e s s o f 
i n n o v a t i o n  a n d t h e t e c h n o l o g i c a l 
environment.  Lewis establ ished the 
reciprocal  need inventors and innovators 
have for  each other  in  a  stimulus-response 
cycle  loop, but  I believe that  there is a third 
key  actor  in  the invention-innovation cycle: 
the adopter  of the technology.  Inventors, 
innovators,  and adopters stimulate each 
other.  Although  most adopters will be fairly 
passive actors,  some will  adapt the 
technology  to be used as something  that 
neither  the inventor  nor  the innovator 
thought it  could be used for,  in  a  process that 
Dix refers to as appropriation.6
I am  convinced that  all innovators are also 
active appropriators – they  appropriate 
existing technologies for  their  new  designs, 
using them in unanticipated ways.
For  example,  the designers of the Chevy 
Volt did not have to reinvent the wheel or 
velour  interiors. On the other  hand, I am  sure 
that  the inventors of the wheel  or  the so-
called “faux  velvet”  did not  envision  an 
electric car  as one of the applications of their 
technological innovations (none of them 
knew  what  electricity  or  cars would be!). 
Progressive innovation  requires the 
appropriation  of previous technologies to be 
used differently  from  what  the original 
designer anticipated. 
W h e n a  c l a n d e s t i n e a c t o r  u s e s 
infrastructure to do harm, he or  she illicitly 
appropriates the  technology  to achieve a  goal 
different from  what  the designers intended. 
In  the online world, we give the name of 
hacking  to that behavior. In the real world, 
terrorists hack our  high  tech society  every 
time they  are successful and the acceleration 
of technological development provides the 
illicit  appropriator  more building blocks and 
more possibilities to combine them  every  day. 
Combinatorial evolution creates unforeseen 
convergence that gives to the inventor-
innovator-appropriator  cycle more uchronic 
choices. 
Terrorism  is a  technological artifact that 
results from  the appropriation  of systems 
through  combinatorial evolution. Forecasting 
every  possible innovation in  this context is 
impossible.
Consequently, while it  seems like an  easy 
challenge to imagine planes as weapons (in 
fact  Tom  Clancy  wrote an  almost  uchronic 
novel out of this exact  idea),  Taleb reminds 
us “had the risk  been  reasonably  conceivable 
on  September 10, it  should not  have 
happened. If such  a  possibility  were deemed 
worthy  of attention, fighter planes would 
have circled the sky  above the twin towers, 
airplanes would have had locked bulletproof 
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doors, and the attack would not have taken 
p lace ,  per iod .”  He then cont inues : 
“something else might  have taken place. 
What? I don’t know.”7 
At this precise point, I am  sure, many 
patterns are forming  that  will  create 
appropriation  opportunities in  the future, 
and some of them  will be harmful.  Which 
ones will turn  out to be relevant? I don’t 
know either.
In  this complex adaptive environment  of 
accelerated high  tech  innovation,  the 
“connect-the-dots”  game seems to be the 
worst possible metaphor. If one has to be 
found,  I would like to offer  an “Encrypted 
letter  soup”  as a  replacement, where all the 
relevant  information  of a  catastrophic event 
becomes relevant  only  after  the pattern has 
been recognized. That is, after the fact.
In  this pr imordia l le t ter  soup of 
catastrophes, the proverbial  dots to be 
connected are encrypted in noise.  Worse, 
because there is no preconceived pattern,  the 
“dots”  evolve and change in  randomized 
ways, until one day they acquire meaning. 
Connecting  every  dot  is called paranoia. In 
the case of nation  states,  institutional 
paranoia  is quite often  the foundation  of 
totalitarian  regimes that  thrive in  the waters 
of the politics of fear.
We cannot anticipate all innovations, and 
imagination  understood as anticipatory 
forecasting of new  threats cannot  be 
bureaucratized. 
CONCLUSION: HOMELAND 
SECURITY: THE EARLY ADOPTER 
DISCIPLINE
Combinatorial evolution  of technology  does 
not have to favor  the illicit  appropriator.  This 
randomized environment created by  the 
accelerated pace of technology  cycles will 
favor  those who can  produce more ideas,  and 
ride the wave of uncertainty  instead of 
opposing it.
While  studying  the origins of the so-called 
geniuses,  Dean Simonton  found that  “The 
more ideas a  mind can  produce,  the higher 
the odds that those ideas will be original and 
varied…. Flexibility  and originality  are both 
to a  very  large extent mere consequences of 
fluency.” 
His research  conclusively  demonstrated 
that:
The creative process is to a  certain  extent 
blind. Even  the greatest creators possess no 
direct and secure path  to truth or  beauty. 
They  cannot guarantee that every  published 
idea  will  survive further evaluation and 
testing  at the hands  of audiences or 
colleagues. The best  the creative genius can 
do is  to be as prolific as possible in 
generating products in the hope that at 
least some subset will  survive the test of 
time. 8
The homeland security  effort  for  the next 
ten  years must  encourage public  and private 
inventors,  innovators,  and appropriators of 
new  disruptive security  ideas to be prolific 
and then  aggregate those efforts.  This would 
allow  us to surpass – by  a  few  orders of 
magnitude – the number of disruptive ideas 
produced by the clandestine actors. 
In  the next  ten  years, the Department of 
Homeland Security  (DHS) should embrace 
and become the early  adopter  of almost  all 
new  technologies,  appropriating  them, 
generating  knowledge about  them,  and 
proactively  thinking how  to recombine them 
with  other building blocks in  order  to make 
civilization more resilient. 
Ten  years from  now, DHS must  be the gold 
standard of usability  labs in  order  to 
understand, appropriate, and improve as 
many new technologies as possible. 
We cannot control  the complex  adaptive 
environment  of technological evolution  nor 
should we try, as positive innovation  requires 
– in  Schumpeter’s words – creative 
destruction  and chaos.9 Nevertheless, we can 
control  the government’s own pace of 
innovation, and its rate  of technological 
understanding and adoption.
For  the next ten years,  the homeland 
security  community  should become the most 
tech-enthusiastic  community  inside of 
government.  No one – with  the probable 
exception of DARPA  – should be more 
innovative and more “tech  savvy”  regarding 
what  makes technology  usable,  why  people 
use a  particular  technology,  and how  security 
can be improved while also improving 
usability. 
In 2021, homeland security  should be 
perceived as a  project  that  has helped 
NIETO-GOMEZ, PREVENTING THE NEXT 9/11  4
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 7, THE 9/11 ESSAYS (SEPTEMBER 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
maintain, or  even  accelerated, the pace of the 
innovation  cycle and not the opposite.  A 
project that  has made the backbone of 
American  innovation stronger,  more open  for 
positive appropriation,  and more resilient for 
when  the unavoidable illicit  appropriation 
does take place. 
Homeland security  as a  doctrine should 
embrace combinatorial evolution and plan 
for it. Government projects should be 
innovative,  but  also scalable, so they  can  be 
adapted to the unexpected,  and they  should 
prefer  social to centralized deployment of 
technology.  When  possible,  government 
should prefer  software instead of hardware 
and off-the-shelf to proprietary. It  should 
also design  policy  and infrastructure for 
openness instead of secrecy; there are more 
good people than  bad people, so policies 
should take advantage of this superiority  of 
numbers and aggregate their  knowledge and 
effort.
Homeland Security  technology  and 
strategies (also a  social technology) should be 
easily  upgradable.  If not, many  of them  will 
be will  be legacy  technology  by  the time they 
reach the public. Homeland security  decision 
makers should avoid bloated solutions and 
examine constantly  old security  measures to 
avoid petrifaction. It  might  even  be 
worthwhile to consider  “sunset”  security  laws 
and regulations,  in  order  to permanently 
question  if old security  layers are still  needed 
in  the ever-evolving security  environment 
(we might be able to finally  leave our cell 
phone on  during  take off…as many  iOS users 
already do, without knowing it!10)
Finally,  instead of official futures (we will 
get  them  wrong anyway),  the homeland 
security  planning process should plan  for 
Uchronia  and serendipity. Current scenario 
planning  methodologies are a  good starting 
p o i n t ,  a l t h o u g h  h o m e l a n d s e c u r i t y 
practitioners should create their own. 
Technological  evolution  is part  of our 
instinct  to explore.  It is who we are, and it  is 
part  of what makes us better  than  our 
previous selves.  In  2021,  the homeland 
security  project  should be the reason  why  the 
creative backbone of civilization is stronger 
and more resilient,  so the explorers of 
tomorrow  can  perpetuate the very  American 
tradition of thriving  in the unknown, pushing 
the last  frontier  – the knowledge frontier  – 
further, one innovation at a time. 
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Rodrigo Nieto-Gómez is a research professor 
at the department of National Security Affairs 
and the Center for Homeland Defense and 
Security at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California. His fields of research 
include  border security, the  implications of new 
technologies for security and defense  and the 
geopolitical and strategic implications of 
homeland security and defense policies.
NIETO-GOMEZ, PREVENTING THE NEXT 9/11  5
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 7, THE 9/11 ESSAYS (SEPTEMBER 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
NIETO-GOMEZ, PREVENTING THE NEXT 9/11  6
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 7, THE 9/11 ESSAYS (SEPTEMBER 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
1 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report (July 22, 2004), 47. 
http://www.9-11commission.gov/.
2 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (Kindle version, 2010).
3 Bryan Arthur, The Nature of Technology: What It Is and How It Evolves (Kindle version, 2009).
4 The history of aircraft hijacks is the history of a threat evolving from the first hijackings that were conducted by 
pilots trying to escape from authoritarian communist regimes, to hijacking as an extortion tool, to the first incidents 
of terrorist sabotage. See: http://fcafa.wordpress.com/2011/03/12/they-flew-to-exile-1950/. 
5 Ted Lewis, Bak’s Sand Pile: Strategies for a Catastrophic World (Monterey, CA: Agile Press, 2011), 259. 
6 Alan Dix, “Designing for Appropriation,” Proceedings of the BCS HCI 2007 Conference, People and Computers XXI 
(London, UK: BCS-eWik), 2, http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/~dixa/publist-2007.html.  
7 Taleb, The Black Swan.
8 Dean Keith Simonton, Origins of Genius: Darwinian Perspectives on Creativity (Kindle version, 1999). 
9 Joseph Schumpeter might be, from among all the classical economists, the one who best understood the nature of 
innovation and change. In Schumpeterian terms: “Industrial mutation – if I might use that biological term – that 
incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating 
a new one. The process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.” From: Joseph Alois 
Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Google books version, 2003).
10 iOS is the operating system that powers most Apple mobile devices, including the iPhone, iPad and iPod Touch. 
Turning the device off is a two step process that requires that the user hold the off button for four seconds, and then 
move a virtual button from left to right in the touch screen. I have noticed many times that during take off or landing, 
when supposedly all electronic devices should be off for the security of the plane, what many iOS users do is to press 
the off button once. While this behavior darkens the screen, the Apple device is still fully powered. Nevertheless, no 
accidents have occurred after many years of unintentional violations of the “turn off all electronic equipment” security  
rule. 
Security Studies: The Homeland Adapts
Stanley Supinski
If there is any  advantage to being at  war,  it is 
that  it  creates conditions for  exploring  new 
knowledge and gathering  disparate players 
around the flagpole for  support. 1 The war and 
political environment  instigated by  the events 
that  occurred on Sept  11,  2001  created just 
such  conditions,  and academia  immediately 
realized it  had an  important  educational  role 
to fulfill.  It  was clear  from  the outset  that  the 
n a t i o n ’ s c a p a c i t y  t o a d d r e s s t h e 
overwhelming  challenges required for 
homeland security  and defense needed to be 
significantly  bolstered. There were academic 
programs at  the time that focused on 
terrorism,  emergency  management,  and 
other related disciplines, but none called 
“homeland security,”  and certainly  none that 
covered the wide range of knowledge 
required.  Academia  and government joined 
forces to resolve this intellectual and 
personnel deficiency  and during the past 
decade homeland security  education  and 
research  have expanded at  a  phenomenal 
rate.  
There was historical  precedent  for 
leveraging  academia  to support  national 
needs. During World War  II,  the scramble to 
deve lop an  a tomic weapon  led the 
government  to undertake the Manhattan 
project, an  intellectual  and scientific 
enterprise. Though led by  the federal 
government,  academia took on  a  key  role in 
c o n d u c t i n g s c i e n t i f i c r e s e a r c h  a n d 
development; their  role in  this process cannot 
be understated and the effects were far 
reaching. Just  as significant was academia’s 
part in  the Cold War. Education programs 
aimed directly  at  supporting that  conflict, 
including those in  national  security  affairs, 
Eastern  European/Soviet  area  studies, 
political science,  and international relations, 
flourished nationwide.  Academic programs 
that  served to support the war  indirectly, 
such  as engineering  and basic sciences that 
built  the expertise needed for  technological 
research  and development, also expanded. 
The federal government  bolstered these 
programs with dramatic increases in  funding 
through  the National Science Foundation  and 
other means.2 The Cold War  was responsible 
for  an unprecedented growth  of academic 
programs supporting  national  priorities 
“both  in  its material manifestations and 
through  the ideological atmosphere that it 
was responsible for creating.” 3  
The decade since 9/11  has seen  a  similar 
response. The federal government and its 
national security  prerogatives helped drive 
academic  priorities, and academia  showed 
that  it could rapidly  adapt to national needs. 
The combination  of federal support, 
adaptability,  and the intellectual resources 
that  academia provides have resulted in  what 
many view as a new academic discipline.
A NEW REQUIREMENT – 
KNOWLEDGEABLE HOMELAND 
SECURITY PROFESSIONALS
The period immediately  following  9/11  saw 
the enactment  of hundreds of statutes and 
regulations,  substantial  changes in  policy 
initiatives, the most  massive governmental 
reorganization  since 1947,  and brought the 
new  business of homeland security  to the fore 
of American  consciousness. This new  mission 
set and political environment  mandated 
personnel with  an entirely  new  collection  of 
competencies and knowledge.  The new 
Department of Homeland Security  (DHS) 
required expertise  to meld its twenty-two 
formerly  independent  agencies into a 
functional  organization.  Every  federal 
department assumed new  responsibilities; 
each  of the 87,000 government  jurisdictions 
and their  entities added homeland security  to 
the ir  miss ion set ; and most  major 
corporations established homeland security 
offices, all  requiring personnel that 
understood the new  way  of doing  business. 
Shortly  after  9/11, Lee Hamilton,  director  of 
the Woodrow  Wilson Center  for International 
Scholars,  testifying  before the Senate 
Committee on  Governmental  Affairs 
recognized that: 
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The maintenance of American power  in  the 
world depends on the quality  of US 
government personnel, civil  and military, at 
all  levels…The US faces a  broader  range of 
national  security  challenges  today, 
requiring policy analysts and intelligence 
personnel  with expertise in  more countries, 
regions and issues…we must take 
immediate action  in  the personnel  area  to 
ensure that the United States can meet 
future challenges.4
The immediacy  of this need made this 
challenge particularly  daunting. Government, 
academia, and others involved in  homeland 
security  did not wait  idly  by  for  direction 
from  a  coordinating authority  to dictate what 
their  programs should look like.  In  true free 
enterprise fashion,  a  wide range of initiatives 
and approaches were undertaken  to address 
the various aspects of the shortfall,  including 
training,  education  at  both  the undergraduate 
and graduate levels, and various forms of 
research  and technological development. 
While the effectiveness of the effort to 
develop homeland security  education  and 
training cannot  be denied, the lack of a 
coordinating body,  and the inherent breadth 
of what homeland security  entails,  has 
resulted in great inconsistency.  
DEVELOPMENT OF AND INFLUENCES ON 
THE HOMELAND SECURITY 
“DISCIPLINE” 
The fact  that  programs do not  look  alike is 
not surprising, nor  is it necessarily  a  negative 
reflection  on the homeland security  academic 
community.   Various influences have shaped 
what  homeland security  education  looks like 
today; government led initiatives,  faculty 
e x p e r t i s e ( o r  l a c k t h e r e o f ) ,  a n d 
administrative groups have had influence 
over what and how higher institutions teach.  
One example of a  government led 
initiative has been the Center  for  Homeland 
Defense and Security  (CHDS) at  the Naval 
Postgraduate School,  which  publishes 
Homeland Security  Affairs.  CHDS was 
established in  2002  through  a  partnership 
between  the Department  of Justice, Congress, 
and the Navy  and its sponsorship moved to 
the new  Department of Homeland Security  in 
2 0 0 3 . T h i s p a r t n e r s h i p l e d t o t h e 
development of the nation’s first  graduate 
Homeland Security  master’s degree program, 
and other  programs emphasizing policy  and 
strategy  have used the CHDS curriculum. 
Additionally,  the Center  was tasked to use its 
government  funding  to assist  other  academic 
institutions,  at no cost to the institutions,  to 
develop homeland security  programs around 
the country  by  sharing curriculum  advice and 
course materials. 
T h e H o m e l a n d S e c u r i t y / D e f e n s e 
Education  Consortium  (HSDEC) is an 
example of an  administrative group created 
to influence homeland security  education.  In 
an  effort to establish  curricular standards, 
support  program  development, and provide 
prospective students with  an additional 
program  selection data point,  the  HSDEC 
was established by  US Northern  Command in 
2003.  The organization  morphed into the 
Homeland Security/Defense Education 
Consortium  Association  (HSDECA)  and 
acquired independent, non-profit  status in 
2007.  
A  more recent  government influence on 
the shape of homeland security  education  has 
come from  the Transportation  Security 
Administration’s Associates Program.  The 
goal of the program  is to generally  increase 
the level of education  for  TSA  personnel,  and 
in  particular  provide them  core homeland 
security  knowledge. At  program  rollout in  the 
Fall of 2010, the courses were being  delivered 
by  twenty-five community  colleges in  twenty-
two states,  almost all  of which  also offered 
them  to their  other  student  populations, 
especially  those in  law  enforcement, fire 
science, and related programs. With  the 
expected expansion  of the program  to all fifty 
states by  the fall of this year,  the TSA-driven 
and funded curriculum  will have increased 
influence at the community college level.  
When institutions decide to establish  a 
program, they  normally  root  them  in  an 
existing discipline,  which offers a  pool  of 
potential faculty  members and an existing 
constituency  of students and after graduation 
employers. The majority  of homeland 
security  programs in existence today  are 
linked to three primary  content  areas: public 
administration,  emergency  management, or 
criminal  justice.  However  the breadth  of the 
topic has also led to programs in  departments 
of political science,  history,  psychology, 
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public health,  law,  and many  others. For 
example, The University  of Southern 
California’s homeland security  certificate is 
offered within  their  school of engineering  and 
is influenced by  their  well-established 
aerospace program. Penn State’s homeland 
security  master’s degree is offered within 
their  School of Public Health.  With  such  a 
disparity  of influence, shaped by  the unique 
approach  taken  by  the hundreds of colleges 
and universities that  have zealously  pursued 
developing homeland security  related 
programs,  what these programs look like 
varies significantly across institutions.
In  many  cases, academic institutions have 
built  these programs for  altruistic reasons, 
but market demands have also exerted a 
powerful influence.  Institutions want to be on 
the cutting  edge of education  and support  the 
needs of the job market, but they  are also 
lured by  the prospect  of high volumes of 
paying  students. The rush  to take advantage 
of the demand has resulted in  wide variations 
in  program  quality  and curriculum,  with 
courses,  often  taught by  faculty  with  little  or 
no direct  professional experience or 
background.  This is also reflected in  how 
programs have been  initiated: right  after 
9/11,  most  were started bottom-up by 
individual or  groups of faculty  members 
interested in  the subject; but  as the discipline 
has evolved, institution administrations have 
seen the value and program  establishment  is 
now more often directed from the top.
So, after  ten  years, is there a  homeland 
security  academic discipline or  is it  just  a 
collection of components from  others? The 
debate still rages,  but  considering  that  it  is a 
branch  of knowledge which  is taught or 
researched at over 300  institutions of higher 
learning, that it  is defined by  recognized 
academic  journals devoted to the subject, and 
that  there are learned societies and academic 
departments to which  their  practitioners 
belong,  it  is well  on  the way. The fact  that 
several schools will  be offering  doctoral level 
homeland security  programs beginning  later 
this year, including  Ole Miss and New  Jersey 
City University, is further testament.
Additionally, although  there is no 
agreement  on  a  standard curriculum  or what 
should or should not be included, ten  years 
after  9/11  a  general picture can  be drawn. 
This basic framework, determined by 
homeland security  academics,5  consists of: 
current and emerging  threats; context  and 
organizations involved; policies, strategies, 
and legal issues; and processes and 
management. While this is a  pretty  generic 
list,  it  is the only  way  to provide an  overall 
summary  of what  homeland security 
education looks like. However, this general 
outline does define the discipline’s content, 
and it  affords the flexibility  demanded of this 
very diverse field of study. 
FUTURE CHALLENGES AND CONCLUSION
While many  in  academia  believed that 
homeland security  education,  and in  fact the 
term  homeland security  itself, would be 
fleeting, the community  that  has been  built is 
a  testament  to its value, and there is little 
doubt  that  it  is here to stay. Nevertheless, 
making  this community  a  permanent and 
respected part  of the educational and 
research  and development  landscape will 
require more work.  
First  and foremost,  there needs to be 
agreement on  what specific knowledge 
parameters come with  the term  “homeland 
security  professional.”  Despite the various 
existing influences on  the topic,  a  commonly 
agreed to core will ensure consistency. 
Second,  a  broadly  accepted validation 
authority,  in  the form  of a  member  run 
accreditation  association, should play  a 
significant role in  furthering the discipline. 
Unless standards are regulated to some 
degree, inconsistency  and examples of poor 
quality  are inevitable. Finally,  closely  related 
to the first  two issues,  is the need to develop a 
cadre of qualified faculty  and researchers. 
The development of research  PhD programs 
in  homeland security, already  begun, should 
address this issue in the long term.
The final question  is just  how  much of a 
role  should government  have in  the march 
toward a  discipline? Government programs 
and legislation  will always serve to sway  the 
direction academia  takes.   The shift  after 
Hurricane Katrina  from  an  almost  exclusive 
focus on  terror  to all hazards was certainly 
reflected in  academic  programs.  However, 
shaping  academic  efforts should not  go any 
further: government’s role is to nurture,  not 
to prescribe. We have gone in  many 
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directions as we have developed our 
programs,  and those directions are marked 
with  both successes and failures.  But  the 
independence and autonomy  of the 
universities, and those working within  all 
settings of higher learning,  must  be 
maintained.  Decisions regarding curricular 
content and assessments of academic 
excellence must  come from  within  these 
institutions and from  the accreditation 
procedures and bodies they  construct. 6  As 
our  profession  of homeland security 
continues to evolve,  these bodies must 
become more active participants in  the 
standard setting process.
The team  effort  by  government  and 
academia  has contributed to developing the 
knowledge and resource base needed to 
handle all-hazards homeland security,  but 
educating  a workforce and populace is a  long-
term  process. Our  terrorist  adversaries have 
shown they  have the patience to make this a 
long-term  struggle,  and the number  of 
natural hazards we have to contend with 
continues to climb.  Only  education  can 
ensure we have the fundamental skills and 
knowledge needed to minimize loss of life 
and property  and handle the long-term  threat 
most effectively.  The academic community 
capitalized on  the sense of urgency  created by 
9/11; maintaining  the momentum  is an 
enduring  challenge.  However, it  is a  challenge 
we as a  nation must meet.   The Honorable 
Paul  McHale, former Assistant  Secretary  of 
Defense for  Homeland Defense,  clearly 
recognized the value of educating society  and 
the importance of it to our  current effort 
when  he stated: “Terrorism  will be defeated 
by intellect, not dogma.” 7 
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Inter-Organizational Collaboration:  Addressing the Challenge
Susan Page Hocevar, Erik Jansen, and Gail Fann Thomas
9/11  and Hurricane Katrina  exposed the 
United States’ vulnerabilities within  and 
across organizational and jurisdictional 
boundaries.  A  number  of breakdowns in 
collaboration were evident: a  lack  of 
information  sharing  among  agencies, 
confused inter-organizational relationships, 
competing  roles and responsibilities,  and 
shortcomings in leadership.  
In response to these inadequacies in 
collaboration, scholars have engaged in 
theoretical  and empirical work  in hopes of 
preventing  another  9/11  and enhancing 
overall  national security.  Studies about the 
need to collaborate have been  the most 
prevalent.  Less prevalent  are studies about 
the “how” of collaboration. To address the 
“how”  of collaboration,  we wanted to better 
understand the enablers and barriers to 
effective inter-agency  collaboration.  To 
address this question,  we queried and 
conducted surveys with homeland security 
m a n a g e r s a c r o s s a  b r o a d r a n g e o f 
organizations and agencies to find out  what 
factors contribute to effective collaboration 
and what factors inhibit collaboration. The 
resulting  model of collaborative capacity  is 
presented here.
INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL 
COLLABORATIVE CAPACITY (ICC) 
MODEL
The response planning and prevention for 
both  man-made and natural  disasters are 
complex  problems that  require the 
capabilities of many  disciplines that have 
both  aligned and competing  interests and 
usually  function  without an  over-arching 
command authority. Because of the lack of an 
integrating  hierarchy, organization  theory 
would define this as an  “under-designed 
system.”  As such, it  requires leadership 
engagement to guide,  motivate,  and structure 
the collaborations needed to be successful  in 
the complex homeland security environment.  
W e d e f i n e I n t e r - o r g a n i z a t i o n a l 
Collaborative Capacity  (ICC) as “the 
capability  of organizations (or  a  set of 
organizations) to enter  into,  develop,  and 
sustain  inter-organizational systems in 
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Figure 1:  Organizations in a Common Problem Space2
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Figure 1  illustrates the simplest  image of a 
collaborative context with  two participating 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s a n d a n  i n t e r - a g e n c y 
organization that  share an interest  in  a 
problem  space.  The inter-agency  organization 
can  be a  temporary  task force, convened for  a 
specific time-limited purpose, or a  more 
formally  established structure such  as an 
intell igence fusion  center.  All three 
organizations depicted have a  collaborative 
capacity  that impacts how  effectively  the 
problem  is addressed. A  key  assumption  of 
this model is that  building  collaborative 
capacity  requires deliberate leadership 
attention  and the alignment  of organizational 
design  elements toward collaboration. The 
ICC model  provides a  mechanism  to assess 
different factors that  contribute to an 
organization’s capacity  to collaborate with 
other  organizations.  It  can serve as a 
framework to diagnose current collaborative 
capabilities and provide data  to guide 
organizational changes to improve those 
capabilities. The model  is comprised of five 
organizational domains: Purpose and 
Strategy, Structure, Rewards and Incentives, 
People,  and Lateral  Mechanisms. There are 
thirteen  factors measured by  the ICC 
diagnostic  survey  that  are distributed across 
the domains of the organizational system  as 
illustrated in Figure 2.  
Figure 2:  Inter-Organizational Collaborative Capacity Model:  Domains and Factors
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The ICC model  has three factors in  the 
domain  of Purpose and Strategy:  Felt 
Need  is the organization’s recognition of 
interdependence with  others and the 
acknowledged need to collaborate in  order  to 
effectively  accomplish  its mission  and goals. 
Felt  Need can be derived from  a  perceived 
threat or  problem  and thus emphasizes 
response capabilities; or  it can  be motivated 
by  opportunity  for  pro-action  or  prevention. 
Strategic Act ions  include goals for 
c o l l a b o r a t i o n ,  d e m o n s t r a t e d s e n i o r 
leadership commitment,  and the willingness 
to consider  other  organizations’ interests in 
planning. The third factor assesses the  extent 
to which  the organization  makes adequate 
Resource  Investments  (e.g. ,  budget, 
personnel) in collaboration. Felt  Need to 
collaborate is typically  the initiating factor; 
but  without  the additional leadership, 
planning, and resource commitments,  there 
is inadequate strategic  emphasis for  building 
collaborative capacity.
The Structure domain is comprised of 
four  factors.  Collaboration Structures  can 
include liaison  roles,  participation  in  inter-
agency  teams and task forces, clearly 
established roles for  each participating 
organization, and internal processes that 
enable effective inter-organizational 
collaboration. Structural Flexibility  allows 
partnerships to adapt  as requirements 
change, demonstrates willingness to adjust 
procedures to facilitate coordination,  and 
responds to the requirements of other 
organizations. Metrics  include established 
criteria  and performance standards for 
evaluating  inter-organizational efforts,  and 
routine mechanisms for assessing  outcomes. 
Support for Individual Collaboration Efforts 
has two facets. The first is how  clearly 
individual collaborative work  is structured in 
terms of clear  goals, constraints, and 
authorities.   The second is the strength  of the 
link between personnel  in  boundary-
spanning roles working  directly  with  other 
organizations and the strategic  leadership of 
their  own  organization. This is reflected in 
the extent to which the organization  follows 
through  on  recommendations of these 
boundary spanners.
T h e I C C m o d e l  f o c u s e s o n  w a y s 
organizations align different internal design 
elements to improve collaboration; thus the 
Incentives and Reward Systems domain 
considers Reward Systems  as they  impact 
the organization’s personnel.  Are employees 
rewarded for  investing  time in  building 
collaborative relationships with other 
organization members and for  successful 
collaborative results? Are collaborative 
talents and achievements considered when 
people are reviewed for  promotion? There 
are, of course,  external factors that  motivate 
an  organization  to engage in  collaboration 
(e.g.,  mandated requirements or  financial 
awards through  grants); but  these incentives 
come from  the larger  organizational  context 
or  environment  rather  than  the “managed” 
reward system  inside the organization  in the 
ICC model.   
There are four  factors that  constitute  the 
Lateral  Mechanisms domain representing 
both  the “hard” and the “soft” aspects of 
lateral  coordination. Social Capital 
represents the social and professional 
relationships that organizational  members 
h a v e w i t h  c o u n t e r p a r t s i n  o t h e r 
organizations.  It  is a  basis for  awareness and 
trust  building.  Collaborative Tools and 
Technologies  prov ide the technica l 
mechanisms for  collaboration  such  as inter-
o p e r a b l e  i n f o r m a t i o n  s y s t e m s a n d 
c o l l a b o r a t i v e p l a n n i n g  t o o l s . T h e 
Information Sharing factor  represents the 
organization’s norms and values that support 
information  sharing, and the adequacy  of 
access that other  organizations have to 
information  relevant to their  success in  the 
collaborative activity.  Collaborative  Learning 
is demonstrated in several ways – joint 
training,  learning  about  the interests and 
capabilities (and limitations)  of other 
organizations,  and systematic assessment of 
l e s s o n s l e a r n e d t o i m p r o v e f u t u r e 
collaborations.  
The People  domain  has only  a  single 
f a c t o r  – I n d i v i d u a l C o l l a b o r a t i v e 
Capabilities.  These include the attitudes, 
skills,  knowledge,  and behaviors of individual 
organizational members that  impact the 
organization’s ability  to collaborate. 
Examples are  conflict  management  skills, 
willingness to engage in  shared decision-
making, respect  for  the expertise of those in 
other  organizations, and knowledge and 
understanding  of how  other  organizations 
work. 
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SUPPORTING EVIDENCE FOR 
COLLABORATIVE CAPACITY FACTORS 
Many  other  scholars have studied the issues 
contributing  to or  preventing  collaboration. 
Paul Stockton  and Patr ick  Roberts 
summarize the findings from  a 2008  forum 
on  homeland security  convened by  Stanford 
University’s Center  for  International Security 
and Cooperation  (CISAC).  They  acknowledge 
the absence of hierarchy  that  uses a  top-down 
centralized approach  to homeland security 
planning  and conclude that  the relevant 
stakeholders (including  federal, state, local, 
and private sector  organizations) need to: 
collectively  identify  a  shared motivation, 
need and purpose; formulate goals that  they 
will jointly  pursue; and use a  consensus 
process for  planning  the means to accomplish 
those goals through  unity  of effort.  They  also 
recommend structural mechanisms like an 
integrated staff organization  and the 
development of doctrine to guide and 
coordinate operations.3 
Sharon  Caudle cites a  study  that  found the 
m o s t e f f e c t i v e i n t e r - g o v e r n m e n t a l 
cooperation occurs when participating  bodies 
acknowledge a  high  level of vulnerability  and 
interdependence and establish  formalized 
partnerships with  clear authorities, roles and 
procedures. She describes additional 
enabling factors that  include:  leadership to 
champion  commitment  to partnership; 
governing  and decision-making  structure; 
policies,  processes and partnership norms; 
activities to build personal relationships 
across organizations; strategic goals with 
designated measures and clearly  defined 
roles ,  responsibi l i t ies and resource 
c o m m i t m e n t s ; a n d a  p e r f o r m a n c e 
management  system  for  both  organizational 
and individual-level performance. 4 
Finally,  Amy  Donahue and Robert  Tuohy 
studied how  to better  learn  from  the lessons 
of disasters.  They  identify  a  number  of 
repeating  “lessons”  that  include failed 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , w e a k p l a n n i n g , 
uncoordinated leadership, and resource 
c o n s t r a i n t s .  T h e y  p r o p o s e t h r e e 
recommendations to strengthen  the learning 
process toward actual changes in  disaster 
planning  and response practices: (1)  recast 
exercises as learning activities where failures 
are not punished but used to focus critical 
analysis; (2) develop robust nation-wide 
capability  to gather, validate,  analyze and 
disseminate information  from  incidents; and 
(3) establish  incentives to “institutionalize 
lessons-learning  processes at  all levels of 
government.” 5
In  2005, the U.S.  General  Accountability 
Organization  reported on  a  study  conducted 
to identify  practices to “Help Enhance and 
Sustain  Collaboration  among Federal 
Agencies.”  It documented the following 
recommendations:
• Define and articulate a  common 
outcome;
• Establish  mutually  reinforcing  or 
joint strategies;
• Identify  and address needs by 
leveraging resources;
• A g r e e o n  r o l e s a n d 
responsibilities;
• Establish  compatible policies, 
procedures, and other  means to 
operate across agency boundaries;
• Develop mechanisms to monitor, 
evaluate, and report on results;
• Reinforce agency  accountability 
for  collaborative efforts through 
agency plans and reports; and
• R e i n f o r c e i n d i v i d u a l 
accountability  for  collaborative 
efforts through  performance 
management systems. 6
These eight practices can all  be mapped to 
one of the five domains and thirteen factors 
of the ICC model.  The two domains that  are 
not explicitly  included in this list are the 
Individual Collaborative Capacities and 
Lateral Mechanisms. However,  a  more recent 
GAO report cites four  actions that agencies 
should take to enhance interagency 
collaboration for national security:
• D e v e l o p a n d i m p l e m e n t 
overarching strategies
• C r e a t e c o l l a b o r a t i v e 
organizations.
• Develop a well-trained workforce.
• Share and integrate national 
security  information across 
agencies.7
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These four  recommendations repeat the 
need for  attention  to strategic  and structural 
requirements for  collaboration, and now 
include two – information  sharing  and 
individual capabilities – that  represent 
Lateral Mechanisms (information sharing) 
and the personnel  capabilities specified in the 
People domain of the ICC model.
TRENDS IN INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL 
COLLABORATION 
The most significant  post-9/11  trend related 
to this essay  is the increasing  attention, of 
scholars and practitioners,  to the importance 
of inter-organizational collaboration  for 
homeland defense and security. As the 2005 
GAO report  states,  “the 21st century  will  be 
difficult, if not  impossible,  for  any  single 
agency  to address alone.” 8  One initial 
response to heightened awareness of the need 
f o r c o l l a b o r a t i o n  w a s t o e s t a b l i s h 
requirements through  mechanisms such  as 
the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. 
But establishing  requirements does not 
automatically  instill the participating 
organizations with  the designed systems, 
motivation, norms,  individual  competencies, 
or strategic  appreciation  necessary  for 
successful  collaboration. So an important 
related trend is the emphasis on  the need for 
organizational  leaders to deliberately  attend 
to the development of collaborative 
capabilities across all aspect of their 
organization  including  strategy, structure, 
reward systems, lateral mechanisms,  and 
people.
The types of organizations viewed as 
critical partners for  homeland security  are 
expanding.  The initial focus was primarily  on 
domestic government agencies at  local,  state, 
tribal and national levels. But  recent DHS 
reports emphasize the importance of 
strengthening collaborative capabilities with 
the private sector,  non-governmental 
organizations,  and international partners.9 
The scope of issues that  are seen  as pertinent 
to national  security  has also expanded to 
include such  concerns as cyber-space,  climate 
change, and the global  economy. These new 
domains require the development of new 
goals,  strategies and linkages with  an  even 
broader  set of stakeholders.  Another  recent 
focus has been  on  citizen  involvement  in 
homeland security.  Community  Emergency 
Response Teams (CERT)  and America’s 
Waterway  Watch  offer  both  prevention and 
response capabilities that  need to be 
i n t e g r a t e d i n t o l o c a l a n d r e g i o n a l 
collaboration  planning and information 
systems. 
A  potentially  significant challenge moving 
forward is the resource-constrained 
environment  resulting  from  the economic 
downturn. The organizations expected to 
participate in  collaborations are also 
competing  for  federal and local funds to 
support  their  organization-level operations. 
To the extent  that  collaboration  is seen  as an 
additional cost  that is secondary  to the core 
mission  of an  organization,  commitment  to 
collaboration  may  wane.  A  related question 
raised by  Sheryl  Jardine’s research  is whether 
current regional collaborations will  be 
sustained if and when federal grants for 
regional  planning are reduced or  eliminated. 
Her  sample of homeland security  managers 
reported an  increased appreciation  for  the 
value of regional planning and benefits 
gained through  partnerships that  had not 
previously  existed.  This is as a  direct  result  of 
federal  funding  requirements or  support. 
However,  the participating managers also 
acknowledge the costs and challenges of 
collaboration. Perhaps the strongest  indicator 
of concern  is that a  number  of the managers 
said they  would not  continue in  regional 
collaborations if funding  or  requirements 
ended. 10 This is clearly  a  question  that  needs 
further investigation.
The rise of Web 2.0 technologies has 
suggested the potential for  e-government, 
which  in  terms of the ICC model, offers 
potential new  tools and technologies that can 
be harnessed in  the critical  domain  of Lateral 
Mechanisms. The collaborative efficiencies 
within  and across boundaries resulting  from 
new  interactive, Internet  technologies can 
improve information  sharing  and provide a 
means of integrating and making sense of 
information  more quickly. Indeed,  the new 
platforms are often called “collaborative 
technologies.”  However, the technology 
investment decisions, which  include the 
technical infrastructure of software, 
hardware and systems as well as the training 
and skills to develop,  deploy  and maintain 
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those systems,  will be a substantial challenge. 
The new  technology  has the promise of 
reaching beyond boundaries to invite new 
types of collaboration  for increased 
efficiencies and collaboration,  but  there are 
few  current case studies. 11  Determining the 
tradeoffs, threats and opportunities of the 
rapidly  changing  domains of Internet and 
mobile technologies represents a  major  area 
of interest for practice and research.  
CONCLUSION: WHERE DO WE GO 
FROM HERE?
What  has become evident  is just  how  difficult 
it  is to achieve effective collaboration.  In an 
era  of increasing  interdependence among 
organizations and the problems they  face,  the 
challenges and opportunities for  building 
inter-organizational collaborative capacity 
are not going  to go away. At least  in  the near 
term, the resources available  to US 
government  organizations and many  of their 
non-government  and international partners 
are likely  to decrease, creating  pressures and 
potential barriers for collaboration.  At  the 
same time, the technical  systems for  enabling 
collaboration  suggest the potential  for 
possible new  innovations. If homeland 
security  and defense managers are to be 
s u c c e s s f u l i n  b u i l d i n g  t h e i n t e r -
organizational collaborative capacity 
necessary  to navigate these new  waters,  they 
will  need to align  the design of their 
organizations in  the critical domains of 
strategy,  structure,  lateral processes, reward 
systems, and people.  There may  be no greater 
challenge or  opportunity  for  engaging the 
complex,  uncertain  problems that  will  face 
us. 
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Reflections on 9/11:
Looking for a Homeland Security Game Changer
Samuel H. Clovis, Jr.
The public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for 
promoting our common destiny.
Felix Frankfurter, 1948
When invited to write an essay  reflecting  on 
the tenth  anniversary  of 9/11  I, like many  of 
my  colleagues I am  sure,  had mixed 
emotions.  The events of that  day  still  make 
me weak-kneed as I remember  seeing  so 
much  destruction  by  resolute attackers who 
showed imagination  and persistence. As a 
member  of the military,  I came into the 
service during  the Viet  Nam  War,  and was on 
active duty  for  the Iran  hostage affair, the 
Beirut  bombing, Grenada, Desert  Storm, and 
operations in  the Balkans. I was the 
quintessential Cold Warrior  until  my 
retirement from  the service in  1996, but I had 
not experienced anything like what  happened 
on  that  fateful  day.  I was a  civilian  teaching  at 
a  small college in  the Midwest and happened 
to be taking  my  stepson to school when  the 
first  airplane hit the World Trade Center 
tower.  I listened incredulously  to radio 
reports, but  as time moved on,  so my 
thinking  turned to experiences I had as a war 
game designer.  I simply  could not believe 
that  individuals bent  on  our  demise actually 
perpetrated events we had imagined in  the 
comfort  of a  conference room.  From  that  day 
forward, things have not been the same.
As fate would have it, I became involved in 
“homeland security”  in  the wake of the 
attacks. I left the intellectual  protection of 
academia  and returned to government 
contract work right after  the Department of 
Homeland Security  was established. My  first 
task with  my  new  employer  was to learn  as 
much  about the new  organization as I could. 
Contractors from  all over  the country  were 
flocking to the new  revenue troughs to feed 
on  what appeared at  the time to be a  never-
ending  flow  of funds to support the new 
mission  space.  The White House and the new 
department were issuing  national documents 
like confetti  at  a  ticker tape parade.  We had 
strategies,  goals,  guidance,  directives,  lists 
and plans – all of which  were focused on 
diminishing  or  eliminating terrorism  as a 
threat  to Americans at  home or  abroad.  We 
jumped into a  war  in Afghanistan  and then 
one in Iraq. We are still in both places.
Over  time,  state and local governments 
began  to absorb “homeland security” mission 
space into their  already  robust  public safety 
and emergency  management  operations. 
Their  focus,  for  the most  part,  moved to all-
hazards,  of which  terrorism  was but  one.  At 
the national level,  however,  the central 
government  maintained (as it  does to this 
day) a primary  focus on  anti- and counter-
terrorism. Playing  nice with  others dissolved 
into traditional institutional  pathologies with 
the national government focusing  on a  top-
down,  one-size-fits-all approach  to homeland 
s e c u r i t y  w h i l e t h e s t a t e a n d l o c a l 
governments worked on  improving  inter-
local  cooperation and enhancing capacities to 
deal with  higher  probability  events, usually 
the result  of nature. Though  the above might 
represent  a  skeptical  outlook  on  how  things 
stand today,  there have been  some 
measurable improvements in  homeland 
security.  
The current established state of homeland 
security  “normal”  offers some hope for  a 
safer,  more secure nation, but  we are a long 
ways from  where we might be. The nation’s 
economic  woes have put a  strain  on 
homeland security  resources at  all levels and 
forecasts indicate these conditions are not 
likely  to change in  the near  future. With 
r e s o u r c e s s o c o n s t r a i n e d , h o w  a r e 
jurisdictions to maintain, let alone grow, 
r e s p o n d e r  c a p a c i t i e s t h a t e n h a n c e 
community  resilience and the security  of 
citizens? Are the precious resources of our 
cities, counties and states being  spread too 
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thin because we are not  addressing  public 
policy  reforms that would genuinely  reduce 
the cost of governance? I submit  that public 
education reform  is the investment  with  the 
highest potential return.
Several years ago, I was asked by  the 
Preparedness Division of DHS to examine 
possible alternatives for  distributing  state 
homeland security  grant  funds. One of the 
tasks was to determine if different  formulae 
could be developed that  would essentially 
lead to a  more equitable distribution  based 
on  risk or  other  factors that  might  be 
appropriate. Specifically,  I was asked to 
develop a  method that would allow  an 
“ a p p l e s - t o - a p p l e s ”  c o m p a r i s o n o f 
jurisdictions that  might better  inform  the 
grant distribution process.  As often  happens 
in  academic  research, one often  stumbles 
a c r o s s s o m e t h i n g  t h a t  w a s w h o l l y 
unexpected.  When comparing  jurisdictions, 
the one attribute that  seemed to influence all 
others was the level of educational 
attainment  of residents in  that  jurisdiction. I 
have since been tinkering  with  developing 
mathematical  models to help me validate my 
original  findings, and I am  making progress. 
I am  convinced that  a  strong  public  education 
system  could have the single largest impact 
on  the security  of the United States.  Public 
education reform,  then,  could be a game 
changer  for  homeland security. Through 
more effective public education, the nation 
could lower  the social costs that  are now 
applied to welfare, income security  programs, 
public safety,  and health  care. With every 
marginal  improvement in  public  education, 
the nation  reaps a  geometric reduction  in  the 
cost  of social programs,  thus freeing  those 
resources to be applied to other  public goods 
and services.
Last  fall,  I started a  lecture series on the 
Constitution,  government,  and governance in 
America  today.  Over the course of the nine 
part  series, it  became apparent  that 
discussing  education  reform  would be 
required in  separate seminars.  In  the spring, 
I delivered two lectures on  education reform 
that  drew  the largest crowds of the entire 
series. Because every  American  goes to 
school, all are  familiar  with  the education 
system.  What  many  citizens do not  know, 
however,  is the current state of public 
education in  this country.  Here are some 
highlights:
• Public  education  represents the highest 
outlay  for  state  and local governments (25 
percent  of budgets), outstripping 
Medicaid (13 percent).1
• Of the 62  million  children  between  the 
ages of three and nineteen in  this country, 
11  percent go to private schools,  3  percent 
attend charter  schools,  and as many  as 6 
percent  are now  home schooled.  The 
remaining  80 percent  attend public 
schools.  Of those children  age three to 
seventeen, 94  percent  are in  school. Of 
those ages eighteen  or  nineteen, only  69 
percent are still in school. 2
• Over  31  million children  are on  some 
form  of federally  funded school  meal 
program. These are means-tested 
programs for  children  from  households 
that  have incomes at 130  percent  of the 
poverty level or below.3
• For  the past  forty  years,  overall academic 
performance in  American  schools has not 
improved.  Forty  years ago,  the United 
States was number one in  academic 
performance in  the world.  Today,  the US 
ranks twenty-fourth  is math  and twenty-
fifth in science. 4
• Fewer than 35  percent  of students achieve 
basic proficiency at grade level.5
• The overall high  school  graduation  rate 
for  the country  is around 70  percent. 
Some 1.2  million children drop out of 
school during  each  academic  year. 
Dropout  rates among  minorities is 
alarming,  with  Native Americans’ dropout 
rate at  49  percent,  African Americans’  at 
45  percent, and Hispanics’ at  44  percent. 
Of all  individuals incarcerated in  the 
country, 68  percent lack  a  high  school 
education.  No major  city  in  the nation has 
a  graduation rate above 64  percent. 
Detroit,  Los Angeles, and San  Antonio 
have graduation  rates of 38  percent,  44 
percent, and 47 percent, respectively. 6
• Closing  the performance gap between  the 
US and other  developed nations – 
between  minorities and between  similar 
schools – would add $2.31  trillion  to the 
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gross domestic product of the nation. 7 
This would mean  an additional $415 
billion  in  revenue at the national level and 
$138 billion at the state and local level. 8
• Current  unemployment  rates for 
individuals with  less than a  high  school 
education is 16  percent,  nearly  twice the 
national rate.9 Those with  less than  a high 
school education  earn  less than  6  percent 
of the national income and see no 
appreciable increase in  earning  ability  for 
the first  thirty  years of their  working 
lives. 10
• High  school dropouts are more likely  to 
have children  out of wedlock (costing 
$110 billion  annually), higher  health  costs 
(now  nearly  all on  Medicaid), and are far 
more likely to be incarcerated. 11
In  my  research, I found that  those 
jurisdictions with  the highest  educational 
attainment  levels also had,  for  the most  part, 
the lowest  poverty  rates, the lowest crime 
rates,  and the highest  volume of goods and 
services provided by  government. How  does 
this “discovery”  impact  homeland security 
and community resilience, however?  
By  using  a  simple mathematical model, I 
was able to compare jurisdictions of similar 
characteristics. I examined fifty  cities across 
the country  that  had populations of between 
100,000  and 500,000.  I used an  array  of 
demographic  and economic characteristics to 
build the comparisons.  Of the fifty  cities 
examined,  thirteen  had distinctly  lower 
“scores”  than the other  thirty-seven.  I then 
looked for  a  “test  case” and decided to 
include New  Orleans in  my  calculus.  Having 
few  examples of “failed”  governments in 
times of crisis, I compared pre-Katrina  New 
Orleans with  two of the “at risk”  jurisdictions 
that had nearly  identical characteristics. 
When the model  was applied to New  Orleans, 
all  three cities had nearly  identical scores. 
New  Orleans government  and governance 
failed during  that  city’s crisis,  and by 
extrapolation, the other  cities might stumble 
during  crisis as well.  Each of the three cities 
had nearly  identical  low  educational 
achievement levels and high poverty rates. 12
The above is by  no means a  validation  of 
anything other than  numbers being  applied 
in  a crude model. However,  of the fifty  cities 
to which  I applied the model, those with  the 
highest  educational attainment  scored the 
best.  A lot of work needs to be done with  the 
model, but it appears to be a good start.
In  David Guggenheim’s compelling 
documentary,  Waiting for Superman, he 
chronicles the experiences of several families 
from  large cities as they  go through  the 
process of applying for  opportunities to be 
part of lotteries to get  into charter  schools.13 
These relatively  new  educational innovations 
– charter  schools – show  great promise in 
raising  performance levels for  those who 
attend. Unfortunately, school  choice 
p r o g r a m s a c r o s s t h e c o u n t r y  o f f e r 
asymmetrical educational  opportunities. Of 
greatest  concern is the seemingly  irreversible 
decline in  school performance in  our  largest 
cities. As Terry  Moe of Stanford University 
has documented, the gap between minority 
student performance – with  the notable 
exception of Asian-American  students – and 
that  of white students in  large cities is 
continuing to expand. 14
This brief essay  is not intended to argue 
the merits of school choice,  school  reform 
initiatives or  the impact of public unions on 
educational outcomes. My  intent is to call  the 
attention  of my  homeland security  colleagues 
to the idea  that public education  reform  must 
be part of any  serious discussion  about 
national or  homeland security.  A  better-
educated citizenry  will  be less dependent  on 
government  and more independent in  times 
of crisis.  A  better-educated citizenry  will  be 
more attentive to issues and challenges at  the 
state and local level  and more engaged at  the 
national level. A  better-educated citizenry 
will cost  less in  public funding and will 
contribute more to the public  coffers. 
Ultimately, a  better-educated citizenry  will  be 
the guarantor  of security  for  the nation  and 
liberty for the individual.
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How Proverbs Damage Homeland Security
Christopher Bellavita
Proverbs express significant truths about a 
cultural  narrative. 1  They  communicate 
values,  beliefs and knowledge.  John  Dewey 
wrote: “The consequences of a belief upon 
other beliefs and upon  behavior  may  be so 
important … that  [people] are forced to 
consider  the grounds or  reasons of their 
belief and its logical consequences.”2  Dewey 
described the “consideration”  as reflective 
thought, or  what  a  century  later  is called 
critical thinking.
Proverbs helped construct  homeland 
security's narrative during its first decade. 
The ideas they  transmitted reduced 
ambiguity  and gave strategic direction  to the 
new national enterprise.
But  proverbs can  inhibit as much  as 
enhance.  Sometimes the "truth" they  embody 
escapes scrutiny, inhibiting  efforts to allow  a 
narrative to evolve. Herbert  A. Simon  wrote: 
“If it  is a  matter  of rationalizing  behavior  that 
has already  taken  place or  justifying action 
that  has already  been  decided upon, proverbs 
are ideal....  [They] are a  great help in 
persuasion, political debate,  and all forms of 
rhetoric.” 3 
Homeland security’s first  decade was 
characterized by  “ready,  fire,  aim.”  A  great 
deal of work  had to be done in  a  short  period 
of time. Much  was accomplished during that 
decade,  and it  cost a  lot  of money.  By  one 
estimate more than  one trillion  dollars was 
spent  on  homeland-related programs during 
the decade.4 No one knows how  much  of that 
money  went  to ineffective activities because 
the homeland security  enterprise spent more 
effort firing than aiming.  
Homeland security’s second decade can 
productively  focus on  “aiming.”  Academics 
and strategists have an opportunity  to 
critically  examine the basic assumptions 
underpinning  the homeland security 
narrative, and identify  evidence that  supports 
or  refutes foundational  ideas used to guide 
strategic  direction. The purpose of this essay 
is to illustrate such an examination.  
Here are one dozen  proverbs that partially 
outline the homeland security narrative:5
1. Intelligence analysts need to connect 
the dots.
2. They  [the “enemy”] hate us for  our 
freedoms.
3. We fight  them  over  there so we don’t 
have to fight them here.
4. R i s k  i s a  f u n c t i o n  o f t h r e a t , 
vulnerability, and consequence.
5. All disasters are local.
6. All hazards means all hazards.
7. To be prepared get  a  kit, make a  plan, 
and be informed.
8. If you see something, say something.
9. People are likely to panic in a disaster.
10. Those who would give up essential 
liberty  to purchase a  little  temporary 
security  deserve neither  liberty  nor 
security.
11. Terrorists only  have to be lucky  once; 
we have to be lucky all the time.
12. Eight-five percent  of US critical 
infrastructure is owned/controlled/
in-the-hands-of/operated by  [the 
verbs change] the private sector.
I think the proverbs are  wrong  or 
misleading in  important  respects.  As a 
consequence,  they  distort  the homeland 
security  narrative and inhibit  the search  for 
more effective ideas to protect  the nation.  My 
overall  claim  is based on  a mix  of anecdote, 
suggestive evidence,  and hunch. I discuss one 
proverb in  depth  (Eight-five percent of US 
critical infrastructure is owned by the 
private sector) and assert  the others can  also 
benefit from critical analysis.  
The 85  percent figure is probably 
America’s best-known  homeland security 
statistic.  The claim  appears in  the 9/11 
Commission hearings,  the 9/11 Commission 
Report,  the 2002  and the 2007  national 
homeland security  strategies,  and stacks of 
related documents.6  It  is parroted by 
Congress, the DHS, think  tanks, academics, 
trade associations, and other  homeland 
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security  residents.7  Its presence is not 
restricted to our  borders.  The number 
appears also in  Canadian and Czech  Republic 
reports about who owns their  critical 
infrastructure. 8
I will  describe my  efforts over  the past 
decade to understand what  the 85  percent 
claim  means and offer  four  reasons why 
uncritically  accepting  the proverb as truth 
harms homeland security.  I close by 
suggesting  why  the other  proverbs may  also 
be misleading.
WHAT DOES THE NUMBER MEAN?
What  could the 85  percent  number  mean, 
even  in  principle? Is there a  difference that 
matters between “ownership,”  “control,”  “in-
the-hands-of,” or “operated?”  
I can come to terms with  the inability  to 
know  with  certainty  what homeland security 
is.  But what  explains the difficulty  agreeing 
who or what controls critical infrastructure?  
Maybe the quandary  rests in  how  the 
claim  is structured.  Sometimes the number 
refers simply  to all “infrastructure.” 9  Other 
times it’s about “critical” infrastructure. 10
But  putative distinctions may  no longer 
matter.  The initial difference between  critical 
infrastructure and plain  vanilla  infrastructure 
seems to have quietly vanished.  
Critical infrastructure used to mean what 
the USA PATRIOT Act directed it to mean:
Systems and assets, whether physical  or 
virtual, so vital  to the United States 
that the incapacity or destruction of such 
systems  and assets would have a 
debilitating  impact on  security, national 
economic security, national  public health 
or safety, or any combination of those 
matters.11  [My emphasis.]
In  2009,  a  different  definition of critical 
infrastructure appeared in  the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan: 
Systems and assets, whether physical  or 
virtual, so vital  that the incapacity or 
destruction  of such  may  have a  debilitating 
impact on  the security, economy, public 
health  or  safety, environment, or  any 
combination of  these matters, across any 
Federal, State, regional, territorial, 
or local  jurisdiction.12  (My  emphasis 
again.)
The “flea  markets, petting zoos, popcorn 
factories,  hot  dog stands or  other  such 
facilities”  DHS was (unreasonably) criticized 
for  including in a  critical assets database a 
few  years ago may  turn out to be someone’s 
critical infrastructure after all. 13
Compounding  the semantic problem,  how 
could one even estimate, let alone calculate 
with  any  precision, ownership  or  control? 14 
Does one identify  every  individual  provider  of 
goods and services that  could be included in 
the (18, 19, or more)  sectors,15 discover  who 
owns (in  some legal sense) each business, and 
then  determine percentages? Does one 
classify  companies and organizations into the 
sectors first, then  figure out who owns the 
sectors and calculate from  that  premise? Is 
ownership equivalent to control? Does 
ownership or  control imply  government has 
little to no say in security practices?  
A  July  2011  Congressional Research 
Service Report observed, 
Sharing information  with the federal 
g o v e r n m e n t a b o u t v u l n e r a b i l i t y 
assessments, risk assessments, and the 
taking  of additional protective actions is 
meant to be voluntary. However, the degree 
to which  some of the activities are 
mandated varies across sectors. In  some 
cases, sectors are quite regulated.16
The answer  to whether  the distinction 
between  public  or  private control has 
substantive meaning  is “yes, no, and it 
depends.”
But  what  about the 85  percent  proverb? 
How does it harm homeland security?
WHEN PEDANTRY MATTERS
The word “pedantry”  was invented to refer  to 
an  excessive concern with  petty  details. 17 One 
might  say  anguishing  over  85  percent  is 
pedantry.
One author  who writes about  critical 
infrastructure noted,
Whether  this figure is 100 percent accurate 
or  based on  any  in-depth analysis is 
debatable but, regardless, little or no 
infrastructure would function  (critical  or 
otherwise) without the efforts of private 
sector owners and operators.18
A  senior  DHS official  addressed my 
distress more directly  a few  years ago: “It 
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doesn’t matter  whether the 85  percent  is right 
or  not,”  he said. “We’re still  going to do the 
same thing.”
I believe it  does matter.  And by  “it”  I mean 
the persistence of an  idea  that impedes 
considering alternative ideas about how  to 
protect critical infrastructure.
Here are four  reasons why  the proverb’s 
persistence damages homeland security. A 
discussion of each reason follows. 
1. It gives the impression  we know  more 
than  we do when  it comes to critical 
infrastructure. 
2. It creates a  false image about  the 
power  relationships between  the 
public and private sectors. 
3. It distorts normative understanding 
about roles and responsibilities.
4. It constrains discussions about  policy 
options.
THE IMPRESSION OF COMPETENCE 
The philosopher  Harry  Frankfurt writes 
about  the distinction  between  those who tell 
the truth  or  who lie,  and those who bullshit. 
Truth tellers and liars cohere around the 
truth,  either  to communicate it  or  to hide it. 
One who uses bullshit  does not  care about the 
truth or  falsity  of a  claim, but  instead cares 
about  the impression  the claim  makes. 
Bullshit substitutes sincerity for accuracy. 19  
“Maybe we don’t know  the truth about 
critical  infrastructure,”  the reasonable 
homeland security  professional might  argue, 
“but  the claim  is well-meaning; work with  me 
here so we can do good.”
The sincerity  underpinning  the 85  percent 
myth  gives an  impression  that  when  it  comes 
to critical  infrastructure we fundamentally 
know  what  we are talking about.  More 
specifically, quantifying  ownership and 
control  signals someone knows what 
infrastructure is actually  critical, and 
professionals can thus manage what  is vital  to 
the nation’s security and well-being.  
The number’s misguided precision  veils 
what  we do know: there is no “one definite 
prioritized list  of critical assets…”  and “it 
would not  be possible or  useful to develop 
one.” 20 
PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC POWER
The 85  percent  number  conveys an  inference 
about  the power  relationships between the 
public and private sector: since the important 
parts of the nation  are  owned by  the private 
sector, government ought to “ask”  the private 
sector  to help out  with  this messy  security 
business.  The private  sector  can,  of course, 
decline.  
There is another  – less discussed – side to 
the power  assessment. The 85  percent 
benediction  does not automatically  advantage 
the private sector. Some infrastructure 
officials,  nominally  in  the private sector, say 
the 85  percent figure justifies preventing the 
private sector  from  receiving  information, 
grants and other public  funds needed to 
upgrade and secure their facilities.
The dilemma… has been  in encountering an 
obdurate, logic-proof insistence by  cops, 
fire fighters, emergency  managers, fusion 
center  staff, and DHS minions to define my 
employer and all  critical infrastructure 
stewards as private sector  entities… [and 
thus] unworthy of [receiving] sensitive 
information… and inherently  suspect of 
being profit driven….21
I have not found data  describing how  well 
the private sector  embraces its sometimes-
reluctant  partnership in  the homeland 
security  enterprise. 22 I have heard anecdotes 
about  industries that  take seriously  the part 
they  play  in  ensuring the nation’s security.23  I 
also hear  stories about  the predictable cast  of 
characters showing  up at regularly  scheduled 
gatherings arranged to praise  or  encourage 
public-private infrastructure partnerships. 
I have not seen the comprehensive metrics 
across critical sectors a  chief financial officer 
or  board of directors would demand about 
the impact  of those partnerships.   But  the 
same can  be said for  evidence about  the 
public sector’s contribution  to preparedness 
and resilience.24  Maybe when  it  comes to 
infrastructure neither sector  has as much 
power as the other believes.  
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OWNERSHIP IS NOT RELEVANT
It may  be rhetorically  convenient to separate 
public and private sector responsibilities.   But 
assuming  what  has yet  to be demonstrated 
interferes with  determining who has to do 
what to strengthen protection.
One of my  colleagues views the “who owns 
what” argument this way:25
The argument is  bogus: the big stuff, like 
water, power, energy, transportation  is so 
regulated and controlled by the feds, that 
the fact that it  is owned by  someone isn't a 
factor.  If  the feds  decided to harden power 
plants, for example, Congress can do what 
it wants.  Isn't  this  the case already  with 
nukes and the Federal Energy Regulatory 
C o m m i s s i o n ? S a m e t h i n g w i t h 
transportation, energy, etc.
Another  colleague expressed his concern 
about responsibilities:26  
The basic foundation  of our society  – [the] 
infrastructure that is  essential  for public 
safety and well-being – is owned and 
controlled by  state and local government.27 
…. The underlying premise behind having 
much of  this  [infrastructure] under state 
and local  control  is they  are monopolies or 
they are so critical  that from a societal 
aspect you cannot have a  company  that 
runs any  of this infrastructure go [into] 
Chapter 7.
Critical infrastructure is too critical  to be 
left  to the private sector  to protect, he argued. 
Policymakers need to acknowledge the 
partnership between  the invisible hand of 
free enterprise and another hand: 
There is a  second “hidden” [and] “unseen 
hand”  to much of this infrastructure. This is 
the state regulatory agencies. The 
regulatory  construct is  what holds this all 
together and without which  the sectors 
could not function. Food and agriculture, 
water  systems, health systems cannot 
function without the regulatory  agencies 
(mostly state government) functioning.
Trying to determine who owns what is less 
productive than  identifying  contributions 
different sectors make to disparate types of 
security and resiliency:
[Our] state governments should actually be 
our primary  infrastructure partner and 
primary  partner in [societal] security and 
resiliency. The private sector who employs 
most  of the work force and generates a 
huge percentage of GDP  should be our 
primary  partner in economic security and 
economic resiliency. Both  are our partners 
in  disaster  resiliency. Most of  our [critical 
infrastructure] does not produce GNP it 
enables GNP  but does not produce 
anything. Thus from an economic 
standpoint we should focus attention on the 
GNP producers. This is  why separation 
between  enablers and producers is 
counterproductive….  We have also made a 
s t rateg ic mis take in [put t ing] a l l 
infrastructure into the “private sector” 
domain  regarding business models. State 
and local  government business models and 
the business model  of a company on  the 
stock exchange are completely different.
HIDING THE NETWORKS
Thinking  about  ownership and control 
encourages strategists and policymakers to 
consider  critical infrastructure primarily  as a 
collection of “eaches”  – individual  farms, 
water  treatment  plants, monuments, dams, 
power plants,  manufacturers – to be 
protected. But “most critical infrastructure 
spans multiple states.”  Gas and oil pipelines, 
electric  power  grids, telecommunications 
networks,  Internet and computer  networks, 
water  supplies,  food, chemical and industrial 
networks “all cross state boundaries.”28 
The “eaches”  framework  that flows from 
the 85  percent mantra obscures policy 
options premised on  a  network view  of 
infrastructure.  Considering  infrastructure as 
networks draws attention to nodes,  links, 
interdependencies,  scale free structures, 
power  laws,  small  worlds,  self-organized 
criticality,  sand piles,  and related concepts 
that  might inspire innovative approaches to 
protecting infrastructure.29
WHAT ELSE?
Debate about  the 85  percent  number  is 
operationally  trivial.  But questioning  whether 
it  is valid can  remind those of us in  the 
homeland security  enterprise to critically 
examine what we accept  as true.  If we got  the 
85  percent wrong,  yet  it  persists as truth, 
what else have we missed?  
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Revisiting the proverbs introduced at  the 
start  of the essay  suggests possible answers to 
that question.
1. Intelligence analysts may  be expected to 
connect the dots,  but the expectation 
ignores the complexity  of the intelligence 
task.  “[Pleading] for  more dots is to 
mistake the nature of the problem  posed 
by  … terrorism, and … even  recognizing 
the significance of the information  is a 
task that  exceeds the capacity  of a  single 
organization….” 30
2. One may  believe the enemy  hates us for 
our  freedoms,  but  one must  also listen  to 
the argument that  “blaming our  freedoms 
for  Muslim  terror is absurd and 
dangerous.” 31
3. We fight  them  over  there so we don’t  have 
to fight them  here,  but the growing 
concern  about  domestic  radicalization 
suggests this proverb needs to be 
retired.32
4. Risk might be a  function  of threat, 
vulnerability,  and consequence, but in 
homeland security  the nature of,  and data 
sources for, that  function  remain 
illusive. 33
5. All  disasters may  once have been  local, 
but in  homeland security’s second decade, 
one may  need to acknowledge “disasters 
h a v e f a r - r e a c h i n g  c o n s e q u e n c e s 
throughout regions,  states, the nation  and 
even the globe.” 34
6. All  hazards does not  really  mean all 
hazards.  As one of the nation’s respected 
emergency  management  scholars 
explained, “All-hazards  does not literally 
mean  being  prepared for  any  and all 
hazards that might manifest  themselves 
in a  particular  community, state, or 
nation.”  It  does mean  developing  a 
general  plan  that  “can provide the basis 
for  responding  to unexpected events.” 35 
[My emphasis.]
7. Getting  a kit, making a  plan  and staying 
informed may  be one theory  about 
preparedness, but  the advice does not 
appear  to resonate with  the American 
p e o p l e .  O n e s t a t e e m e r g e n c y 
management director suggested, 
We need to reframe expectations. A 
disaster  kit, prepackaged and stored 
away only  to be used in a disaster is not 
practical  for many  Americans. It is 
costly  and takes time, attention, and 
desire to maintain…. We must educate 
the public about the risks they  actually 
face, have an  honest discussion with 
t h e m  a b o u t w h a t t h e y e x p e c t 
government to do, what they  can do 
and, more to the point, what they must 
do. Then  we need to ask how we can 
help them  be better prepared. But not 
through  another  revised seventy-two-
hour preparedness campaign  with  the 
same messages we are promoting 
today.36
8. If you  see something,  say  something, but 
what  gets said, and with  what effect? The 
Metropolitan  Transit  Authority  created 
the trademarked slogan  shortly  after  the 
9/11/01  attacks. It  has since been  leased 
to the Department  of Homeland Security. 
Is this proverb an  effective way  to engage 
citizens in  homeland security,  is it 
eyewash, or  is it  pernicious?37  One 
security  expert  cautioned,  "if you  ask 
amateurs to act  as front-line security 
personnel, you  shouldn't  be surprised 
when  you  get amateur security. People 
don't  need to be reminded to call the 
police; the slogan is nothing  more than  an 
invitation to report  people who are 
different.” 38 
9. The idea  that people are likely  to panic in 
a  disaster  persists in  the face of 
convincing evidence to the contrary.  As 
one example,  a  study  of over  500 disaster 
events concluded: “panic was of very  little 
practical or operational importance.” 39
10. People  who agree with  Benjamin 
Franklin’s 1775  homily  that  “Those who 
would give  up essential liberty  to 
purchase a  little temporary  security 
deserve neither  liberty  nor security,”  may 
ignore the suggestion  raised by  Philip 
Bobbitt that in The Wars  for the Twenty-
First Century  “it  is possible  to increase 
the powers of government  and, at the 
same time,  increase the rights of the 
people.” 40
11. The belief “Terrorists only  have to be 
lucky  once; we have to be lucky  all the 
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time”  originated in  a  terrorist message 
issued after  the 1984  Brighton bombing.41 
US policymakers adapted the language 
and turned it into a  strategic  proverb.42 
One American  WMD expert countered 
that  claim  by  noting terrorists planning  a 
complex operation  have to worry  about 
many  pieces coming  together.  “They  have 
to be right  all the time,”  he said.  “We only 
have to be right once to stop them.”43
WHAT IS YOUR CLAIM AND WHY 
SHOULD ANYONE BELIEVE IT?
The proverbs discussed in this essay  may  turn 
out eventually  to be approximately  right  or 
substantially  wrong. As Herbert  Simon  wrote 
about a different set of proverbs: 
It is not that the propositions expressed by 
the proverbs are insufficient; it  is rather 
that they  prove too much…. For almost 
every  principle one can  find an equally 
plausible and contradictory  principle…and 
there is  nothing…to indicate which  is the 
proper one to apply.44
A  2011  study  described homeland security 
as an  “anemic  policy  regime,”  whose 
purposes are “poorly  understood and not 
widely  shared among  different elements of 
the federal  government  or  at  subnational 
levels.”  It  is characterized by  “the weakness of 
the integrative ideas of ‘homeland security’ 
and ‘all  hazards’ preparedness,  the lack  of a 
strong constituency  for  the regime,  and the 
institutional  misalignment  among  relevant 
subsystems.” 45
That critique does not flatter the 
organizations and people who shaped the 
homeland security  enterprise. But  the study’s 
conclusions are based on evidence not 
slogans. One can  agree or  disagree with  the 
authors ’ assumptions, analysis ,  and 
conclusions, but  one does not have to guess 
how those conclusions were derived.
Homeland security’s second decade ought 
to evolve toward a narrative foundation 
constructed by  something  more substantial 
than  proof by  repeated assertion.  One should 
ask for evidence.
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The Post-Tragedy ‘Opportunity-bubble’ and the Prospect of 
Citizen Engagement
Fathali M. Moghaddam and James N. Breckenridge
“The evil that men do lives after them.” 
William Shakespeare
The September  11  2001  terrorist  attacks are 
an  example of evil that  has lived on,  echoed 
in  atrocious acts of violence against  ordinary 
people around the globe over  the last  ten 
years,  most  recently, in  Oslo. Most  Americans 
remember  9/11  as an  exceptional  event, a 
contemporary  equivalent  to the Japanese 
attack  on  Pearl Harbor. From  a  psychological 
perspective, however,  many  aspects of the 
public’s response to 9/11  followed a  pattern 
quite  familiar  to students of group dynamics 
and inter-group relations,  a  pattern  that 
warrants the close attention of leaders at all 
levels because it  reveals an  opportunity-
bubble – a  promising,  yet f leeting, 
opportunity  to shape the course of 
subsequent  events.  In  order  for  leaders to 
take advantage of this opportunity-bubble in 
a  timely  and effective manner, they  must  first 
understand it. By  studying the group and 
intergroup dynamics that  follow  tragedies, 
leaders can  lead in  such  a  way  as to ensure 
the opportunity-bubble leads to constructive 
rather than destructive outcomes.
One of the most  robust  and pervasive 
trends in  social behavior  is the  relationship 
between  perceived in-group threat  and group 
cohesion. 1  Both  experimental evidence and 
historical case studies demonstrate this 
relationship:2  when  individuals perceive a 
serious threat  to the in-group (such as from 
an  enemy  attack or  natural  disaster), they 
show  greater solidarity  with  other  group 
members and increase their  support  for  the 
group leader. “Showing greater  solidarity” 
can  mean making enormous sacrifices in 
order  to support the in-group,  and standing 
firmly  behind the leader  even when mistakes 
are seen  to be made in leadership decision 
making. It  can  also mean demonstrating 
extraordinary  resilience in  the face of 
pressures and difficulties.  Thus,  examples of 
the kind of “Dunkirk spirit”  the British  public 
displayed during  the London  Blitz bombings 
in  World War  II often  occur during  wars, 
crises, and disasters.  
Judging  correctly  when  and how  to make 
constructive use of the opportunity-bubble 
after  a tragedy  is a  hallmark  of great 
leadership.  Enormous potential  for  civic 
generosity  and sacrifice is available at  the 
height  of an  opportunity-bubble,  but  leaders 
must  choose the kinds of sacrifices and the 
timing of calls to action carefully.  Timing  is of 
the greatest  importance: too early, and 
people – still  reeling  from  the impact  of the 
tragedy  – may  be unable to respond; too late, 
and people may  have grown too detached 
from  the tragedy  and accustomed to non-
commitment; even  later, people (and the 
media) may  focus critically  – and perhaps 
angrily  – on leadership’s failure to have asked 
for more. 
We argue that although  great  crisis will 
inevitably  invite consideration  of many 
alternatives, leadership must  pay  special 
attention  to opportunities to engage the 
public as capable partners  in  their  country’s 
response to the crisis – calling upon them  as 
citizens with  civic duties, as well  as rights. 
Such  opportunities will often entail 
significant sacrifice,  which we believe will 
generally  be accepted if the public’s role is 
clearly  explained and accompanied by  ample 
means to readily  acquire information  about 
t h e c r i s i s ,  f u t u r e t h r e a t s , a n d t h e 
government’s response.
Undoubtedly,  in  the immediate aftermath 
of 9/11  Americans were ready  and willing  to 
make personal and collective sacrifices. Over 
the first three weeks following the attacks, the 
rate of volunteerism  increased more than  six 
s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n s a b o v e a v e r a g e 
throughout the nation. 3  Within  only  three 
months, charitable donations for  9/11  victims 
and their  families exceeded $1.5  billion. 4 An 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 7, THE 9/11 ESSAYS (SEPTEMBER 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
extraordinary,  albeit brief,  increase in  social 
capital signaled the publics’ readiness for 
civic contribution. Public  trust and 
confidence in  government  reached a  thirty-
year  peak in  the first few  weeks following  the 
attacks.5  Support for  leadership was 
extraordinarily  high  and widespread. Even 
p r e s t i g i o u s ,  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  s k e p t i c a l 
newspapers – for  example, The New  York 
Times  and the Washington Post – were 
uncritically  supportive of leadership 
dec is ions a f ter  9/11 , inc luding  the 
momentous decisions to wage wars in  Iraq 
and Afghanistan,  according to retrospect 
scholarly  analysis. 6  Yet,  in as little as six 
months, the large majority  of Americans who 
in early  post-9/11  surveys had reported 
increased trust  in  government and had 
sought  greater  opportunities for  political and 
social engagement simply  vanished. 7  The 
opportunity-bubble had begun to burst.
This is not  to say  that  leadership had not 
called for  civic contributions. In  his first  State 
of the Union  Address after  9/11,  for  example, 
President  Bush  called on Americans, as a 
“responsible nation,” to commit “at  least  two 
years – 4,000  hours over the rest of your 
lifetime – to the service of your  neighbors 
and your nation”  and invited Americans to 
join the newly  created USA  Freedom  Corps, 
which  would “focus on three areas of need: 
responding  in case of crisis at home; 
rebuilding  our  communities; and extending 
American  compassion throughout  the 
world.” 8 Nevertheless, in  the years to follow, 
aside from  military  enlistment,  opportunities 
for  civic  engagement  associated directly  with 
the threat  of terror  seemed largely  confined 
to calls for  increased citizen  vigilance. 
Interviewed on  the eve of the Iraq War  troop 
surge, 9 President  Bush was asked why,  given 
the importance he often  stressed the war  on 
terror  represented for  the country’s future,  as 
well  as the disproportionate share the 
volunteer  military  and their  families had 
sacrificed relative to the rest  of the country, 
the president  had not  “asked more Americans 
and more American interests to sacrifice 
something,”  in  particular, sacrifices that 
would “muster  the support”  and would 
involve Americans “in  the struggle.” In 
response,  President Bush  referred to his 
earlier  call for  volunteerism  and his decision 
to establish  the Freedom  Corps and asserted 
that  he had strongly  opposed what  were 
apparently  the primary  potential  forms of 
sacrifice considered after  9/11: compulsory 
military service and tax increases.
American  history,  however,  provides many 
examples of quite effective alternatives to 
calls for  compulsory  public sacrifice. The 
decision  to meet  the enormous requirements 
of the World War  II war effort  by 
supplementing  taxes with  a  campaign  calling 
upon  citizens in  all income categories to 
make voluntary  contributions through  War 
Bonds is particularly  instructive.  The War 
Bond campaign was carefully  crafted to 
create an  emotionally  compelling sense of 
civic  duty  and public  partnership in  the war 
effort.  During  an  all-day  fundraising  radio 
broadcast  in 1943,  for  instance,  the popular 
singer and celebrity  Kate Smith  explained to 
her  fellow  citizens: “when  we buy  War  Bonds, 
we’re not  buying  tanks and guns and shells 
and planes. What  we’re doing  is buying our 
boys back … bringing them  home to us, safe 
and sound once again.” 10  The call for 
voluntary  contributions through  War  Bond 
commitments generated $98.3  billion  by 
1945, representing  almost  half the then  Gross 
National Product.11
Our  own  data, utilizing a  nationally 
representative probability  sample of several 
thousand American  adults surveyed in  late 
2008, underscores the public's sustained 
desire for  and disappointment  in  the lack  of 
opportunities they  believed government 
offered to serve a  meaningful  role in the 
country's response to terrorism.12 Seven  years 
after  9/11, only  37  percent  of Americans 
adults reported that they  had ever  made 
sacrifices on behalf of the “war  on  terror.” 
While  Americans continued to engage in 
voluntary,  unpaid civic services (32  percent), 
only  a  few  (6  percent) reported participating 
in  volunteer activities directly  associated with 
crisis or  disaster  preparedness. A  slim 
majority  (52  percent) nevertheless indicated 
a  desire for  volunteer opportunities designed 
to prepare for  and respond to disasters or 
acts of terrorism.  Moreover,  nearly  two thirds 
of survey  respondents felt  that government 
had failed to provide or  clearly  explain  ways 
for average citizens to play  a  role or 
participate in  their  country’s defense against 
terrorism. Most  respondents (66  percent) 
indicated that government  had failed to 
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clearly  explain  citizens’ role in  the country’s 
fight  against  terrorism  and even more (74 
percent) that government  had failed to 
adequately  explain  how  to prepare for  acts of 
terror.
PREPARING FOR THE NEXT 
‘OPPORTUNITY-BUBBLE’
Although  social scientists have often  helped 
government  craft patriotically  appealing  and 
persuasive calls for  civic action during 
national crises in  patriotically  appealing and 
persuasive ways,  we do not  suggest  that  the 
results are inevitably  effective or  desirable. 
Political scientists contributed to the 
successful  WWII war  bond campaign.  In 
contrast,  similar  efforts by  the Federal Civil 
D e f e n s e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d t h e 
Psychological  Strategy  Board,  designed to 
engage the public in  the Cold War  civil 
defense movement, ultimately  backfired. 
Public  outrage and distrust  increased as the 
public's growing  appreciation  of the 
catastrophic  destructive capacity  of nuclear 
weapons emphatically  contradicted the threat 
minimization  and implied survivability 
underlying civil defense propaganda. 13 
Our  main  goal in  this brief discussion  is to 
call  attention  to the opportunities and 
challenges ahead. Tragedies will happen, 
even  with the best  planning.  But  leadership 
can  take advantage of opportunity-bubbles to 
ensure that  citizens are effectively  engaged in 
constructive activities in  post-tragedy  eras. 
Thus, our  message is that it  is not enough  to 
plan  ahead to avert  tragedies; it is also 
essential to plan  ahead to take advantage of 
opportunity-bubbles when tragedies do come 
about.
The present  climate of suspicion  that 
p e r v a d e s p u b l i c a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d s 
g o v e r n m e n t  m i g h t w e l l u n d e r m i n e 
enthusiasm  for  such  planning,  as well  as 
confidence in  prospects for  capitalizing  on 
opportunities. Indeed, distrust  has long 
characterized public  attitudes towards 
government. Throughout the decade 
following  World War  II,  four  out  of five 
Americans reliably  claimed broad trust  and 
confidence in their  government; by  the 
millennium,  only  two in  five Americans made 
similar  claims. 14 With  respect  to government 
institutions charged specifically  with 
homeland security  or  crisis management  and 
preparedness missions,  our  own  data  reveals 
a  parallel and troubling  lack of public trust 
and confidence.  Over  the years 2006  and 
2007, for  example, we observed that  between 
20 and 30 percent  of the public claimed 
“absolutely  no confidence”  in  the Department 
of Homeland Security  (DHS). By  December 
2008  an  even  greater  proportion  (30-46 
percent)  did not  trust DHS would be “open 
and honest with  the public,”  “provide what 
was needed when it  was needed,”  or  “do the 
right  thing”  in  the aftermath of a  terrorist 
attack  or  other  crisis – levels of distrust 
exceeded only  by  the public’s appraisals of 
FEMA.  To make matters worse,  popular 
literature has suggested that government has 
and will cynically  exploit  the publics' 
vulnerability  and suffering  inflicted by  the 
"shock" of disasters and other  crisis to enact 
highly unpopular political policies.15
On  the surface, these trends seem 
disheartening for  leadership,  because they 
seem  to suggest that citizens will not  be 
influenced by  leadership communications. 
However,  to understand why  this is not the 
case,  it is useful to remind ourselves of typical 
behavioral trends in  post-tragedy  situations. 
The vitally  important feature of opportunity-
bubbles is that, for  a  fleeting  period,  citizens 
cast aside their  doubts,  criticisms, distrust, 
and negative attitudes, and become ready  to 
sacrifice for  the group and strongly  support 
leadership.  Thus, although  the level  of public 
trust  in  authorities is generally  low  at 
present, we can  predict with  high  certainty 
that  there will be a  widespread readiness 
among  the public to make sacrifices for 
society during the next opportunity-bubble.
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The Last Days of Summer
James J. Wirtz
Thinking  about  the  recent history  and future 
course  of homeland security  will be forever 
tied to a series of events that transpired on  a 
beautiful  Tuesday  morning  in  September 
2001. The attacks on  the United States that 
day  had a  profound effect  on  everyone – 
witness the outpouring of emotion  on  the 
part of the “9/11  generation”  following the 
good news from  Abbottabad. But  those who 
grew  up in  the shadow  of 9/11  will never 
really  know  what  changed that  day. Events 
might  suggest  to them  that people were 
complacent or  careless during  the last  days of 
that  summer.  They  also might  be forgiven  for 
thinking that  people will  again  become 
complacent. After  all, al-Qaeda  is on  the 
ropes and Osama  Bin  Laden  has gone to a 
watery  grave.  Why  should we continue to care 
about  homeland security? But this would be 
an  incorrect  perception  of what  transpired 
during  the last days of that fateful summer; it 
is also wrong  to use that  perception as a 
guide to the future of homeland security. So 
what  about  America and Americans changed 
on  9/11  and what do these changes hold for 
the future?
A GROWING SENSE OF UNEASE
Looking  back  on  the months leading  up to 
9/11,  it  is clear that  the intelligence and law 
enforcement  systems were indeed “blinking 
red.”  Al-Qaeda was on the move and the 
United States was failing  to take effective 
action  to derail  the  terrorist  network. 
Scholars have documented that a  general 
feeling  of unease had spread across 
Washington  that  summer  as various 
government  agencies struggled to assess and 
respond to the emerg ing threat  o f 
transnational terrorism  undertaken  by  non-
state actors. 1  The US government was 
attempting  to head off al-Qaeda  before the 
network could act  on  their  nefarious 
intentions.  Ultimately,  the government  would 
lose that race. 
The academic community  also was aware 
of the emerging  threat  posed by  transnational 
terrorist  networks populated by  non-state 
actors.  Although  I never  considered myself an 
expert  on  terrorism, by  9/11  my  own  work 
covered several topics that  were eerily 
prescient.  I had edited a volume in  which  one 
of the authors described the strategic 
significance and fundamental techniques 
behind the tradecraft  used in 1993  by  the 
terrorists who bombed the World Trade 
Center. 2  The operatives involved in  the 
September  11  attacks also used the same 
tradecraft  by  “hiding in plain  sight”  to 
prevent detection by  intelligence and law 
enforcement  officials. In  the summer of 2001, 
the US Air  Force Institute of National 
Security  Studies also published an  edited 
volume in  which  I suggested that  as the US 
military  bolstered personnel and base 
security  in  the Middle East,  terrorists might 
seek “softer”  domestic targets within  the 
United States.3 Neither  of these articles came 
close to predicting actual events,  but  they  do 
demonstrate that  scholars were turning  their 
attention  to the threat posed by  transnational 
terrorism.
Two personal experiences in  the summer 
of 2001  also stand out  in my  mind. The first 
was a  dinner  conversation I had with  two US 
Customs officers.  The officials had just 
identified and detained a  gentleman from 
Central  Europe who had attempted to use a 
badly  forged Italian  passport  to enter  the 
United States.  The motivations behind the 
forgery  were not  particularly  threatening,  but 
I do remember expounding  at  length  with the 
officials about how  border  security  was 
becoming  the front line of American defense. 
I recognized that it  was imperative to stop 
terrorists from  entering  the country  before 
they  could disappear  into various ethnic 
communities or  the anonymity  of one of our 
great  cities. The customs officers did not 
disagree with  my  position, but  they  also gave 
me the impression  they  thought  I was 
exaggerating  the significance of what  was to 
them a rather mundane action.
The second incident  was a  debate that 
emerged during a conference sponsored by 
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the Defense Threat Reduction  Agency  in 
Norfolk, Virginia. The debate concerned the 
likelihood that the United States would suffer 
a  mass casualty  terrorist  attack. One of the 
speakers suggested that  such an  event  was 
unlikely  because terrorists lacked the 
organizational  and technical skills needed to 
orchestrate  the use of chemical or  biological 
devices to obtain  maximum  lethality.  The 
1996  Aum  Shinrikyo Sarin  attacks on  the 
Tokyo subway  were used to illustrate this 
point.  Despite the fact that the Aum  cult 
possessed significant  resources and much 
technical  expertise, their  effort  to disperse 
Sarin was rudimentary  at  best.  The other 
speaker  did not dispute this assessment of 
Aum’s prowess when  it  came to weaponizing 
Sarin,  but  instead made a  point  well  known 
to social scientists: just because something 
has not  yet  occurred does not guarantee that 
it  will  not  happen  in  the future.  Within a few 
days,  this argument would be settled, but  not 
in a way that the conferees had anticipated.
During  the final  days of that  summer, 
scholars and officials alike were concerned 
about  transnational  terrorism  undertaken by 
shadowy  groups. “Non-state actor”  was a 
f a s h i o n a b l e w a y  t o d e s c r i b e n o n -
governmental organizations that were bent 
on launching  destructive  or  disruptive 
activities. Officials and scholars also knew 
t h a t  b y  b re a ki n g  d o w n b a rr i e rs t o 
t ransportat ion  and communicat ion , 
globalization  and the information revolution 
were making  international  borders highly 
porous.  For  the most part, the availability  of 
these new  conveniences was viewed as a 
positive  development.  For instance,  I 
remember  a trip I made to London  in  July 
2001. I had purchased the plane tickets and 
made the hotel  reservations entirely  online.  I 
also abandoned travelers checks for  the 
airport  automated-teller  machine, which,  I 
was reassured, would allow  me to deduct 
British  pounds directly  from  my  American 
bank account. It was hard to perceive the 
dark side of this new  freedom  as one 
experienced it  for  the first  time. In hindsight, 
it  is easy  to see how  al-Qaeda was able to 
“r ide the ra i ls”  o f the information 
superhighway,  but this mixed metaphor  itself 
conveys how  difficult it  was to envision  how 
terrorists could harness new  technologies to 
create mayhem.
Although  some of them  were quite novel, 
all  of the pieces of the puzzle were available. 
There was a  growing  recognition  that 
globalization  and the information revolution 
were transforming  the security  landscape.  We 
just lacked a  framework to make sense of it 
all.  
THE NEW AGE
As I watched the World Trade Center 
collapse, I was struck by  the audacity  of the 
terrorists and what  I can  best describe as 
hubris, our  hubris.  We had underestimated 
our  opponents and they  had succeeded in 
striking  us in  a  significant way. Theoretical 
concepts such as asymmetric  attack,  porous 
borders, and “hiding in plain  sight”  took on  a 
harsh  reality  as it  became clear  that we had 
lacked a sense of urgency  during the summer 
of 2001. We were living on  borrowed time 
and time had run out.  It  was almost  as if 
Americans were banking on the fact  that  our 
opponents would not have the nerve to attack 
our homeland. Al-Qaeda had plenty of nerve.
It also was immediately  clear  that our 
thinking  about emerging  terrorism  was 
biased towards either  well-understood 
threats (bombing,  shooting,  hostage taking) 
or  more exotic  activities (chemical and 
biological  weapons),  not the real problem  at 
hand. Our  reality  was worse than  our 
imaginations.  Al-Qaeda  was willing to use 
locally  available materials to create death  and 
destruction. They  had identified the high-
e n e r g y  s y s t e m s t h a t  s e r v e d a s t h e 
infrastructure of modern  society  as means to 
attack  the United States.  Instead of chemical 
weapons, for  instance, chemical plants now 
appeared to be a  likely  terrorist  target 
because they  provided access to highly  toxic 
compounds within  urban  areas. Instead of 
using  time and resources to develop their 
own  weapons, Al-Qaeda  recognized that it 
could weaponize our  industrial and 
transportation  infrastructure to attack  us. 
The fact that this infrastructure was not 
entirely  designed to resist  unauthorized or 
unintended uses created a  critical problem 
for  the US. Vulnerabilities had to be 
identified and countermeasures had to be 
adopted before these weaknesses could be 
exploited in another devastating attack.
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I realized from  my  previous work  on the 
topic of intelligence failure that it  quickly 
would become apparent that  scores of 
“signals”  – accurate and timely  pieces of 
information  concerning  what  was about  to 
unfold – were contained within the files and 
systems the intelligence and law  enforcement 
communities maintained. Needless to say, 
officials and analysts had failed to exploit 
fully  the materials that were contained within 
this “intelligence pipeline.”  As would become 
apparent  in  the following  weeks, however, the 
intelligence problem  posed by  transnational 
terrorism  was daunting  because it  crossed 
scores of organizational and jurisdictional 
boundaries.  Information uncovered by  the 
Central Intelligence Agency, for  instance, 
might  have to find its way  to a  local law 
enforcement  agency  to be put  to good use, 
but there was no existing  method to move 
this data  in an operationally  relevant 
timeframe.  And if the information  was highly 
classified,  there was no real way  to move the 
information  at  all.  Local  law  enforcement 
officials lacked the required security 
clearances or  facilities to receive or  store 
classified reports. Additionally,  local law 
enforcement  agencies were now  on  the front 
lines.  Information  collected during a  traffic 
stop,  for  example,  might  be critical to an 
ongoing  analysis by  the Federal  Bureau  of 
Investigation or  Customs officials.  But  there 
was no way  for  local officials to communicate 
information  in  an  operationally  relevant 
timeframe to federal agencies that  focused on 
international threats. Al-Qaeda  was hiding 
within the operational and jurisdictional 
seams that existed between  the US military, 
the intelligence community,  and law 
enforcement  agencies.  The fact that our 
opponents were exploiting these seams 
created a  critical vulnerability  that  had to be 
quickly eliminated. 
9/11  did not “change everything,”  but it 
demonstrated that the threat  posed by 
transnational  terrorism  was real  and 
immediate. Our  opponents had chosen  to 
attack  us; they  had chosen war. The idea  that 
we could respond in  a leisurely  way  to the 
emerging threat,  that  we were somehow 
ahead of the terrorists,  was gone forever.  We 
could not  count  on  controlling  the pace of 
events. It also quickly  became evident that  al-
Qaeda had chosen  to exploit  vulnerabilities 
embedded in the very  infrastructure of 
modern l i fe . Potential threats were 
intermingled within our  cities because scores 
of high energy  or  potentially  toxic systems 
permeated our  infrastructure. Weapons 
suitable for mass destruction  or  mass effect 
were already  in  place within  the United 
States. What the terrorists needed was an 
innovative or  cunning  plan to gain access to 
them. Our  defenses were poorly  configured 
because they  reflected a  sharp distinction 
between foreign  threats, which were 
primarily  the responsibility  of the military 
and intelligence community, and domestic 
threats,  which  were the purview  of law 
enforcement  agencies . There was a 
distinction  between  the “front  lines”  and “the 
rear”  when it came to our thinking  about 
threats. That  distinction no longer  seemed 
appropriate, but  just  about every  resource, 
organization, and concept  we possessed 
reflected distinctions between  foreign  and 
domestic security  as well  as military  or 
intelligence activity  and law  enforcement. 
Overcoming  these weaknesses, which  were 
exploited by  al-Qaeda on  9/11,  animated our 
activities during  the first  homeland security 
decade.
THE FUTURE OF HOMELAND SECURITY
There have been  several important 
developments since that fateful summer. We 
now  recognize the importance of intra-
governmental relations in  defeating the 
terrorism  threat  and the need to share 
information, resources, and best  practices 
across federal,  state,  local  and tribal 
jurisdictions and agencies.  We now 
understand the importance of collaboration 
and cooperation  among  law  enforcement, 
fire,  emergency  medical services,  public 
health,  and intelligence officials to generate 
the situational awareness and capabilities 
needed to combat  the terrorism  threat. We 
also recognize that  we have to work to bridge 
the boundaries between jurisdictions and 
agencies to prevent our  opponents from 
operating within the seams of our defenses.
Today, homeland security  programs and 
policies are less animated by  a  crisis 
atmosphere and instead reflect  the notion 
that  emerging  best practices have to be 
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embedded within a  wider  range of 
intelligence,  law  enforcement,  and other 
public service  programs. In  a  domestic 
setting,  the activities of most  public officials 
and agencies are directed at meeting  myriad 
demands for support  and services that have 
little to do with  transnational terrorism. 
Programs that are intended to respond to the 
ongoing  threat of terrorism  have to help 
bolster  capabilities when it  comes to the “all-
source threat”  focus of the vast  majority  of 
law  enforcement, fire,  public  health, and 
emergency  medical service agencies across 
the country. Instead of remaining  an 
“extraordinary”  activity,  homeland security  in 
the United States is becoming  part of 
everyday  life because it  is slowly  but surely 
improving  the ability  of federal, state, local 
and tribal agencies to prevent  and respond 
more quickly  and effectively  to all  sorts of 
threats and incidents.
For  theoretical, practical, and operational 
reasons,  incorporating  an  “all-threat” 
approach  to homeland security  is a  positive 
development. From  a  theoretical perspective, 
it  is difficult to anticipate the exact  nature 
and best response to future threats.  It  is 
better  to foster  broad situational  awareness 
across a  variety  of jurisdictions and 
disciplines (e.g., border  patrol, public health, 
or  the chemical industry), to look for 
unanticipated developments or  new  patterns 
of potentially  disruptive activity.  From  a 
practical perspective,  it  is simply  not 
politically  possible to devote large portions of 
scarce public funds to respond to a mercifully 
rare type of event  (i.e., a  mass casualty 
terrorism  attack), while communities suffer 
from  a long  list of mundane problems. 
Homeland security  initiatives that  help 
communities respond to local problems will 
enjoy  greater  political  support than  activities 
that  seem  to deal with  rarified issues of little 
immediate significance. From  an operational 
perspective, an  “all  threat”  approach  can  help 
improve communication  across disciplines, 
agencies, and levels of government  because it 
fosters better  interaction  in dealing  with 
everyday  events.  By  making  data fusion  and 
operational  cooperation  a  matter  of routine, 
“all-threat”  collaboration can serve as the 
basis for prompt  detection  and defense 
against a potential terrorist incident. 
There is also evidence that  our  overall 
situational  awareness and response protocols 
continue to improve. The quick and effective 
action taken  by  local bystanders and patrol 
officers during the 2010  Time Square 
bombing incident suggests that average 
Americans feel  empowered to respond to 
suspicious situations and that  police and fire 
departments possess appropriate procedures 
once suspicious activity  is reported.  The car 
bomb in Times Square failed to detonate,  but 
if it had,  quick  action  by  the New  York  City 
police and fire departments would have 
helped to limit casualties from a bomb blast.
Because the attitudes of Americans have 
changed, efforts to improve homeland 
security  are now  embedded in  a  general way 
in  public  policy  and our  attitude towards 
national security. Ten  years after  9/11, the 
c r i s i s a t m o s p h e r e h a s f a d e d ,  b u t 
organizations and agencies everywhere 
recognize the imperative to strengthen 
homeland security  and to include homeland 
security  “best practices”  across a  range of 
public service activities and agencies.  The 
emergence of homeland security  as a 
“process”  is a phenomena  that  will gain 
strength  in the years ahead. This process has 
already  stopped several  significant  terrorist 
plots before they  could unfold.  It  also has 
made the United States a  far  less hospitable 
place for clandestine terrorist networks.  
CONCLUSION
Before 9/11  it  might have been possible to 
write this essay, but I doubt that it  would 
have been  published. The threats described 
would have appeared implausible.  Reviewers 
might  have granted me the fact  that 
launching  a  mass casualty  terrorist  attack 
using  materials at hand was possible,  but 
such  an  act would have appeared to lack 
strategic justification. I also doubt  that 
manuscript reviewers would have been 
willing to grant  that our opponents possessed 
the motivation  or  operational  skill to pull off 
this type of operation, or  could easily  slip 
through  our  security  measures.  In other 
words,  one could have posited a  perfect  storm 
attack,  (e.g., terrorists armed only  with  box 
cutters succeed in  destroying  the World 
Trade Center  in a  few  hours),  but it  would 
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have been  dismissed as either  alarmist  or 
foolhardy.
The fact  that we now  believe that  we could 
(again)  be the victim  of a  mass casualty 
terrorist  attack  and that it  is a  mistake to 
u n d e r e s t i m a t e t h e i n g e n u i t y  a n d 
determination  of our  opponents marks the 
most important  way  Americans have changed 
in  the aftermath  of the September  11  attacks. 
This is the greatest lesson we learned on  that 
last day  of that  summer. We no longer are 
living  on  borrowed time, we are working to 
recognize and overcome our weaknesses. 
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